Scale and differentiation in services : using information technologies to manage customer experiences at Harrah's Entertainment and other companies by Mansharamani, Vikram, 1974-

Scale and Differentiation in Services: 
Using Information Technologies to Manage Customer Experiences at Harrah’s 
Entertainment and Other Companies 
 
by 
 
Vikram Mansharamani 
 
 
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management on January 11, 2007 in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is focused on the topic of service innovation and explores economies of 
scale and strategic differentiation in services via an inductive field-based case study of the 
world’s largest casino gaming company, Harrah’s Entertainment.  It includes comparisons to 
services firms in other industries such as distribution/logistics (UPS) and for-profit/online 
education (Apollo Group/University of Phoenix).  The findings suggest that scale and 
differentiation (considered by many to be mutually exclusive in services) can be combined 
through the strategic use of information technology in a manner that increases customer 
switching costs, resulting in improved profitability and returns.  The limitations of 
standardization-only scale-oriented strategies are discussed, and the dissertation concludes with a 
description of the three key components needed by any firm seeking to employ a strategy of 
scalable service differentiation: (1) a loyalty program, or other means of linking specific 
transaction data with specific customers, (2) an analytic engine that determines the 
ranking/prioritization of customers and the criteria upon which to differentiate services, and (3) a 
set of information technology tools that automate consistent differentiated service delivery across 
a company’s touch-points with its customers. 
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Preface 
 
Over the course of ten years as an investment professional focused on service companies, 
I was struck by the seemingly inevitable tendency of service companies to focus eventually on 
standardizing their service.  Across the dozens of companies with which I worked, the rationale 
for this pursuit was remarkably similar: by standardizing a service offering, the company might 
be able to achieve the holy grail of operating performance – namely, economies of scale.  For 
better or worse, many pure professional service companies found themselves trapped in a simple 
“employees” times “rate” times “utilization” framework of determining financial performance.  
Many sought to escape this constraint by creating more “standardized” or “product-like” 
offerings that could scale and produce profit margins that would expand with volume.   
One company with which I had the privilege of working as a member of its Board of 
Directors was The Taylor Group1, a New Hampshire based systems integrator that focused 
virtually exclusively on the Great Plains enterprise resource software market for small and 
medium enterprises.  After many years of struggling against the service growth constraint I 
described above, the company eventually resorted to developing in-house software (known as the 
“Integration Manager”) that would enable its consultants to perform their tasks with greater 
speed – which, in the context of fixed price contracts, enabled the company to achieve the 
elusive scale economies it had so desperately sought.   
Over time, however, the company found that even greater scale economies could be 
developed by offering the software for sale independent of the consulting services that had 
traditionally accompanied the Integration Manager tool.  Thus, the desire for increasing returns 
to effort (i.e. economies of scale) led the Taylor Group and its chief executive Dan Taylor 
                                                 
1 The company was later renamed ManagedOps.com, Inc. during the heyday of the Internet bubble. 
towards a business model transformation that focused on the development of standard service 
offerings that became so standard that they were eventually productized.  Upon my arrival at 
MIT, I soon found that many service companies in a host of industries were using similar tactics 
(i.e. “productizing”) in their quest to become more efficient and achieve scale economies.  Two 
of these companies which I investigated – United Parcel Service and the Apollo Group – are 
profiled later in this dissertation. 
In a very symmetrical manner, I also found that the companies most interested in 
developing service were those companies that found themselves in an environment of rapidly 
commoditizing offerings.  Michael Cusumano’s exhaustive work on the software industry 
(Cusumano, 2004) provides ample evidence of a phenomenon in which software companies 
began to add services in a quest to differentiate their products.  Despite having excellent 
incremental profitability margins (after all, how much extra does it cost to produce the 
1,054,761st copy of software?), software companies eventually found that products were subject 
to massive volatility of demand.  Cusumano notes that one software company saw the price of its 
software drop from $1.2 million per license to less than $250,000 per license in less than 2 years.  
In a quest to overcome such capricious demand environments and the commoditization of key 
functionality embedded in software products, many software companies sought to add 
integration and other services as part of an effort to differentiate their offerings from those of 
their competitors.  Services, they found, were a means through which to both differentiate and 
develop greater insight into the customer, his needs, etc. 
 Thus, I found that product companies wanted to be service companies – while service 
companies wanted to be product companies.  Many emerged as hybrid companies offering both 
products and services, but one fundamental fact remained: services that differentiated were not 
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scalable, and standardization that enabled scale economies was not differentiable.  Anecdotal and 
empirical evidence, it seemed, suggested a direct trade-off between differentiation and 
standardization-driven efficiency.  Academic research seemed to support this evidence: Harvard 
Business School Professor Michael Porter had suggested that cost leadership strategies (similar, 
although not identical to economies of scale) and differentiation strategies were usually2 
inconsistent (Porter, 1985).  But is this actually the case?  Can firms deliver differentiated service 
via scalable business models?   
 This dissertation is an attempt to address this topic in a manner that will help both 
business academics and managers alike understand that the trade-off between scale and 
differentiation is not inevitable.  In fact, this dissertation will tentatively suggest that reality may 
be exactly opposite this perspective: namely, that consistent differentiation (via the automation 
of services) is always scalable because of the technology used to automate a differentiated 
approach.  If nothing else, I hope this dissertation provokes some thought on the subject of 
strategy and innovation in the domain of services. 
 
Vikram Mansharamani 
Moody, ME 
January 2007 
 
 
                                                 
2 Porter argues that a firm can achieve both differentiation and cost leadership under three circumstances: (1) when 
all other competitors are “stuck in the middle,” a situation which results from competitors unsuccessfully attempting 
to be all things to everyone, (2) scenarios in which costs are affected by share or inter-relationships, or (3) when a 
firm pioneers a major innovation.  Porter further argues that both (1) and (3) are likely to be fleeting and temporary 
as competitors will adapt to eliminate the opportunity to achieve both cost leadership and differentiation. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This dissertation examines how service firms can deliver services which are both scalable 
and differentiated.  The research focuses on how companies can apply “niche-market” 
differentiation strategies to “mass market” opportunities by generating consistent 
individualization or personalization across a variety of operating environments, customers, 
locations, etc.  In so doing, managers and academics alike may discover ways to immunize a 
service enterprise from the competitive profit-dissipating forces that eventually infect profitable 
markets.  Indirectly, the research suggests the generic strategies of cost leadership, 
differentiation, and market focus (Porter, 1985) may be constraining to IT-enabled service firms. 
I focus on service companies for two main reasons: (1) despite representing a large (and 
growing) share of economic activity today, services have received disproportionately little 
attention from management scholars – resulting in a relatively large gap in the literature; and (2) 
my personal experiences as an employee of, an investor in, and a customer of services companies 
presented several issues on which I found little focus within the strategy or innovation 
communities.  Despite these two factors, managers seem consistently curious about service 
innovation as well as service-specific strategies.  In short, the topic to be addressed in this 
dissertation is both relevant and unaddressed. 
Of particular curiosity to me was the topic of how inherent differences between services 
and products resulted in the possible need for service-specific innovation and strategy theories.  
As a precursor to the dissertation’s findings about the scalable service differentiation strategy 
that Harrah’s used to generate an edge over its competitors, the topic of how services differ from 
products is a major concern of this dissertation.  The topic colors the lens through which the 
research and analysis was conducted. 
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Strategy & Firm Performance 
 
 Perfect competition is an idealized model in which all firms earn an adequate return to 
cover their cost of capital and not a penny more.  Perfect ease of entry results in the immediate 
dissipation of any net economic profits (economic profits = profits in excess of the cost of capital 
vs. accounting profits=revenue – costs).  In addition to the lack of entry barriers, the perfectly 
competitive environment assumes that firms cannot affect price—although in aggregate all firms 
determine price—and that information flows are immediate.  Thus, although a firm is free to 
choose any price, attempting to sell goods or services above the market price effectively will 
equate to no demand for the firm’s offering.  Likewise, setting a price below the market price 
will result in infinite demand and the unnecessary loss of accounting profits. 
 This perspective on economic forces necessarily equates to a view that all firms and 
goods are identical.  A firm is a firm is a firm, and no good is differentiated from other goods.  
Suppose this were not the case.  If one firm had a lower cost method of producing a good, then it 
would sell the good below the market price—thereby capturing the entire market.  Information 
about the firm’s methods, however, would immediately diffuse to other firms and they would 
soon begin producing at the same cost.  Thus, although economic profits existed when the firm 
captured the entire market, classical economic forces would immediately eliminate such a 
situation driving economic profits back to zero.  Likewise, if goods differed and one good was 
valued more highly by consumers and resulted in an economic profit to the firm producing it, 
other firms would immediately produce an identical offering—reverting to a situation in which 
aggregate economic profits again returned to zero.  
 In summary, the perfectly competitive environment described (albeit as a stylized ideal) 
by economists is one in which all firms are identical, all goods are undifferentiated, and 
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information flows are immediate.  In short, no firm is able to sustain a competitive advantage 
that produces positive economic profits. 
 While the classical economic forces discussed above suggest that all firms are identical 
and no net economic profits are possible, empirical evidence suggests otherwise.  Strategy 
researchers have focused on evaluating differences in firm performance and the origins of those 
differences.  Two “pure” explanations for competitive advantage and variance in firm 
performance exist: (a) industry structure and strategic-position based accounts, and (b) firm 
resources/endowment based theories.  In all likelihood, reality is a blend of these two 
perspectives.   
Industry structure analysis assumes that all firms remain identical, but the environments 
they face are different and therefore result in differing profitability and performance. The essence 
of this argument is that firms differ in performance—although each one is identical—because 
they face different industry structures.   From this view, performance is a function of the 
environment, not of the firm.   
 The second primary school of thought suggests that firms are not identical and that 
differences in firm performance can (at least partially) be explained by different resource 
endowments.  Known as the “resource-based view” of the firm, this perspective suggests that 
firms differ in performance because they differ in resources (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), 
capabilities (Prahalad, 1993; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), and birth (time of founding) effects 
(Stinchcombe, 1965).  In essence, firm performance differs because firms differ.  A natural and 
related extension of this logic is found with the population ecology view that firms are “selected 
away” if their capabilities and resources do not fit the current environment (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977, 1984, 1989).  Thus, firm performance is a function of firms, with limited weight placed on 
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the role of industry structure.  In fact, another interpretation of this internally-focused perspective 
is that the structure of the environment is the result of differing firm capabilities—meaning that 
the “structurally attractive” industry segments are the result (rather than the cause) of differences 
in firm performance. 
Reality is likely between these two extremes.  Firms operate within and affect 
environments, and environments clearly affect firms (Henderson, 2000).  Disentangling the 
causality in such a scenario is a difficult—if not impossible—task.  Nevertheless, it appears that 
both “pure” schools of thought have tremendous merit and broad relevance for the study of 
strategy and innovation within services firms.  Particularly relevant issues from the industry 
structure perspective include Porter’s five forces (bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining 
power of customers, the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitutes, and the nature of 
competition within the industry) (Porter, 1980).  Pertinent considerations from the 
internal/resources perspective include the existence of unique capabilities and other non-
replicable resources. 
One distinguishing characteristic of a service is that customers are involved in the 
production of an offering.  Because customers are not perfectly homogenous, they therefore 
introduce a degree of variability into the service production process.  Quality control and 
consistency of offerings are not guaranteed, and although standardization of service offerings has 
created many “product-like” services, the fact remains that one cannot pre-inspect the service 
before it is produced.  Further, managers cannot assure consumers that the service will be 
identical to a previously delivered service due to customer involvement.  Given this 
heterogeneity of the same offering within a firm across time, it is highly likely that service 
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offerings across firms in a similar industry exhibit great variety.  Further, the highly social nature 
of many services results in a complex interaction that cannot be immediately standardized. 
This customer-introduced variability dramatically affects service firm strategy.  In 
particular, it complicates the firm’s ability to standardize an offering in a manner that promotes 
efficient production of the offering.  Specifically, customer-introduced variability vis-à-vis the 
service offering limits the ability of a service firm to achieve economies of scale.  Only through 
standardization—which by its very nature implies the loss of differentiation—have service firms 
been able to achieve economies of scale.  By standardizing their offerings, however, service 
firms leave themselves vulnerable to commoditization and the competitive forces that drive 
economic profits away.  The alternative is to remain differentiated but without scale.  Firms, it 
seems, ultimately need to choose between two seemingly incompatible objectives: differentiated 
service (i.e. the high end restaurant) and scalable service (i.e. McDonalds).    
Are “Differentiated Service” and “Scalable” Business Models Incompatible? 
 
Although a relatively recent literature on “mass customization” exists (Gilmore & Pine, 
1997; Pine, 1993) that attempts to address this tradeoff (primarily in the domain of products), the 
research seems to fall short of explaining how mass customization is meaningfully more than an 
unbundling of product features to allow for customer configuration.  The mass customization 
process is about letting consumers configure the modules they would like their product to 
include.  Consider Dell Computer, the flag-bearing champion of the mass-customization 
movement.  While one Dell customer can order a desktop computer with a 60GB hard-drive, a 
DVD player, a 1.7 gigahertz processor, and 512 MB of memory, another may order a laptop with 
100GB of hard-drive space, external speakers, a CD-ROM drive, a built-in wireless modem, and 
256 MB of memory.  The reason Dell is able to “mass-produce” these “customized” products is 
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that they are based on modular configurations.  If a customer were to ask for an “off-the-menu” 
item, the system breaks down and the request cannot be accommodated.  Thus, the logic of mass 
customization should perhaps be labeled “mass configuration.” 
Fundamentally, configuration and differentiation are different concepts.  Configuration is 
based on the selection and organization of standard modules, and although this is indeed possible 
in services (see UPS examples below), it differs meaningfully from service differentiation which 
involves treating customers differently.  The driving logic behind the concepts of differentiation 
and configuration are in fact antithetical.  Mass customization driven configurable solutions are 
highly dependent upon the standardization of “sub-components” of the offering.  James Gilmore 
and Joseph Pine highlight this dependence on the inherently standard components of a mass 
customized offering in their recent book, Markets of One: Creating Customer-Unique Value 
Through Mass Customization: “modular capabilities are a necessity” (Gilmore & Pine, 2000).  
Differentiated solutions are based upon solutions that treat different customers differently. 
The restaurant industry provides an interesting illustration of this concept, using the 
“meal” as the offering that one is procuring.  McDonalds provides a mass customized solution to 
the service of meal development: one is given a menu of standard options from which to create a 
“custom” configuration that meets individualized needs.  One customer might choose a 
cheeseburger, fries and a milkshake while another may opt for a salad, onion rings, and a diet 
soda.  Just as with the Dell example, ordering “off-the-menu” items cannot be accommodated.  
(Imagine asking for a non-breaded fish fillet…)   
McDonalds is not offering a differentiated service, but they are offering a mass 
customized, configured solution to one’s meal development needs.  The differentiated equivalent 
in the restaurant industry is an establishment that, in the extreme, does not even have a menu.  A 
Mansharamani  Page 20 
customer arrives and his unique needs are accommodated.  No menu constrains choice, and 
although his needs may be exactly opposite to those of another customer, both are 
accommodated without issue.  The mass customization approach taken by McDonalds seems 
inconsistent with the highly differentiated approach taken by the local diner or a high-end 
restaurant that cooks “made-to-order” meal solutions.  Producing the McDonald’s burger is a 
scalable activity, while generating the “made-to-order” omelet is not.  Scale and differentiation, 
it seems, are incompatible. 
This trade-off does not imply that the concepts of mass customization are not pertinent to 
service firms.  Many of the principles are in fact highly relevant. As the dissertation 
demonstrates in a discussion of the UPS Trade Direct strategic service innovation, mass 
customized and configurable solutions can help firms develop scale and improve their 
competitive positioning.  These efforts do not, however, overcome the inherently standardized 
components of a “customized by configuration” offering that are eventually subject to 
commoditizing forces.  In fact, the essential logic of mass customization is to create customer-
specific configurations via standard components.  In a service specific context, this implies that 
standardization (i.e. elimination of differentiation) leads to scale.   
 The title of a recent BusinessWeek magazine article summarizes the current sentiment 
among managers regarding the scale-differentiation trade-off quite succinctly: “Satisfaction Not 
Guaranteed: How cost-cutting can backfire when it ignites customer rage”(Hindo, 2006).  The 
article goes on to discuss how cost cutting and quality service are incompatible, highlighting how 
companies such as Dell Computer, Home Depot, and Northwest Airlines have angered customers 
with poor service driven by financial constraints.  To many managers, it seems a pre-determined 
conclusion that this trade-off necessarily exists.  Are differentiated services inherently 
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incompatible with large scale delivery of those services?  Is the trade-off between scale and 
differentiation inevitable? 
One company that has managed to move beyond this trade-off is Harrah’s Entertainment.  
Through innovative use of customer data and intensive IT-based analytics, Harrah’s has 
developed what may be a model of sustainable and scalable differentiation for the entertainment 
services it offers its customers.  Driven in large part by its pioneering loyalty card program Total 
Rewards, Harrah’s has demonstrated an ability to understand millions of customers well-enough 
to offer differentiated service.   Total Rewards, and its predecessor Total Gold, were begun at 
Harrah’s in the mid 1990’s and have been a fundamental cause of the sustained industry-leading 
profitability Harrah’s has enjoyed over the past ten years.   
The scalable service differentiation enablers that Harrah’s has developed (most of which 
are powered by intensive use of information technologies) and used at its multiple properties are 
another essential component of the ability for the company to escape what Jim Collins and Jerry 
Porras refer to as the “tyranny of the OR” in their bestselling book Built to Last.  According to 
Collins and Porras, “the Tyranny of the OR [is] the rational view that cannot easily accept a 
paradox, that cannot live with two seemingly contradictory forces or ideas at the same time.  The 
‘Tyranny of the OR’ pushes people to believe that things must be either A OR B, but not both” 
(Collins & Porras, 2002).  The authors continue by providing several examples of either/or 
propositions that seem universally accepted, to which I might easily add “Service offerings can 
be scalable OR differentiated.”  Collins and Porras go on to suggest that visionary companies 
embrace the “Genius of the AND.” 
This dissertation is about how Harrah’s managed to escape the tyranny of the OR and 
achieve the genius of the AND in the context of services.  In particular, the dissertation will 
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focus upon the scalable service differentiation enablers that Harrah’s used to generate sustained 
industry-leading returns on its invested capital.  It is about how the company managed to succeed 
against larger, more capitalized competitors in an industry historically characterized by scale.  In 
short, it is about how Harrah’s has achieved both scale and differentiation in services. 
This study will have implications relevant to a wide range of scholarly communities.  
Entrepreneurship scholars and entrepreneurs may take comfort in seeing that Harrah’s (with 
limited resources) successfully operates (at higher returns on capital) against well-capitalized 
competitors.  Strategy scholars will notice that (at least in Harrah’s case) information technology 
matters—contrary to Nicholas Carr’s controversial proposition (Carr, 2003; Carr, 2004) that it 
does not.  Finally, innovation scholars may recognize that services are in fact different from 
products, and that this difference necessitates a need to re-evaluate “accepted” theories. 
The Dissertation Focus: Scalable Service Differentiation  
 
Fundamentally, this dissertation is about how companies can achieve scalable service 
differentiation. The research strategy I utilize is the case study method.  The dissertation is a 
detailed case study of the world’s leading gaming entertainment services company, Harrah’s 
Entertainment.  Harrah’s Entertainment was selected for various reasons, most important of 
which was the fact that it has successfully utilized information technology to overcome the 
seemingly insurmountable conflict between scale and differentiation.3   
In particular, I focus upon three IT-powered capabilities that Harrah’s has utilized to 
deliver scalable service differentiation.  The information technologies – which include the Slot 
Service Dispatch System, the Seven Stars Program, and the Operational CRM platform – 
                                                 
3 Other rationale included the degree and depth of access and support from senior Harrah’s executives, the fact that 
Harrah’s had an IT-enabled customer loyalty driven strategy, and that the company had undergone a remarkable 
transformation while competing against competitors with greater access to capital and investment resources. 
 
individually and collectively enable the company to deliver service commensurate with a 
customer’s value to the firm.  Thus, these scalable service differentiation enablers facilitate the 
best service for the best customers, without degrading the quality of service that other customers 
receive.  They also enable—to use a term that Harrah’s Chief Information Officer Tim Stanley 
has coined—an enterprise-wide “auto- magic” capability.  Auto-magic is the automated ability of 
the company to create high-quality, magical experiences for a customer without the appearance 
of orchestration.  This dissertation will investigate these IT-powered technologies and how they 
serve as the basis for the scalable service differentiation Harrah’s delivers. 
The data utilized in this dissertation is primarily based upon interviews with Harrah’s 
managers.  Archival records such as SEC filings, annual reports, press releases, internal 
memos/reports were analyzed and compared to the findings from coded interviews (based on a 
standard interview guide used to question managers at all levels and across all functions of the 
organization).  For a more in-depth discussion of methodological considerations, the reader may 
consult the Appendix of this dissertation. 
Harrah’s Entertainment as a Service Innovator 
 
Harrah’s is an extraordinarily successful company that seems to have “beaten the odds” 
(pun intended!) of competing against companies with greater capital and better assets.  In 1998, 
Harrah’s Entertainment was on the verge of bankruptcy and was struggling in almost all of its 
major markets.  In Las Vegas, the company’s $300mm refurbishment of Harrah’s was competing 
against the $1.6bn Bellagio.  In New Orleans, the company’s bankrupt property was struggling 
with regulations prohibiting the casino from operating as a full-service casino resort with 
restaurants, etc.  In Atlantic City (“AC”), the company’s properties were run down and the whole 
gaming industry in AC was facing a serious downswing.  In short, the company’s prospects were 
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not promising.  Harrah’s Entertainment common stock (NYSE ticker: HET) was trading for $15 
per share.  To many Wall Street analysts, recommending purchase of Harrah’s was a sure-fired 
way to career stagnation.  As Loveman noted: 
 
In 1998, Harrah’s had the most businesses with one name 
(“Harrah’s”) but they were all different – ranging from a Las 
Vegas strip property of a modest type to riverboats, native 
American casinos, resort properties in Northern Nevada, some 
with hotels, some without hotels, some with cruising riverboats, 
some land-based, some serving alcohol, some not…and in general, 
some big competitor with better facilities and better resources than 
we had…then in 1999, Steve Wynn opened Bellagio with what was 
an unthinkable budget of $1.6bn, and at that time referred to it as 
the sort of place God would build if he had the money…and just up 
the street, there we were with little Harrah’s ($300mm of invested 
capital).  The company was under tremendous pressure.  The share 
price performed very poorly, we had missed our quarterly earning 
estimate virtually every time for several years, the company’s New 
Orleans business was in bankruptcy.  It was a tough time 
(Loveman, 2005a). 
 
Today, the company is the world’s largest gaming entertainment services company and 
has a footprint in the United States that is unmatched by any of its competitors, has an 
extraordinarily powerful and valuable database with detailed and pertinent information about 
40mm gamblers (out of an estimated 50mm gamblers in the United States), and has plans to 
redesign the central Las Vegas Strip that would have been deemed unimaginable only 5 years 
ago.  The company’s profits have skyrocketed, its productivity has increased dramatically, and 
CEO Gary Loveman has been labeled as the Best Senior Executive in the Gaming Industry for 
Mansharamani  Page 25 
Mansharamani  Page 26 
several years in a row by Institutional Investor magazine.  Perhaps as the ultimate sign of the 
company’s true value, two buyout firms recently reached an agreement with the Board of 
Directors of Harrah’s Entertainment to take the company private for $90.00 per share – 
indicating they believe the company to be worth significantly more than that offer. 
 Understanding what happened during this dramatic transformation of the company’s 
competitiveness is reason alone for management scholars to study Harrah’s.  However, the 
company is also an accomplished service innovator.  Inspired and enabled by a data collection 
and management system dressed in the garb of now familiar “loyalty programs,” the company 
has developed the very scalable service differentiation capabilities I briefly described above.  It 
has a highly integrated and multifunctionally-trained team that leads the company.  Management 
bonuses are based on customer satisfaction scores, and Harrah’s may be the only company that 
awards cash bonuses to every single property-level employee if customer satisfaction scores 
(which are regularly measured) improve. 
 Given the fact that Harrah’s had limited access to capital resources over the past eight 
years, comparing performance measures such as stock performance, accounting profits, or even 
revenue growth does not do justice to the company’s ability to generate substantial returns from 
the assets with which it had to work.  Further, consolidation that has taken place in the industry 
over the past eight years also confounds performance analysis.  One measure that appears free of 
these considerations and is therefore an effective measure of management’s ability to squeeze 
returns from an existing asset pool is cash operating earnings as a percentage of tangible assets.  
The table below compares the results of Harrah’s and its primary competitors on this metric.4 
  
                                                 
4 The use of cash operating earnings in the numerator helps to offset the impact of non-cash charges such as 
depreciation and amortization, as well as non-operating financial impacts.  The use of tangible assets in the 
denominator removes the impact of goodwill and hence does not penalize companies that have acquired assets.   
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Table 1: Harrah’s vs. Major Gaming Companies: Cash Earnings Return on Assets* 
 
Ameristar Harrah's Station Wynn MGM Mirage
1997 14.0% 18.3% 17.2%
1998 8.1% 16.4% 12.6% 9.8%
1999 13.2% 18.1% 18.6% 14.8%
2000 7.7% 19.0% 20.7% 9.0%
2001 19.1% 18.8% 14.3% -3.1% 10.1%
2002 16.1% 21.4% 15.9% -1.8% 10.9%
2003 20.2% 19.3% 17.0% -2.5% 9.9%
2004 18.8% 18.3% 18.2% -2.3% 11.5%
2005 19.5% 11.8% 15.3% 2.5% 9.6%
Average 15.2% 17.9% 16.6% -1.4% 11.4%  
* Operating Income plus Depreciation & Amortization Divided by Tangible Assets; Source: Securities & Exchange Commission Filings 
 
Harrah’s ability to squeeze profits from existing assets is unmatched in the industry, even 
after factoring in the adverse impact of Hurricane Katrina and one-time expenses associated with 
the acquisition of Caesar’s Entertainment, which disproportionately affected Harrah’s results in 
2005.  The two closest competitors (in terms of returns) are Ameristar Casinos and Station 
Casinos.  Both are significantly smaller companies operating within (relative to Harrah’s) far 
more constrained geographical footprints.  Thus, Harrah’s has achieved higher returns on a 
significantly larger base of assets, a not-insignificant accomplishment. 
Further, Harrah’s has utilized information technology to constantly improve employee 
productivity.  The company continues to outpace its peers in terms of productivity.  A simple 
gauge of productivity, “revenues per employee,” demonstrates the efficiency of a labor force.  As 
the chart below shows, Harrah’s has consistently outperformed the overall casino industry5 in 
terms of employee productivity over the past six years.   
                                                 
5 Note that the “casino industry” averages are taken from American Gaming Association data, which includes 
Harrah’s Entertainment.  Removing Harrah’s from the casino industry data would increase the difference between 
the two statistics as Harrah’s raises the industry averages. 
Graph 1: Harrah’s Entertainment Employee Productivity vs. US Casino Industry 
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Scalable Service Differentiation in Action 
 
Harrah’s scalable service differentiation model has created a powerful capability that is 
emerging to be a source of advantage over its competitors.  By meticulously tracking customer 
transaction data via its Total Rewards loyalty program, Harrah’s has developed a formidable 
database of customer behavior patterns that are linked to customer-provided demographic data.  
Given the cumulative nature of the database (it grows in size and value every minute of every 
day) and Harrah’s physical footprint, it is unlikely that any other casino company will ever 
approach the breadth and depth of casino player understanding that Harrah’s has achieved.  
Competitors that begin today will forever lag Harrah’s database. 
Because of this database, the company has developed unique insights into customer 
behavior patterns as well as customer worth to Harrah’s.  For instance, Harrah’s not only thinks 
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about a customer in terms of her value to the company on a single trip – but rather considers 
what the lifetime value of a particular customer may be to the company.  As Chief Executive 
Officer Gary Loveman notes,  
 
Our system allows us to distinguish between what a 
customer may be worth to us if we get them to like us versus what 
their worth is as we see them today…I know the type of game the 
person plays, the level of their wager, and whether they live in a 
place where they are likely to be exposed to gaming a lot… 
Let’s imagine you have a 60 year old lady who visits our 
casino briefly, plays the $10 slot machine for a few minutes, and 
then goes wherever it is she goes next.  Based on her value from 
that visit, we would say “This is not a very interesting customer; 
she didn’t spend much money with us; probably not worth 
pursuing.”  But instead, what we do is take that information and 
we compare it to what people like her do in the casino business… 
The fact that this is a lady who has time in her life because she’s a 
bit older, she lives nearby a major casino market, and she’s come 
in and played a $10 slot machine all indicate to us that this is 
pretty good customer, but probably a very good customer of our 
competitors… (Loveman, 2005b). 
 
The company has taken customer analytics to a new level and has accelerated its 
application to a real-time environment.  One particularly noteworthy capability (which will be 
profiled later in the dissertation) in the Harrah’s suite of services merits particular attention: the 
operational customer relationship management (OpCRM) tools and their corresponding rules that 
enable differentiated service. 
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While many companies utilize analytical customer relationship management (CRM) tools 
to analyze the value and worth of their customers as well as to design appropriate marketing 
campaigns based upon a customer’s stated (and in the case of highly advanced companies, 
revealed) preferences, they usually focus on “after-the-fact” actions.  A multi-billion dollar 
industry exists to support analytical CRM tools and capabilities, and such capabilities are widely 
dispersed among corporations in a wide-variety of industries.  Harrah’s Entertainment’s use of 
operational CRM goes beyond analytical CRM in that it enables real-time application of data-
analytic insights derived from traditional CRM capabilities.  A simple example may help 
illustrate the difference. 
Suppose an unknown customer comes in and registers for a loyalty card.  He then begins 
play on a slot machine with it and proceeds to lose $100 over the course of three hours of play.  
Given his type of play (wager amount, type of game, number of wagers per hour, etc.), his 
theoretical loss (i.e. the loss he should have incurred based on the casino’s average statistical 
advantage) may have been $20.  Because gambling outcomes are stochastic, his actual loss 
exceeded his theoretical loss – resulting in what is labeled an “unlucky” experience.  Analytical 
CRM capabilities would capture this information and design a marketing campaign (possibly 
delivered via direct mail) to entice the customer to return.  The customer, however, would leave 
the casino feeling that the casino was particularly unlucky and may go across the street to play at 
another casino.  His luck may be better there and he might then develop loyalty to that casino. 
Operational CRM capabilities, however, would allow a real-time intervention to alter the 
customer’s impression of the casino before he left.  Knowing that the casino has won a “lucky 
$80” from this customer, operational CRM would allow a reinvestment of some portion of that 
amount back into this first time visitor in an attempt to change his impression before he walks 
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out the door.  In fact, based on his gaming profile (i.e. demographics, type of game, wager 
amount, distance from casino, etc.), operational CRM may even lead to an investment of more 
than $80 in this customer because of his likelihood to be an extremely high-worth customer.  
One possible outcome of the operational CRM tool may be the issuance of free tickets to a show 
that evening via a ticket printed at the slot machine when a player removes his loyalty card.  If 
the customer actually attends the show, he will surely attribute some value to the offer and may 
possibly even return to the casino later that evening either before or after the show.  Statistically, 
his next gambling experience is likely to be “luckier” (i.e. his actual loss should be less than his 
theoretical loss) and he may therefore change his impression of the casino and may become a 
loyal customer. 
This is just one example of a scalable service differentiation capability that Harrah’s has 
utilized to automate personalized experiences and deliver “auto-magic” onto the casino floor.  
Others to be profiled later in the dissertation include the slot service dispatch system (SSDS) and 
the Seven Stars program.  These examples will provide insight into the tools and methods 
through which Harrah’s has overcome the efficiency vs. differentiation constraint. 
As mentioned earlier, the scalable service differentiation capabilities that Harrah’s 
utilizes to deliver its services have helped it compete effectively against better, more capitalized 
competitors.  Fundamentally, this advantage arises from switching costs.  While switching costs 
are well understood in the domain of products, our understanding of both consumer and 
producer switching costs with respect to services is not as well explored.   
Switching costs with services tend to be very different than with products.  In particular, 
these costs tend to be reversed in terms of who bears the burden.  It seems that consumer 
switching costs are typically higher and producer switching costs are typically lower for product 
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firms than for service companies, all else equal.  Service firms, however, tend to have higher 
producer switching costs and lower consumer switching costs than product firms, all else equal. 
For instance, consumer knowledge of and familiarity with products such as Microsoft 
Excel or Microsoft Word may make it more expensive for those consumers to change to Lotus 1-
2-3 or Wordperfect.  By switching producers, consumers “reset” their understanding of product 
features and capabilities and must relearn how to use the new product.  Microsoft, however, does 
not bear any active costs (of course, it loses revenues) if a consumer switches products and does 
not generate any direct benefits (vis-à-vis its costs) from having a long history with a consumer.     
With respect to services, the opposite appears to be true.  Here, the burden of switching 
costs appears to be shouldered by the producer.  Consider McDonalds.  Because McDonalds 
takes the time to understand and design its menu to match its customer desires (on the go adults 
tend to be more health-conscious; the menu is therefore adjusted to include more salads), it 
becomes expensive to switch customers (catering to the needs of children who desire sweeter 
options, etc.). Customers however may move to a different fast-food chain without incurring any 
substantial costs.  Thus, switching costs are borne by the producer in the case of services. 
The strategy Harrah’s has utilized is based on generating consumer switching costs.  
While this is not unique to Harrah’s, it is definitely unique to the gaming industry.  Further, 
while other service companies have attempted to generate consumer switching costs, the basis 
upon which they have done so is not as robust or as sustainable as the means through which 
Harrah’s has done so.  The primary enabler of Harrah’s ability to generate consumer switching 
costs is the company’s Total Rewards database – which represents a substantial amount of 
transaction history between Harrah’s and its customers.  This database is a digital manifestation 
of what I call “reciprocal history” in prior work (Mansharamani, 2004).   
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“Reciprocal history” is the term I use to describe the mutual experience base of a 
consumer interacting with a producer’s services and of a producer learning how to produce to a 
consumer’s needs.  Reciprocal history does not apply equally to most product-oriented firms in 
which consumers acquire history and experience interacting with a particular producer’s 
offering.  For instance, many consumers of products develop an understanding of product 
features that result in ease of use and familiarity with functions.  Product producers, however, do 
not develop a significant understanding of consumers and the subtleties and nuances of their 
consumption methods.  Although product producers run focus groups and attempt to understand 
product usage purposes and patterns (i.e. is the consumer planning on driving the automobile off-
road?), producer understanding of product consumption can not be as detailed, thorough, or 
exhaustive as producer understanding of service consumption because of the intimate interaction 
that occurs between a service producer and consumer.   
This is an inherent characteristic resulting from customer involvement in service 
production.  Consider legal services.  A lawyer understands the consumer’s situation better than 
any self-help legal product ever can.  This is so because of the customer’s involvement of 
interacting with the lawyer.  Consider auto repair services.  Through interaction over time, the 
mechanic develops an understanding of consumption patterns and needs, how a car is driven, and 
whether its owner “rides” the brakes.  Consider airlines.  American Airlines, for example, has 
knowledge of my most frequented travel destinations, my seat preference, my appetite for 
restrictions on a ticket, my cost consciousness, etc.   
In no way do I intend to imply that producers and consumers in the products context do 
not develop detailed understandings of each others capabilities and needs.  Rather, I am 
suggesting that producer-consumer understandings are more detailed, thorough, or exhaustive in 
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the context of services—due to the highly interactive nature of producer-consumer relationships 
in service delivery and consumption.  Thus, customer involvement in service production leads to 
service producers directly observing a consumer’s actual preferences and needs (vs. the “stated” 
preferences that product producers obtain).  This shared history that results in a producer 
acquiring intimate knowledge of consumption is “reciprocal history.”  In Harrah’s case, Total 
Rewards is the store of this reciprocal history. 
Reciprocal history alone, however, does not generate competitive advantage.  Rather, if 
utilized effectively, reciprocal history can generate the consumer switching costs that lead to 
competitive advantage.  Reciprocal history exacerbates and intensifies service consumer loyalty 
to particular producers and service producer loyalty to particular consumers through switching 
costs that arise for both service producer and service consumer.   
Consider hotel services.  As a hotel learns more about my actual preferences, it becomes 
better positioned (relative to competitors) than others to efficiently serve my needs.  No need to 
provide me with a room containing a mini-bar that must be checked and restocked every night if 
I’ve never purchased a mini-bar product.  By switching consumers, producers “reset” their 
understanding of consumer needs to an “average level” intended to satisfy the average consumer 
(i.e. they must offer rooms with mini-bars to all new consumers).  When reciprocal history is 
introduced and utilized, however, consumers develop a switching cost as well.  If a hotel knows 
that I prefer hypoallergenic pillows and the Wall Street Journal (vs. the USA Today), they are 
meeting my needs more efficiently than their competitors may.  By switching producers (i.e. a 
new hotel), I am now forced to effectively “reset” a producer’s understanding of my needs—
thereby reducing the quality of my experience and the service I receive.   
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 In Harrah’s case, the Total Rewards program embodies the reciprocal history.  Many of 
the company’s scalable service differentiation capabilities (based upon the reciprocal history) are 
encouraging the development of consumer switching costs.  By growing its understanding of 
customer behavior over time (via the Total Rewards database), Harrah’s has created the basis for 
a scalable service differentiation strategy.  Over time, Harrah’s is becoming increasingly 
personalized (i.e. differentiated) in how it serves its 40 million (i.e. scale) customers—which in 
turn generates consumer switching costs.  The figure below diagrams how Harrah’s has created 
what may prove—over time—to be a service-specific competitive advantage through scale and 
differentiation of its offering. 
 
Figure 1: Scale and Differentiation at Harrah’s Entertainment 
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An Overview of the Dissertation: Brief Chapter Summaries 
 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) of this dissertation is a detailed review of the existing 
literature on services and service innovation.  It summarizes the current state of understanding in 
academic literature.   In addition to defining the five unique service characteristics that 
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distinguish services from products, the chapter concludes that the literature does not fully 
incorporate the unique service characteristics into existing theories of innovation or 
development. Of particular interest for further investigation is the role of a customer in the 
process of producing a service – and the inherent variability introduced by such involvement.  
The chapter concludes that customer involvement produces a trade-off between differentiation 
and scalability, resulting in a 2x2 framework through which to analyze service innovations. 
Immediately following the literature review, Chapter 3 evaluates the topic of service 
innovation within two service companies that have been remarkably successful within two of the 
largest sectors of the global economy – transportation and logistics, and education. Short cases 
are presented of both United Parcel Service and the Apollo Group.  The three service innovations 
presented in the UPS case highlight how the company has developed a service innovation agenda 
that is focused on producing new offerings that are repeatable and productizable.  Similarly, the 
two service innovations profiled in the Apollo case demonstrate the desire for standard, scalable 
offerings at the world’s largest education institution.  In both of these examples, the results of the 
service innovation efforts are “product-like” offerings that are highly scalable but become un-
differentiated in the process of becoming scalable.  The chapter concludes with a short 
discussion of how standardization, by itself, may actually be detrimental to long-term 
competitive advantage as it may reduce customer switching costs and change the basis of 
competition towards cost / price.  
Chapter 4 sets the context for the detailed case study of Harrah’s Entertainment by 
providing an overview of its overall competitive strategy within the gaming industry.  The 
chapter includes a review of the type of customers that seek casino entertainment, and the 
various strategies pursued by the main US casino operators in pursuit of those customers.   A 
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brief overview of Harrah’s is presented, as well as short profiles of Harrah’s primary 
competitors.  A short section then reviews the casino industry’s attitudes towards technology, 
and the chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the industry’s competitive dynamics and 
how well the Harrah’s strategy has performed within it. 
The following chapter, Chapter 5, begins the detailed discussion of Harrah’s service 
differentiation strategy.  It begins with a short discussion about how Harrah’s conceptualizes its 
offering to customesr.  The chapter then describes how service differentiation imbues many of 
Harrah’s services, and how the company strives to make some customers “more equal than 
others.”  Next, the overall strategic objective of monogamous customers is discussed, as is the 
role of Total Rewards and Harrah’s IT systems in capturing reciprocal history and generating 
mutual switching costs.  Future technological plans are briefly discussed – with particular 
attention to their ability to influence the delivery of differentiated service. 
Chapter 6 then turns to some of the scalable service differentiation capabilities that 
Harrah’s has designed, developed, and delivered at its various properties.  It begins with an 
insight regarding customer behavior within a casino—namely that bad service or service 
interruptions are seen to be luck “busters.”  Given this insight, one of the objectives of the 
differentiated service strategy is to minimize the risk that Harrah’s best customers are exposed to 
luck busting outcomes.  Three scalable service differentiation capabilities are then addressed: (1) 
the slot service dispatch system, (2) the Seven Stars tier, and (3) the operational CRM capability.  
For each of these service innovations, I describe the capability, its fit with Harrah’s service 
strategy, its performance, and how it fits into the scalability – differentiation framework. 
The next chapter (Chapter 7) captures many of the elements of Harrah’s culture and 
management approach that are essential to support the scalable service differentiation strategy.  
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In particular, I review four primary components of the Harrah’s service system that appear 
integral to the company’s service operations: (1) the ability to put employees in a “mode” to 
deliver great service, (2) the organization of the firm’s human capital to match the best customers 
with the best employees, (3) the incentivizing of employees towards increased customer 
satisfaction with monetary bonuses for all frontline Harrah’s employees, and (4) the heavy focus 
on measurement and evidence-based management.   
Chapter 8 utilizes the research findings to suggest applications of the scalable service 
differentiation strategy to other service industries.  Three examples are provided, with brief 
discussions of how scale and differentiation can be achieved in the air transportation, online 
commerce, and communication services industries.  The short summaries of each industry 
merely illustrate how companies within these industries can utilize the principles of scalable 
service differentiation to achieve slight advantages that may accumulate into a significant 
competitive edge. 
 Chapter 9, the Conclusion, summarizes the paper’s findings and articulates a 
methodology for developing a scalable service differentiation capability.  Three key ingredients 
are described as essential to the strategy: (1) a loyalty program, or other means of linking 
specific transaction data with specific customers, (2) an analytic engine that determines the 
ranking/prioritization of customers and the criteria upon which to differentiate service, and (3) a 
set of delivery tools that automate consistently differentiated service across a company’s touch-
points with its customers.  
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Chapter 2 – A Review of the Existing Literature 
 
According to the 2005 edition of the OECD in Figures, services contribute approximately 
78% of the gross economic value added in the US, 69% in Japan, and 74% in the United 
Kingdom.  Of the thirty countries for which data is provided, none have a services contribution 
below 55%.  The country with the highest service contribution is Luxemborg (83%) and the 
country with the lowest is Ireland (56%).  It is also worth noting that over the 1993-2003 
timeframe, the average services contribution to the economy of an OECD country grew by 6.8%.  
Labor figures are equally persuasive, with the service sector accounting for more than 80% of 
employment in most countries.  As these data demonstrate, services are an important and 
growing part of the global economy.  Despite their importance, services have received 
disproportionately little attention from academics in management fields and at business schools 
around the globe.  The purpose of this chapter is to review this recent literature and develop a 
map of what we know about the management of services, and more precisely, the management 
of innovation in services.   
 A major reason behind the scarcity of focus on services lies in the history of how services 
have been conceptualized and measured.  Historically, services have been thought of as 
unproductive.  Adam Smith, for instance, describes services as inherently inferior to 
manufactured goods: 
 
…the labor of the manufacturer fixes and realizes itself in some 
particular subject or vendible commodity, which lasts for some 
time at least after that labor is past…[while] the labor of…services 
generally perish in the very instant of their performance, and 
seldom leave any trace or value behind them…(Smith, 2002 
printing, p.112). 
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 For a more recent example, consider this quote from the marketing literature: “When a good is 
purchased, the buyer acquires an asset; when a service is purchased, the buyer incurs an 
expense” (Rathmell, 1966).   In addition to viewing services as unproductive, most governments 
and statistics-gathering agencies have historically treated services as a residual category.  In fact, 
for much of the twentieth-century (and the corresponding defining, mapping and measuring of 
economic activity categories), many economists and statisticians treated services as a “residual” 
or “tertiary” sector – supplementing the primary “raw materials” and secondary “manufactured 
goods” sectors (Miles & Boden, 2000).  Services were anything but a commodity or a good. 
 The rapid growth of employment in the services sector during the 1960s and 1970s, as 
noted by Miles & Boden, resulted in two contrary interpretations: (a) politicians, sociologists, 
and geographers developed a theory of the “post-industrial” society while (b) economists, 
seeking a return to documented productivity gains resulting from manufacturing, labeled the new 
era one of “de-industrialization” and called for a re-industrialization to overcome the economic 
malaise that characterized the early 1980s. 
 The post-industrial society was seen as a positive development, one in which demand for 
material goods had been virtually satiated and in which affluence led to increasing demand for 
services.  According to these theorists (epitomized by Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell’s The 
Coming of the Post-Industrial Society), producing services was a higher value use of human 
capital and harkened the arrival of an “information age” in which information processing 
capabilities (not manufacturing abilities) became key to economic success (Bell, 1973).  Services 
was the natural next step in economic progression – just as productivity gains in agrarian pursuits 
had led to industrial life, so too did manufacturing innovation lead to a service focus.  Services 
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were seen as superior to goods; and allowed for the rapid absorption of displaced manufacturing 
jobs while simultaneously increasing the proportion of “thought” that went into work.   
 The de-industrialization school, meanwhile, emerged in reaction to the large-scale 
reductions in manufacturing employment during the 1980s (primarily in the UK and US).   
 
De-industrialization arguments are often little more than a 
reassertion of the view that only the production of tangible goods 
constitutes productive work…one line of argument is almost 
moralistic: if consumer demand is shifting to services, this is the 
symptom of cultural decadence, the growth of a hedonistic 
consumer culture, or welfare dependency, rather than a creative 
and production oriented society.  An alternative perspective…sees 
the growth of the service sector as reflecting a failure to 
modernize…rather than pointing to shifts in consumer demand 
(Miles & Boden, 2000).  
 
Some even sought to explain the rapid growth of the newly-industrialized-countries (“NICs”) in 
terms of an opportunity presented by de-industrialization in the West (Singh, 1992).   
 Despite this increasing focus upon the service sector among policy-makers, politicians, 
and (non-management) social scientists, the conspicuous lack of attention from the management 
community within academia reflected confusion as to the ramifications (if any) of a service 
economy upon the practice of management.  Early management research on services even had a 
distinctly “manufacturing-like” tone and vocabulary.  For instance, note the titles of Theodore 
Levitt’s (one of the earliest management scholars focused on services) two most-cited pieces: 
“Production-line Approach to Services”(Levitt, 1972) and “The Industrialization of Service” 
(Levitt, 1976).  The tone of both pieces reflects a belief that the management of services was not 
different than the management of products or manufactured goods.  In fact, services were seen as 
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a new domain in which to apply lessons learned from the industrialized economy.  Some even 
began to view services as an additional offering at the root of which was a manufactured offering 
(Quinn, Baruch, & Paquette, 1988).  Forward-thinking management scholars did begin, however, 
to focus increasing amounts of attention upon the uniqueness of services and the ramifications of 
these characteristics upon the management of strategy, innovation, R&D, operations, and 
marketing.   
While management scholars remain interested in innovation, much of their focus has 
been upon products and product companies (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Anderson & 
Tushman, 1990; Benner & Tushman, 2003; Christensen, 1997; Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
Tushman & Murmann, 1998; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994; Utterback & 
Abernathy, 1975), retarding theoretical advancement of services innovation.  Although several 
management theorists have studied the management of service operations (Bitran & Logo, 1993; 
Sasser, Hart, & Heskett, 1991; Sasser, Olsen, & Wyckoff, 1978) and the role of technology in 
services (Guile & Quinn, 1988a, b; Quinn, 1992; Quinn & Paquette, 1990), few have explicitly 
addressed the issue of innovation in services (Barras, 1986, 1990; Martin & Horne, 1993; Miles, 
2000; Sundbo, 1997, 2000; Tether, 2003; Thomke, 2003a).   
Some management scholars have described services innovations in distinctly product 
terms (Bitran & Pedrosa, 1998; Bullinger, Fahnrich, & Meiren, 2003; Cooper & Edgett, 1999; 
Guile & Quinn, 1988a; Menor, Tatikonda, & Sampson, 2002; Meyer & DeTore, 1999; Thomke, 
2003a), noting the importance of new service development processes, experimentation, and an 
understanding of user needs.  Guile and Quinn note that “many of the principles that have proved 
so essential to innovation management in product or manufacturing environments are equally 
important in services,” while others describe an “R&D” function within a services context 
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(Baumol, 2002; Edvardsson, Gustafsson, Johnson, & Sanden, 2000; Gwynne, 1998; Thomke, 
2003a).  Others have suggested that service innovation, like product development, must be 
thought of according to development procedures as well as the interaction of various design 
components (Bitran & Pedrosa, 1998; Bullinger et al., 2003; Cooper & Edgett, 1999; Meyer & 
DeTore, 1999; Shostack, 1984).  The immediate task facing management academics interested in 
service innovation will be to assess the usefulness of the assertions (see sections below on 
product development organization, development processes, and new service development.)   
Despite a myriad of arguments assuming and highlighting service innovation’s similarity 
to product development, some researchers have tried to articulate key differences between 
service and product innovation.  They have argued that service organizations do not have “R&D” 
infrastructures (Shostack, 1984; Sundbo, 1997) and that “service businesses are not product 
businesses” (Nambisan, 2001).  Cusumano’s extensive work on the software industry 
(Cusumano, 2004; Cusumano, 1991; Cusumano & Yoffie, 1998) also highlights the uniqueness 
of services  and the usefulness of service revenues during tough economic conditions.  Others 
note that innovation in services demands unique organizational forms (Sundbo, 2000; Vermeulen 
& Van Der Aa, 2003).   
In preparing to embark on management research that pushes the bounds of what currently 
receives attention within business schools, I first sought to identify key gaps in the service 
innovation literature so as to determine “ripe” jumping off points that merit attention.  As the 
divergence of opinions regarding the existence of service and product differences in the context 
of innovations demonstrates, basic distinctions between services and products remain obscured.  
As noted in a recent opinion piece in the Financial Times, “it is now time to update our 
curriculum for teaching and researching innovation to address the dominant sector of economic 
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activity” (Chesbrough, 2004).   A detailed review of the existing literature and the development 
of a research agenda in this domain will shed needed light upon service innovation and the 
service development process. 
How do Services and Products differ?  
 
 As set forth above, services have historically been described via a negative definition (i.e. 
by describing what services are not).  Anything that was not a commodity or manufactured good 
was a service.  Needless to say, this definition was not particularly conducive to research or 
development of the service-specific management field.  The lack of consensus and rampant 
confusion has resulted in missed opportunities for productive research.  This chapter of the 
dissertation will review the management literature’s current conceptualization of services and 
conclude with a positively-defined, working definition of what constitutes a service.  Ultimately, 
it will be possible to formulate a set of key criteria that merit including an offering as a “service.” 
 The importance of classification and categorization should not be understated, especially 
given the goal of developing a service category distinct and unique from a “product” category.  
The true value of labels and categories, as noted by Hambrick, lies in the ability to infer 
unknown attributes to members of a group for which some attributes are known (Hambrick, 
1984).  Thus, by developing categories and classes that are based on common criteria and 
characteristics, we may be able to infer the attributes (upon the whole class) by merely studying 
the behavior of a sample of that class.  A successful classification scheme empowers research 
and accelerates scholarly progress around the “theory-building” track (Christensen, Carlile, & 
Sundahl, 2003), enabling researchers to identify anomalies and further categorize/segment in a 
manner that allows the development of “anomaly-free” theory. 
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 Two of the most important criteria of an ideal classification system are mutual exclusivity 
and completeness (Bowker & Star, 1999).  Mutual exclusivity demands that an item not be a 
member of more than one category and completeness requires that all items belong to a category. 
An ideal definition of a service will therefore focus upon what makes a service unique.   
 The earliest definitions of services were provided by the marketing literature (Judd, 1964; 
Rathmell, 1966). Judd (1964) was building on his 1962 dissertation which criticized the 
American Marketing Association’s negative definition of service, provided below: 
 
Services - Activities, benefits, or satisfactions which are offered for 
sale, or are provided in connection with the sale of goods.  
Examples are amusements, hotel service, electric service, 
transportation, the services of barber and beauty shops, repair and 
maintenance service, the work of credit rating bureaus.  This list is 
merely illustrative and no attempt has been made to make it 
complete.  The term also applies to the various activities such as 
credit extension, advice and help of sales people, delivery, by 
which the seller serves the convenience of his customers. (Pyle, 
Converse, & AMA, 1960 as quoted in Judd (1964)) 
 
Judd defines a marketed service as a transaction in which “the object of the market transaction is 
other than the transfer of ownership (and title, if any) of a tangible commodity.”  Further, Judd 
goes on to categorize three types of services: (a) rented goods services, (b) owned goods 
services, and (c) non-goods services.   
As noted in Judd’s first two service categories, services are often linked with goods and 
products.  Whether referred to as a goods-service continuum (Rathmell, 1966) or a fluid 
boundary between goods and services (Quinn et al., 1988), there is clearly a grey area between 
products and services that obfuscates simple classifications.  In seminars and classes alike, a 
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great deal of confusion exists around the product-service distinction.  Nobody wishes to have a 
product for the sake of having a product; rather, one acquires a product for the service that it 
renders.  Theodore Levitt, in his classic 1972 Harvard Business Review article entitled the 
“Production-Line Approach to Services,” noted that “there is no such thing as a service industry. 
There are only industries whose service components are greater or less than those of other 
industries.  Everybody is in service” (Levitt, 1972).  Likewise, Quinn and colleagues have noted 
that most manufacturing costs are in fact attributable to services, with very little of the activity 
base actually involved in the alteration of raw materials into finished goods (Quinn & Gagnon, 
1986); services such as repair, maintenance, delivery, collections, pre- and post- purchase 
support, etc. compose this “massive hidden service sector” (Levitt, 1976). 
Services in some form have found a receptive audience in the operations research 
community.  Here, attention has been focused on the application of operational optimization 
theories to the service sector, in the belief that application to services of lessons learned in the 
manufacturing sector would yield substantial returns (Levitt, 1972, 1976).  This attention did not 
stop at application of the industrial logic to service delivery; rather, it continued to describe new 
service development in distinctly product terms (Bullinger et al., 2003; Cooper & Edgett, 1999; 
Edvardsson et al., 2000; Meyer & DeTore, 1999; Tidd & Hull, 2003). 
To date, there has been shockingly little focus upon services outside of the operations and 
marketing literatures.  The ProQuest ABI/Inform online research database confirms this; the 
results of several searches conducted as of early 2006 are listed below:  
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Table 2: Articles Containing “Service” in the Title, by Journal 
 
 
Journal 
 
Discipline/Focus 
“Service” in Article Title 
(Citations / Year on Average) 
Production and Operations Management Operations 6 
The Journal of Marketing Marketing > 4 
Administrative Science Quarterly Organization < 1 
Management Science Multi-disciplinary < 4 
Research Policy Multi-disciplinary < 3 
Industrial & Corporate Change Strategy < 1 
Organization Science Organizations < 1 
Harvard Business Review Managers < 2 
 
Thus, Productions and Operations Management, arguably the most prestigious and 
respected journal in the operations community, and The Journal of Marketing6, arguably the 
marketing equivalent of the Productions and Operations Management journal, are representative 
of the disciplinary breakdown of attention to services.  When one contrasts this attention with the 
number of articles in the non-operations and non-marketing journals: Administrative Science 
Quarterly7, Management Science, Research Policy, Organization Science, Industrial and 
Corporate Change, and Harvard Business Review (arguably the most relevant for managers) 
each have meaningfully less focus on the topic of services. 
Before reviewing the existing service innovation literature (if it can be so called), this 
chapter addresses the task of classification.  It is important to clarify the distinction between a 
                                                 
6 Further, and perhaps more illustrative, is the fact that the marketing community has a dedicated journal for the 
subject of services marketing entitled the Journal of Services Marketing. 
7 Just to assuage the reader’s concern that the last six years may have been anomalous, a search was conducted of 
ASQ for articles with “service” in the title going back to 1975—only 15 articles appeared in total. 
product and a service offering.  Understanding the unique characteristics and traits that merit 
labeling a particular offering a “service” is the first step in the categorization and classification 
process.   A review of articles across marketing, operations/productions, and other management 
literatures yields a view of “service characteristics” that exhibits both consensus and confusion 
with respect to what unique traits characterize a service. 
After an exhaustive search of journals and academic journals, I was able to identify 13 
articles that had some discussion of characteristics that distinguish a service from a product.  
These 13 articles, analyzed in the table below, serve as the “literature” from the perspective of 
understanding the unique service characteristics.  While the list of articles I include in my 
definition of the “literature” is likely not complete, it is definitely representative of the current 
academic understanding of services and how they differ from products. 
Consensus exists that services are intangible, perishable, simultaneously produced and 
consumed, and heterogeneous.  Confusion dominates regarding qualities such as capital and 
labor intensity, the role of the customer, magnitude of centralization, the importance of location, 
and the importance of culturally specific issues.  The table below summarizes my interpretation 
of the literature vis-à-vis the discussed “service peculiarities” and “unique service 
characteristics.”  The shaded columns represent characteristics that that are in the “consensus” 
and the un-shaded columns are areas of perceived confusion. 
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Table 3: Evaluating the Key Service Characteristics: An Overview of the Literature 
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(Bitran & Logo, 1993) X X X X    X   X 
(Chase, 1978)    X X X   X   
(Chesbrough, 2004) X X X  X X      
(Cooper & Edgett, 1999) X X X X        
(Edvardsson et al., 2000) X X X  X X X X X   
(Heskett, 1987) X X X    X X    
(Judd, 1964) X           
(Miles & Boden, 2000) X X X X X X      
(Nightingale, 2003) X X  X        
(Quinn & Gagnon, 1986) X X X X      X  
(Shostack, 1984) X X X         
(Sirilli & Evangelista, 1998) X X     X     
(Vermeulen & Van Der Aa, 
2003) 
X X X X        
TOTAL (13 possible) 12 11 9 7 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 
 
Each of the four consensus characteristics merits brief discussion.  The goal here is not to 
discuss how each of these four service characteristics affects management practice; rather, the 
objective at this point is simply to illustrate what is meant by the characteristic and how the 
characteristic manifests itself in a service offering. 
Intangibility 
 
The most accepted service characteristic in the literature is intangibility.  Examples 
abound.  A customer purchases services from a hotel.  After spending the night in the room, 
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he/she has nothing to show for the service purchased.  Another customer picks up the phone and 
dials a friend in Europe.  After utilizing this communications service, he/she is billed for value 
received but again has nothing to show for the service purchased.   
Judd (1964) noted that the intangibility requirement for classification of an offering as a 
“service” is extremely useful in that it provides two key benefits: (a) the criteria is clear and 
mutually exclusive (either something is tangible or it is not, there is no “hybrid”), and (b) the 
demarcation will allow for appropriate description of services and the development of an 
understanding of how they differ from products. 
Although services often have a physical record of their having been performed (consider 
the actual report produced by a management consultant), the actual service is not tangible.  This 
is an important distinction to make as the intangibility description is often not as clear-cut as one 
would hope.  Often a tangible good is provided to a customer by a service company.  To remain 
consistent, however, we can distinguish between the service and the product – although they may 
be bundled.  Consider the case of fast-food restaurants such as McDonalds.  Although one can 
argue that they are producing hamburgers, the appropriate analysis will allow for segmentation 
between the product and the service.  The product is the beef, bun, onions, ketchup, and paper-
wrapper.  The service is embodied in the preparation of these items into an offering that is 
purchased, the provision of an environment in which to eat the offering, and the convenience of 
allowing for a single financial transaction.  Surely one sees the value of buying a hamburger for 
~$1 vs. the procurement of ground beef, buns, tomatoes, napkins, ketchup, and a place to eat. 
Simultaneity & Perishability 
 
 The choice to link (and ultimately dismiss one of) the next two most common 
characteristics is a conscious one as they appear highly inter-related.  It is precisely because 
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services are simultaneously produced and consumed that they are also perishable.  In fact, 
returning to our classification and categorization logic, the value of a distinguishing 
characteristic is that it is mutually exclusive (i.e. if it applies to a service, it does not also apply to 
a product).  Unfortunately, despite the consensus in the literature that services are perishable, this 
distinction is not a useful one.  Many products are perishable as well. Consider a banana, which 
is thought to have a useful life of less than one week.  (A useful modification to the definition, 
perhaps, is that services are instantaneously perishable.  See below.) 
Simultaneity, however, is a useful characteristic and is unique to services.  Examples 
include telephone calls, hotel stays, doctor/dentist visits, electricity procurement, cleaning 
services, or automobile maintenance services.  It is impossible in each of these services to 
separate production and consumption.  Air transportation provides another example.  Consider a 
flight from Boston to San Francisco.  The service offered is transportation between the two 
cities.  The service “production” begins upon customer boarding and concludes upon deplaning 
at the destination.  Service consumption, likewise, begins upon customer boarding and concludes 
upon deplaning.  There is no way for service production to occur without consumption.  An 
empty seat instantaneously perishes.  It represents service production for which there will never 
be consumption.  One might argue that the next available flight allows for later consumption 
(particularly if one has purchased a flexible ticket), but the argument falls upon itself.  The later 
flight is a new service production. 
Multiple services may be combined into a bundle that appears to offer non-simultaneity.  
Baggage delivery services (accompanied by air travel) may result in drop off before the flight 
and baggage claim after the flight.  Occasionally (and unfortunately) these services are 
decoupled.  Likewise, ticket purchase and customer service are “accompanying services” that 
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can be decoupled from the actual transportation services which the consumer has received.  In 
each case, one will notice that the actual service is simultaneously produced and consumed in an 
offering. 
Heterogeneity 
 
As a result of the fact that “humans tend to be inconsistent in their behavior and therefore 
in their delivery and consumption of services” (Bitran & Logo, 1993), the customer-provider 
interface becomes a point of significant heterogeneity in services.  One can contrast this 
heterogeneity with the factory-produced tangible offering which might have a six sigma quality 
rating of 99.9997% similarity to all other tangible offerings. 
The literature accepts that humans are inconsistent and that services, often delivered by 
humans, are therefore unlikely to be homogenous.  Services tend to be specialized to provide the 
greatest value to individual customers.  Even seemingly homogenous customer objectives (such 
as in the airline industry where customers want to be taken from point A to point B) have been 
customized for customers demanding refundable tickets and those who are willing to pay for 
extra comforts while traveling (first class).   
Further, the fact that humans are involved in the production and consumption of services 
leads to an inherently inconsistent social interaction that will lead to a potentially different 
experience each time.  Several scholars have noted the importance of this “interaction” point, 
referring to it as the “moment of truth” (Bitran & Hoech, 1990).  Others have noted that 
customer involvement leads to necessarily heterogeneous outcomes and that managers of service 
companies should seek to minimize customer interaction in a quest for efficiency (Chase, 1978) 
– generally seeking to control customer involvement in the service production process. 
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Non-Consensus Attributes of Services 
 
In addition to these four three “consensus” characteristics that are unique to services, 
several other characteristics are mentioned in the literature.  The following brief review of each 
of these attributes intentionally avoids any discussion of why the literature lacks consensus. 
Customer as Participant 
 
 The literature varies in the extent to which it addresses the importance of the customer in 
a service offering.  The customer role in a service transaction is very different than his/her role in 
a product transaction; in a service transaction, a customer is a key participant in the production 
process and can play multiple roles.  Professor Hank Chesbrough of the University of California 
at Berkeley eloquently captures this difference between a service and product transaction:  
 
The service transaction is different.  The exchange is generated by 
both parties, and the process of adoption or consumption is an 
integral part of the transaction.  So the adopter or customer is also 
a co-producer, intimately involved in defining, shaping, and 
integrating the service into his or her organization. The supplier of 
the service can extend an offer of what is to be provided…but 
cannot entirely specify the requirements of the service.  Instead, 
the supplier designs the system to elicit this information from its 
customers, and modifies the offering in response to customers’ 
needs before the sale…(Chesbrough, 2004) 
 
Several researchers have suggested using “degree of customer involvement” and 
“magnitude of customer contact” to classify service types (Bitran & Lojo, 1993; Bitran & Hoech, 
1990; Chase, 1978; Chase & Dasu, 2001; Heskett, Jones, Loveman, Jr, & Schlesinger, 1994).  
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Some suggest “respecting the customer” (Bitran & Hoech, 1990) while others suggest 
minimizing customer involvement to achieve greater efficiency (Chase, 1978). 
Labor and Capital Intensity 
 
Services tend to be produced via either labor or capital-intensive methods.  Examples of 
services in the first group—high labor-intensity—include professional service firms such as 
management consultancies, law firms, accounting firms, and some training companies.  These 
organizations are people-heavy, with a majority of the costs originating in human resources.  Due 
to the inability to fire professionals on a project by project basis, the cost structures of these 
professional service firms are primarily fixed.  Management of professional services firms is 
difficult, as personalities and egos often complicate efficient teamwork.  Scholars have addressed 
the importance of recognizing this dependence upon employees, providing case studies of 
professional service firms managing strong egos while fostering teamwork (Lorsch & Tierney, 
2002; Maister, 1993; Sasser et al., 1991). 
 Examples of high capital-intensive service offerings include hotels, airlines, and 
telecommunications services.  Large fixed plants and high capital expenditures characterize these 
offerings, with initial start-up costs running into the hundreds of millions of dollars.  Similar to 
the labor-intensive offerings, which are driven by staff utilization, these high capital intensity 
businesses are driven by plant utilization.  Success is driven by customer loyalty, demand 
management, and achieving consistent consumer satisfaction.  Scholars have written cases on 
airline, hospitality, electric utility, telecommunications, education, and logistics companies 
(Guile & Quinn, 1988a; Heskett, Sasser, & Schlesinger, 1997; Sasser et al., 1991). 
 Given the inability of capital or labor intensity to distinguish between service and product 
companies, it seems the distinction is not particularly useful.  This is particularly true given that 
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many products are made via both labor intensive methods and capital intensive methods.  Of 
greater value, perhaps, is the importance of “utilization management” in services (see below). 
Co-Location 
 
Most services are consumed in the same location at which they are produced (Bitran & 
Logo, 1993).  This characteristic of services implies that producers either travel to the consumer 
or the consumer travels to the producer.  It is impossible for a cleaning service to clean a house 
without visiting the house.  The production (cleaning) necessarily occurs at the site of the 
consumption (the house).  Similarly, a guest is unable to procure accommodations (the 
production) at a hotel without visiting the site to sleep in the room (the consumption).   
While modern technologies are introducing an element of “distance” into this relationship 
(Edvardsson et al., 2000), they are unable to remove the essential existence of a 
production/consumption interface.  This interface is referred to as the “moment of truth” (Bitran 
& Hoech, 1990) because “much of a service’s perceived value is created at the moment and 
place of contact” (Quinn & Paquette, 1990) – which is often in the field.   
Customization 
 
Although several scholars claim that services are characterized by their high degree of 
customization (Chesbrough, 2004; Miles, 1993), several others note that services can be 
standardized in a manner that allows for increased efficiency and greater scale (Chase, 1978; 
Levitt, 1972, 1976).   Within services, customization is most clear among professional and 
personal services firms that cater to each client’s specific situation.  Tax preparation, legal, hair 
styling, and catering services are highly customized solutions to specific client needs.   
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 Closely related to the issue of customization/standardization is the subject of scale 
economies.  Given that scale is a derivative of the customization issue (higher standardization 
allows for greater scale and greater customization limits scale), the issue of scale is a moot point 
and follows from conclusions regarding standardization. 
This customization distinction, however, does not help distinguish between products and 
services.   Can products be customized?  Of course. Consider Dell Computer, which offers 
customized computing products to meet client needs.  It is also possible to order a car with the 
exact colors and features that you desire.  Further, authors Joseph Pine and James Gilmore have 
noted that this approach can serve as the basis of a mass-customization strategy (Gilmore & Pine, 
2000; Gilmore & Pine, 1997; Pine, 1993) which allows for the scale and cost benefits of mass 
production with the customized benefits of individualization. 
While some may argue that these examples are not really customized products but rather 
configured products, the question then is matter of degree.  Likewise, can services be 
standardized?  Absolutely, one need only look at the delivery services offered by UPS or FedEx 
or restaurant services offered by McDonald’s or Burger King. 
Cultural Specificity 
 
Bitran and Lojo (1993) note that the cultural context in which a service is consumed 
and/or produced is an attribute of the service itself: “culture influences the expectations and 
behavior of customers and service providers, and gaps that may exist between their cultural 
orientations can either enhance or detract from the service encounter.”   They go on to note how 
“good” restaurant service in the northeastern US differs dramatically from “good” service in the 
South.  Northeasterners expect formal distance (both figuratively and literally) between the 
customers and servers, while Southerners prefer informal, friendly interactions between the 
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customers and servers.  The issue of cultural specificity is obviously important in international 
contexts, particularly when crossing major cultural barriers (Asia vs. Western Europe, etc.).   
 While the subject of cultural specificity clearly applies to services, its value as a 
distinguishing characteristic (between products and services) is limited as cultural issues also 
come into play when marketing products.  For instance, cars sold in the United States may be 
culturally unacceptable to Europeans who seek smaller (to accommodate parking constraints) 
and more fuel efficient (to accommodate higher fuel taxes) vehicles.  Likewise, clothing styles 
may vary from culture to culture, resulting in a need to produce garments catering to the tastes of 
a particular culture. 
Summary: What are Services and How Do They Differ From Products? 
 
 In an effort to synthesize the findings of the literature (and the interpretation thereof 
presented above), the table below captures the five main service characteristics that seem to have 
classification and categorization value in distinguishing services from products. 
 
Table 4: The Five Key Service Traits 
 
Characteristic Description of the Trait Air Travel Example Illustration 
Intangibility After “consuming” a service, no 
physical manifestation of the offering 
exists.  Customers are not left with 
anything tangible as a result of their 
having purchased a service.   
After a customer has consumed 
travel services such as air transport, 
she/he is left at the destination with 
nothing physical (apart from the 
ticket stub) to show for the 
expenditure. 
Simultaneity/ 
Perishability 
Services are simultaneously produced 
and consumed.  Customers are 
therefore unable to see or experience 
the actual service they will receive 
before it is delivered.  Further, 
services are perishable and cannot be 
“stored” in a format for later delivery.
If a passenger is on a plane, then 
she/he is consuming the service as 
it is produced.  If she/he is not on 
the plane, then the service has 
perished and been produced without 
consumption. 
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Heterogeneity Each service encounter is somewhat 
unique and the particular service 
being procured is not produced (for 
examination by the client or anyone 
else) before the time of consumption.  
Every time a passenger gets on a 
plane, she/he is subject to the mood 
of the flight attendants, the weather 
conditions (turbulence), and air 
traffic (delays).  Each affects the 
perceived quality of the service. 
Customer 
Involvement 
Due to the simultaneous (perhaps 
joint) production and consumption of 
services, customers affect the quality 
and effectiveness of the service; 
further, customers may interact 
among themselves. 
Despite having an on-time flight 
without any turbulence, one unruly 
passenger can affect the service for 
all other passengers.  Further, a 
passenger may demand a window 
seat when none is available. 
Co-Location Most services are also consumed in 
the same location at which they are 
produced.   
It is impossible for one to consume 
air travel without being on the 
plane.  Likewise, it is not possible 
to produce air travel without that 
same plane. 
NOTE: Adapted from (Mansharamani, 2005). 
How the Service Traits Affect the Management and Strategy of Firms 
 
 This section of the chapter evaluates the implications of the five unique service offering 
characteristics upon service firm management practice, in an effort to escalate the unit of 
analysis from the level of the service offering to the level of the firm.  In particular, the objective 
is to explore how the unique offering characteristics demand unique general management 
practice.  Further, this section of the chapter will also evaluate how these five unique 
characteristics might affect our analysis of firm strategy (assuming all else remains equal). 
Implications of Intangibility 
 
Three managerial implications arise from the intangibility attribute: (1) the marketing and 
sale of services is far more complex and “psychological” than that of products due to the 
inability to see or experience a service prior to its purchase/consumption – resulting in greater 
dependence upon reputation; further, the inability to return a service yields greater “angst” in the 
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purchase decision as it has a sense of permanence not present in product purchase decisions; (2) 
the intangible nature of service offerings makes it extraordinarily difficult to appropriate 
innovations due to the “open and obvious” nature of them; customers will want to know exactly 
what service is to be provided before they agree to procure the new innovation; and (3) 
intangible services that are bundled with products are not seen as valuable by themselves – 
despite the fact that the product may have no value without them. 
Bitran and Lojo (1993) began to explore the managerial implications of this quality, 
noting that “the intangible nature of services makes it difficult to promote their consumption on 
purely technical grounds.”  Due to the intangible nature of the service, decisions to purchase tend 
to overweight (relative to decisions to purchase products) expectations and perceptions (Chase & 
Dasu, 2001), resulting in the prevalence of service guarantees and quality assurance programs 
(Heskett, 1987; Heskett, Sasser, & Hart, 1990; Reichheld & Sasser, 1990).   
Because customers are unable to see or experience the actual service they will receive 
prior to their purchase/consumption of the service8, reputation is also a prominent element of any 
service business model—this is not to say that reputation is not important in products, merely 
that it seems to be of greater importance in services.  Consumers will likely depend on the 
experiences and impressions of others as well as their own beliefs in making decisions regarding 
services.  Many academics have used this fact to develop theories stressing the importance of 
generating customer loyalty (Bitran & Hoech, 1990; Chase & Dasu, 2001; Coyne, 1989; 
Edvardsson et al., 2000; Hart, 1990; Heskett et al., 1997; Shostack, 1984; van Biema & 
Greenwald, 1997). 
                                                 
8 See “Implications of Simultaneity/Perishability section below for a brief discussion of how standardization may 
affect a customer’s ability to judge the expected service based upon prior deliveries of the service. 
Intangibility also makes it particularly difficult for firms to appropriate service 
innovations.  The “open and obvious” nature results from the requisite sharing with customers 
what they will receive; without sharing, customers would not be able to asses the value of the 
offering.  Further, although business method patents are an increasingly popular class of patents, 
the ability to seek intellectual property protection for an intangible good is limited and its 
effectiveness as a means of protection is questionable.   
Third, intangibility exacerbates the “taking-for-granted” or undervaluing of a service by 
customers, particularly when the service is bundled with products.  Certain services suffer from 
what earlier work labeled as the “lighthouse syndrome” (Mansharamani, 2005).  Just like the 
unrecognized (until removed) value of a lighthouse, maintenance and preventative services are in 
an unfortunate situation vis-à-vis the customer when it comes to the obviousness of value 
delivered.  Most customers do not realize the value of the service unless things go wrong, in 
which case they tend to blame the service provider.  Service providers that efficiently and 
effectively accomplish their objective of no breakdowns, however, fall victim to their own 
success as customers may not see the value of their offering.  Although reputation can alleviate 
some elements of this potential problem, the need to “materialize” the service and make the 
customer aware of value received remains important (Bitran & Logo, 1993). 
From a strategic perspective, these three ramifications of intangibility (all else being 
equal) affect competition by impacting the threat of entry.  As discussed above, the inability for 
customers to analyze an offering prior to its consumption greatly complicates the nature of the 
marketing function.  In particular, reputation acquires an increased importance in the minds of 
consumers considering the purchase of service, which in turn reduces the threat of entry from 
new competitors that lack the reputation needed to compete.    
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Implications of Simultaneity / Perishability 
 
The primary ramification of the simultaneous production and consumption of service 
offerings upon service firms is the inability to pre-produce services (i.e. create an inventory 
buffer) to smooth mismatches between supply and demand (Bitran & Mondschein, 1997).  This 
has two direct ramifications for service managers: first, service production capacity may remain 
inactive for periods of time (a phenomenon I term “the stranded capacity problem”), and second, 
customer needs may be unmet during periods of peak demand (a phenomenon I term “the 
inadequate capacity problem”).  These two direct results confuse pricing and complicate capacity 
planning (Berry & Yadav, 1996).   
The stranded capacity problem arises from the relatively-fixed capacity of most service 
firms.  While this is obvious in capital-intensive sectors such as air travel, hospitality, electricity, 
and telecommunications, it is also present in (skilled) labor-intensive services such as 
professional services.  At the root of the problem is the inability to rapidly reduce capacity in 
times of weak demand.  Two primary methods exist for dealing with the stranded capacity 
problem: (a) spurring demand during these periods (such as hotels and airlines with “off-peak” 
fares or other incentive programs), and (2) forming variable “capacity” (such as restaurants with 
wait staff paid hourly, construction firms with 100% temp laborers, and airlines that cancel 
flights when lacking adequate customer demand (they don’t really do that, do they?!), etc.) 
The inadequate capacity problem is driven by the inability to inventory services.  While it 
is definitely possible to prepare some portion of the service in advance of its delivery (Chopra & 
Lariviere, 2005), it is impossible to inventory a service.  Thus, although accountants can pre-
populate forms with prior year data, they cannot pre-calculate tax returns for potential 
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consumers.  Likewise, auto repair services need an understanding of the problem (tire alignment, 
engine malfunction, air conditioning problem) before they can deliver a repair solution. 
The inseparability of production and consumption, when combined with the relatively 
fixed nature of costs in these industries, leads to management efforts focused on utilization 
maximization.  Given that utilization cannot at any point exceed 100%, many service firms 
“variabilize” supply and smooth demand to motivate customer purchases in off-peak periods.9  It 
is this problem that originally attracted operations scholars such as Gabriel Bitran, Theodore 
Levitt, and others to the study of service firms. 
Finally, it appears that simultaneity complicates a problem discussed above under the 
“implications of intangibility” section – namely, the inability of customers to evaluate a service 
prior to its procurement.  The fact that there are degrees of service standardization seems to 
cause some confusion on this matter.  While a customer cannot in fact view the actual service 
that he/she will receive, the customer can view the service as delivered to other customers in 
prior deliveries.  Consider airlines and package delivery services.  While a customer may have an 
expectation of the service to be delivered (i.e. the plane takes off from Boston and lands in 
Dallas), there is no way to know about the “quality” of the service beforehand.  Will the flight 
attendant be in a good mood?  Will there be a screaming baby next to a focused business 
customer?  What about turbulence and weather conditions?  Perhaps the airspace is particularly 
congested today, resulting in massive delays…or that the baggage handlers forgot to load the 14 
pieces of luggage that were connecting from a different flight…  Thus, although the “unknown” 
                                                 
9 While it is true that firms can have workers continue to work overtime and exceed the planned capacity of the firm, 
such measures are only temporary as the fundamental constraint of capacity remains due to the simultaneity of 
production and consumption.  After a service operation is 100% utilized for 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, 365 
days per year, there is no ability to surge utilization.  
factor of a service is smaller in standardized services, it is not absent.  It merely boils down to a 
matter of degrees and gradations of “standardization.” 
Perhaps the best admission of this variability in service performance arises from the 
financial services and investment management community’s primary disclaimer: “Past 
performance is no guarantee of future results.”  Thus, although one can assume that past 
performance of a service has been acceptable, it does not necessarily mean that your own 
experience will be as positive as those before you.  As stated above, service guarantees and other 
quality assurance/control mechanisms can be used to address this issue – but even these 
mechanisms target “after the fact” service recovery.  The importance of reputation, highlighted 
above, is further strengthened by the simultaneity of services. 
The strategic ramifications of the supply-demand management complication discussed 
above, however, create unique complications for the management of service firms.  In particular, 
it affects the power of customers / buyers in a fairly dramatic manner.  In evaluating the extremes 
of very specific and very flexible consumer needs, we find that customer need specificity 
dramatically alters the nature of the perishability-customer power relationship.  In particular, 
customers with flexible needs have increased power.  Consider the case of air travel.  Those 
consumers willing to purchase air transport services at the last minute—when the services would 
otherwise “expire”—have tremendous power over producers.  Surely $50 received for a cross 
country flight is better for an airline than an empty seat crossing the country.  On the other hand, 
however, consumers with very specific needs are significantly less powerful vis-à-vis producers.  
The need to fly on a specific date and on a specific routing leaves a consumer with few options.  
Thus, the perishability characteristic of services (all else being equal) interacts with the nature of 
customer needs to affect the bargaining power of customers. 
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Implications of Heterogeneity 
 
The necessarily social nature of most services, as discussed above, leads to an inherently 
heterogeneous offering.  Further, many services companies—such as auto repair, management 
consulting, investment management, IT services, and hotel companies—operate in unregulated 
environments.  Despite the fact that no mandated restrictions affect these companies or protect 
them from market forces, many of these service companies use certifications to generate an 
image of quality consistency.  Industry associations and independent certification organizations 
assure the consistency of human resource capability in several service industries.  Even 
management consulting firms, which seemingly lack “quality assurance” measures comparable 
to certification, employ only MBA students from the top business schools—effectively creating a 
“pseudo-regulated” certification process.   Similar certifications exist in IT services (Microsoft 
Certifications, etc.), finance (Chartered Financial Analyst), law (membership in the Bar 
Association), and real estate brokerage (licensure, etc.). 
In addition to training for consistent service quality, mangers need to train employees to 
be flexible enough to handle heterogeneous customers and to simultaneously produce a 
consistent offering that does not create any unnecessary reputation risk – a non-trivial task.  
Academics recognize the importance of this issue; two primary schools of thought exist as to the 
appropriate manner in which to utilize service employees.   
The first, which I shall call the Empowerment School, suggests that optimal performance 
on the heterogeneity/consistency tradeoff is achievable via accommodation on the heterogeneity 
side of the equation (Bowen & Lawler, 1992; Bowen & Lawler, 1995; Schlesinger & Heskett, 
1991).  These scholars believe that managers should train employees so that they are flexible 
enough to accommodate heterogeneous customer needs (i.e. create “empowered” employees).  
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The most famous example of a company that has successfully utilized this approach is Southwest 
Airlines, where employees are empowered to adapt to customer needs. 
The second school of thought is based upon the belief that employees can only add 
volatility and heterogeneity to the service and therefore need to be “trained” into operating like 
machines.  This approach, which we shall call the Production Line School, essentially believes 
that service quality and performance can be improved through the introduction of scripts, 
policies, and procedures from which employees should not deviate (Davidow & Uttal, 1989; 
Levitt, 1972, 1976; Swank, 2003).  McDonalds, Shouldice Hospital, and Jefferson Pilot Financial 
are three companies profiled in the literature that demonstrate how production-line style 
management can be successfully implemented. 
From a strategic perspective, the heterogeneity of offerings leads a heavy dependence 
upon labor management.  The two approaches highlighted above show the two strategic 
extremes, with empowerment dramatically increasing the importance of labor as managers 
demand “capable professionals” while the production line approach seeks machine-like 
execution from “dumb-labor.”  Given that a primary ingredient in the production of most 
services is human labor, the heterogeneity characteristic of service therefore interacts with labor 
philosophies to affect the bargaining power of suppliers.  In particular, managers that adopt an 
empowerment approach to heterogeneity management are more dependent on capable, dynamic, 
and adaptable labor (thereby increasing the bargaining power of labor), while those opting for a 
production line approach are willing to utilize virtually any labor (thereby decreasing the 
bargaining power of labor). 
Further, the Empowerment School and the Production-Line School approaches impact 
the nature of rivalry and competition among existing firms.  In particular, the production line 
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approach seeks to achieve consistency and standards comparable to that in manufacturing; the 
goal is scale, cost-efficiency, and high quality (defined as high consistency).  The result of this 
approach is more-likely-than-not to be a competitive strategy based on price and scale.  
Empowerment oriented managers, however, focus on enhancing the customer experience via a 
highly adaptable employee force that meets unique customer needs.  As a result, companies 
taking this approach are more-likely-than-not to pursue competitive strategies based on customer 
experience differentiation. 
Implications of Customer Involvement 
 
Although customer involvement in the production process is not unique to services 
(Thomke & Von Hippel, 2002; von Hippel & Katz, 2002; von Hippel, Thomke, & Sonnack, 
1999), it does lead to interesting managerial actions.  To begin, managers need to understand that 
management of the customer is just as important as management of the employees—because 
both can equally influence the service production process due to the “location” of knowledge.  
Service firms need to devise appropriate mechanisms through which customer knowledge that 
may be tacit and/or sticky (Chesbrough, 2004; von Hippel, 1994, 2001) can be extracted – a task 
that is seemingly essential to the designing, developing, and delivering of new services. 
 For example, consider the service of an IT implementation firm.  In order to deliver a 
high-value implementation of information technology, the client must provide the service firm an 
understanding of how the IT will be used, what business processes will be automated by the IT, 
etc.  Without such knowledge, it becomes impossible for an appropriate solution to be devised.  
Similarly, it is impossible for even the most-skilled attorney to create an estate plan that 
accomplishes her/his client’s objectives without a detailed understanding of the client’s situation 
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and goals.  Thus, the inherent nature of customer involvement in a service leads the managers of 
service firms to be dependent upon their customers. 
 Two primary research streams exist addressing the role of the customer in a service 
offering.  The first, championed by Heskett et al. (1997), emphasizes the development of 
customer loyalty.  According to these authors, the value of repeat interactions with the same 
customer rises dramatically as the number of interactions increase.  Thus, the value of a customer 
increases with the nature and level of customer-employee interaction.  High touch customers are 
better than low touch customers.  The second research stream, epitomized by Chase (1978), 
claims that greater customer interaction yields lower standardization and efficiency.  Effectively 
a production-line approach to customer management, the logic of the argument is that customers, 
like employees, introduce inefficiency and should be managed accordingly.   
 The involvement of the customer has quite significant ramifications for the strategy and 
management of service firms.  As customer gain familiarity with companies, they become 
increasingly efficient co-producers of the service and are hence more valued “suppliers.”  
However, loyalty programs can lock-in customers in a manner that makes them less likely to 
leave, thereby reducing customer power.  Parallels exist for new customers: they possess less 
power as suppliers but more as potential lifelong customers (once they get “locked-in”).   These 
customer-producer relationships can also be reflexive, feeding upon themselves in a manner that 
increases switching costs for both parties: customer history with companies affects customer 
experiences which in turn affect their future history with the company.  Finally, the “lock-in” 
competitive dynamics (driven by loyalty programs and the switching costs borne by companies 
when they seek to “change customers”) tend to affect the nature of rivalry among the existing 
firms by creating an increased marginal focus on existing customers. 
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Implications of Co-Location 
 
The co-location of service production and consumption results in an increased 
geographical dispersion than with traditional product companies.  For instance, most retail 
services are located at multiple sites to facilitate customer exposure.  Similarly, lots of 
professional services (legal, accounting, financial planning, etc.) tend to take place with local 
vendors.  While it would not be unusual for an American to procure a product that is 
manufactured in China, it is highly unlikely that that same American would procure legal 
services from a lawyer greater than 100 miles away from his/her hometown.    
The primary implication for managers is that large service organizations will necessarily 
become geographically dispersed – with dramatic ramifications for the ability for a central office 
to monitor the “pulse” of the business.  This development has led to the creation of new 
organizational forms to assist centralized general managers from becoming insulated from the 
business.  Of particular note is the franchise format – popularized by many fast food and retail 
service companies.  By creating a method through which local market knowledge trickles 
towards the central office, the franchise model simultaneously allows for geographic dispersion 
and (relatively) tight centralized management controls (Bradach, 1998).  
Recent technological developments have made the co-location of producer and consumer 
an increasingly irrelevant characteristic from a strategic perspective.  Does the fact that 
Amazon.com is based in Seattle affect its service to a customer in Texas?  Because co-location 
as a characteristic does not affect strategic considerations for service firms, the topic boils down 
to one of location.   Although location and the “clustering” of industries affects competitive 
strategy (Baptista & Swann, 1998; Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1998; Porter & Stern, 2001) and the 
innovation environment within firms, the topic is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
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Summary: How Unique Service Traits Affect Firm Strategy & Management 
 
Several key issues immediately emerge from a general management perspective with 
respect to service offerings.  As discussed above, intangibility complicates the sales and 
marketing process in a way that increases consumer dependence upon reputation.  Service 
guarantees were one method used to decrease this dependence.  Further, recent advances in 
behavioral psychology have shed light on how to affect customer decisions.  With respect to the 
simultaneity-associated problems of stranded and inadequate capacity, demand and supply 
management can supplement the “pre-processing” (to mimic inventory) to minimize productivity 
losses.  Heterogeneity yielded two managerial issues – employee training philosophy (employees 
are either flexibly capable or need to be treated like machines) and customer management.  The 
problem of customer knowledge has suggested the use of toolkits and the creation of loyalty, and 
organizational forms such as the franchise model can help overcome co-location issues. 
The table below summarizes the existing research in the context of the general 
management ramifications of the five service offering characteristics. The next section of the 
chapter will evaluate how these five unique service traits affect/interact with extant innovation 
theory.   
 
 
Table 5: The Service Traits, Managerial Issues, and Corresponding Research Topics 
 
Characteristic Managerial Issues Research 
Customer inability to evaluate 
a service prior to 
procurement; reputation 
paramount to successful sale 
Service Guarantees  
(Hart, 1988, 1990; Reichheld & Sasser, 
1990) 
Intangibility 
Perception and image of 
service are very important 
Customer psychology management  
(Berry & Yadav, 1996; Chase & Dasu, 
2001) 
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Stranded capacity problem  Manage supply and demand  
(Bitran & Mondschein, 1997; Sasser, 1976; 
van Biema & Greenwald, 1997) 
Inadequate capacity problem Mimic inventory with “pre-processes” 
(Chopra & Lariviere, 2005) 
Simultaneity/ 
Perishability 
Customer inability to evaluate 
a service prior to procurement 
Service Guarantees  
(Hart, 1988, 1990; Reichheld & Sasser, 
1990) 
Employee heterogeneity 
increases inconsistency of 
service offering 
Production-line approach  
(Davidow & Uttal, 1989; Levitt, 1972, 
1976; Swank, 2003) 
Employee flexibility increases 
the perceived value of the 
service 
Employee empowerment approach 
(Bowen & Lawler, 1992; Bowen & Lawler, 
1995; Schlesinger & Heskett, 1991) 
Heterogeneity 
Customer heterogeneity 
affects service delivered to 
other customers 
Manage customers 
(Chase, 1978) 
Customer 
Involvement 
Need for knowledge resident 
with customer 
Toolkits and customer involvement  
(von Hippel, 1994, 2001; von Hippel & 
Katz, 2002; von Hippel et al., 1999) 
Facilitate knowledge transfer via loyalty 
(Heskett et al., 1994; Heskett et al., 1990; 
Sasser et al., 1978; Schlesinger & Heskett, 
1991) 
Co-Location Geographic dispersion leads 
to decreased information flow 
Franchise model (Bradach, 1998) 
 
 
 The ramifications of these five unique service straits seem to have a substantial impact on 
the competitive strategy of service firms (vs. product firms).  While several of the characteristics 
substantially impact the strategy of firms, the customer involvement trait appears particularly 
influential vis-à-vis its strategic impact on the competitive environment, suggesting that service 
strategy should be thought of as distinct from product strategy.  The table below summarizes 
how the unique service characteristics affect competitive strategy. 
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Table 6: Service Traits and Their Strategic Impact 
 
Characteristic Strategic Impact 
Intangibility Intangibility increases the importance of reputation as customers are not 
able to inspect or evaluate a service before it is procured and consumed.  
As a result, the threat of entry is reduced marginally as new entrants 
lack the reputation or customer history to overcome intangibility. 
Simultaneity / 
Perishability 
Simultaneity creates an exponential urgency regarding capacity that is 
about to perish.  The example of an empty seat on an airplane departing 
in 2 hours demonstrates the issue.  Customers with specific needs (the 
businessman who needs to be on the flight to make a meeting with a 
high-value client) will have different leverage and power than customers 
with flexible needs (the vacationing couple that is happy to take the next 
available flight with cheap seats).  As such, customers with flexible 
needs gain power, while customers with specific needs lose power. 
Heterogeneity Because employees are human beings and introduce heterogeneity into 
the service production process, management philosophy with respect to 
labor affects the competitive strategy via the bargaining power of human 
resources.  In particular, managers pursuing an empowerment approach 
will demand specific labor capabilities (i.e. an adaptable person) and will 
likely compete based on service experiences.  Thus, empowerment-
oriented managers will increase the power of labor and compete on 
customer experience.  Likewise, managers pursuing a production-line 
approach will seek the lowest cost labor available and will compete on 
cost via standardized offerings.  Thus, production-line-oriented 
managers will decrease the power of labor and compete on cost. 
Customer 
Involvement 
Because customers are both suppliers and buyers of a service offering, 
the strategic impact of this dual-role is quite dramatic.  The primary 
distinction that affects the competitive dynamic is the classification of 
customers as either existing or new.  From a customer as supplier 
perspective, existing customer suppliers gain power as they exhibit 
knowledge of a company’s service production processes.  From a 
customer as customer perspective, existing customers lose power as 
they get locked in with familiar offerings.  New customer suppliers lose 
power (due to learning costs), while new customers gain power through 
the lure of lifelong loyalty.  Finally, customer history creates a reflexive 
dynamic that creates switching costs for both the company and the 
customer, and the competitive focus drift to existing customers. 
Co-Location The co-location specific strategic impacts are negligible and do not differ 
from the well-documented location ramifications. 
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The Service Traits and Our Understanding of Innovation 
 
Over the past thirty years, management scholars have paid significant attention to 
innovation and product development.  During this time, several powerful explanations of 
innovation have emerged, specifically theories of architectural innovation (Henderson & Clark, 
1990), disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen & Bower, 1996), and 
product/technology life cycle innovation (Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Murmann, 1998; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).  This 
section of the dissertation will evaluate each of these theories and their respective ability to 
incorporate the unique service characteristics.  The next section of the dissertation will then turn 
to the service innovation and new service creation literature.   
Architectural Innovation 
 
Henderson and Clark’s theory of architectural innovation is explicitly focused on 
products.  In addition to framing their research in terms of product development, the authors 
define architectural innovations as “innovations that change the way in which components of a 
product are linked together, while leaving the core design concepts (and thus basic knowledge 
underlying the components) untouched” (Henderson & Clark, 1990).  All of the anecdotal 
examples they provide (Xerox small copiers, RCA radio receivers) and the foci of the research 
(photolithographic aligners) are products.  While there is no direct mention of the theory’s 
applicability to services, the authors do summarize the underlying logic of architectural 
innovation in terms applicable to services: “the essence of an architectural innovation is the 
reconfiguration of an established system to link together existing components in a new way” 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990).  Many service offerings can be broken down into sub-service 
components, thereby facilitating a link between architectural innovation and service companies.   
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For example, most Borders bookstores have an information desk where employees can 
provide information to customers about a particular book, whether it is in stock, and if so, its 
location in the store—a function that is one sub-service in the total value proposition that 
Borders offers its customers.  Employees use a computer terminal to look up this data before 
regurgitating it to the customer.   Recently, however, most Borders bookstores have installed 
“Title Sleuth” stations equipped with user-friendly computers to access the same databases 
formerly used exclusively by employees.  Notice that the retail service offering did not introduce 
any new components; rather, the company altered the connections between existing components 
in a manner that reduced customer wait times and improved customer satisfaction.   
On the surface, it appears that the theory of architectural innovation is broad enough to 
accommodate the unique service characteristics, especially when one considers sub-services as 
comparable to components of product systems.  A methodical review of the unique traits, 
however, reveals instances in which the theory cannot accommodate the service characteristics. 
 
Table 7: The Service Traits and Architectural Innovation 
 
Characteristic Incorporate? Comments 
Intangibility Yes Given that even intangible services can be broken down 
into sub-services, there is no reason to believe that 
architectural innovation cannot accommodate 
intangibility of the offering 
Simultaneity Yes Architectural innovation tends to focus upon the 
production process and does not explicitly comment on 
consumption 
Heterogeneity No Architectural innovation assumes that all components 
fit together in the same manner each time the sub-
systems are combined; the inherently fickle nature of 
human interaction, however, does not allow for such an 
assumption. 
Customer  Maybe Given that the customer is explicitly involved in the 
production of a service, the theory of architectural 
innovation needs to accommodate “customers” into an 
understanding of how different “production pieces” 
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interact to deliver the final “offering.” Depending upon 
how liberal one is with definitions (i.e. including 
customers as part of the production system), 
architectural innovation might be able to accommodate 
the customer involvement criteria. 
Location Yes The fact that services are produced and consumed at the 
same place does not necessarily affect the applicability 
of architectural innovation 
 
Disruptive Innovation 
 
 The disruptive innovation theory espoused by HBS professor Clay Christensen is a story 
of customer power (Christensen & Bower, 1996).  In particular, it is about the power of 
customers to mislead their suppliers into overshooting (in terms of performance) the needs for 
which customers are willing to pay.  Eventually, the very customers that faithfully informed 
vendors of their demands switch to lower cost “downmarket” providers of similar offerings.   
These innovators that attack from below with initially less capable offerings eventually achieve 
“offering performance” demanded by customers at costs lower than incumbent providers.  Often, 
initial markets of the innovator do not overlap with the incumbent’s markets.   
Given that disruption is a theory about markets, there is no reason to believe that it is not 
applicable to services.  In fact, several examples indicate that the disruptive framework is 
extremely powerful in explaining innovation within services industries.  The market for small 
parcel and letter delivery is a case where disruption from below went effectively unnoticed by 
the United States Postal Service, a dominant incumbent.  United Parcel Service, the global 
logistics company, began its operations in 1907 as a local message delivery and errand service in 
Seattle.  The American Messenger Company, as it was then known, preceded the United States 
Parcel Post system by six years and primarily served individual consumers.  The company 
expanded by addressing the needs of retailers, providing services seen by the United States 
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Postal Service as “downmarket” and non-threatening, through the 1950’s.  From the 1950s to the 
1980s the company acquired the legal rights to enter new markets and, by 1985, UPS offered 
next day air service to all fifty US states.  The late 1980s led to international operations and the 
company increased its information capabilities (tracking, etc.) through much of the 1990s.  Since 
2000, UPS has expanded its set of offerings to include logistics management services and 
purchased retail business service provider Mailboxes Etc., thereby creating a company that 
competes head on with the United States Postal Service.  Again, cursory analysis yields an 
assumption that the disruptive innovation framework can accommodate services.   
Rigorous (albeit a bit cookie-cutter) analysis, however, yields a different story.  In 
particular, it appears that simultaneity and customer involvement don’t quite fit. 
 
Table 8: The Service Traits and Disruptive Innovation 
 
Characteristic Incorporate? Comments 
Intangibility Yes The above example of package delivery services 
demonstrates that even intangible offerings can be mis-
construed by competitors as not meeting mainstream 
customer needs. 
Simultaneity No Simultaneous production/consumption leads to 
customer fear about trying service from unknown (i.e. 
new entrants) providers; “reputation” and longevity 
create additional advantage to the incumbent. 
Heterogeneity Yes The inconsistency of a service and the corresponding 
human resource and customer management 
mechanisms do not necessarily affect the applicability 
of disruptive innovation. 
Customer  No Disruptive innovations assume that customers are 
unable to fully articulate their desired objectives.  
Given the intimate involvement of customers in service 
production, it seems more likely that customers may 
lead firms to co-produce services that they seek.  
Perhaps this can explain why management consultancy 
has never faced a disruptive threat? 
Location Yes The fact that services are produced and consumed at the 
same place does not necessarily affect the applicability 
of disruptive innovation. 
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Technology Life Cycle Innovation 
 
 The primary model of product evolution argues that major innovations appear during a 
period of heightened innovation activity, a period labeled by some scholars as the “era of 
ferment.”  This heightened level of activity drops off dramatically following the adoption of a 
dominant design.  At this point, innovation activity again begins to pick up, but focused upon 
incremental process innovations (versus major product innovations) that increase quality and 
reduce cost, rather than enhance features or performance (Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy & 
Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 1994; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).   
 HBS professor Mike Tushman and INSEAD professor Phil Anderson expanded upon the 
early Abernathy and Utterback work to advance the product-process life cycle model by 
introducing technological discontinuities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986), innovations that punctuate relatively long periods of incremental change.  The cycle 
begins with an era of ferment (in which numerous possible designs exist) and continues until a 
dominant design emerges.  At this point, the cycle enters a period of incremental change and is 
punctuated with a discontinuity that leads to another era of ferment. 
 The case of online retailing demonstrates how an era of ferment relating to a core sub-
service (shipping design) resulted in a shift in the basis of competition and entry into an era of 
incremental change.  Prior to 2003, many different models existed for the pricing of the shipping 
expense sub-service.  Designs ranged from treatment of shipping as a loss leader (no cost to 
customer) through viewing shipping as a profit center (“cost plus” pricing on shipping).  Some 
vendors offered free shipping on purchases of certain dollar amounts or certain physical sizes.  
During this “era of ferment,” consumer perception of cost as measured by shipping expenses 
drove competition.   
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Although it is not yet obvious if customers now expect (a la a “dominant design”) the free 
shipping offer, let’s assume that free shipping for orders exceeding a certain dollar amount 
emerges as the accepted standard.  If this were the case, all online retailers would adopt this core 
sub-service or face the prospect of failure.  Further, the adoption of a core sub-service in the 
business model transforms the basis of competition in the overall service to one in which cost of 
shipping is no longer a variable.  The industry transforms from a fluid state to a specific state.  
The basis of competition shifts to other variables and shipping design innovations enter an era of 
incremental innovation, with a focus upon real time tracking capability and estimation of arrival 
dates.  Thus, the “standardized” sub-service effectively becomes a “dominant design.”  
The emergence of a dominant design at the overall service level is also worthy of 
analysis.  Financial services firms provide an interesting example, especially in light of their 
recent emphasis on “one-stop-banking.”  It is possible to argue that this current emphasis on 
consolidated financial services is the result of an emerging dominant design which began with 
Merrill Lynch’s 1977 introduction of its innovative Cash Management Account (CMA), a single 
account which consolidates a client’s checking, brokerage, mortgage, and credit card accounts.  
The 1970s, 1980s and 1990s might classify as an “era of ferment” in which numerous designs for 
client account management emerged; discount brokerage, savings and loan, and online banks all 
drew clients in separate directions providing “best of breed” or “point solutions.”  Beginning in 
the late 1990s, however, most financial service firms stopped competing for a portion of a 
client’s financial services business and instead adopted Merrill Lynch’s integrated approach to 
financial services, seeking to gain all of a client’s financial services business.  Even E-trade, the 
discount brokerage firm started in the heyday of online trading, today offers insurance, online 
brokerage, mortgages, auto loans, and credit card services in a single integrated account.   
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Thus, the concepts of dominant designs and product/process innovation appear to be 
applicable to service companies and while the parallel is stronger with the concept of standards, 
the product cycle theory has some relevance to services.  As for the ability of the product/process 
and technology life cycle model to incorporate the five unique service characteristics, the table 
below summarizes the analysis. 
 
Table 9: The Service Traits and the Technology Life Cycle Model 
 
Characteristic Incorporate? Comments 
Intangibility Yes The examples provided above (both intangible) are able 
to be readily accommodated by the lifecycle model. 
Simultaneity Yes There is nothing about the simultaneity of service 
production and consumption that should affect the 
ability of the lifecycle model; instantaneous 
perishability likely translates into more rapid progress 
through the cycle. 
Heterogeneity Maybe Increased variation is a basic input for the lifecycle 
model of innovation; however, it is unclear if increased 
variation at the experience level (vs. the firm level) is 
actually consistent or inconsistent with this theme. 
Customer  No The basic underlying mechanism driving the lifecycle 
model of innovation is one of variationÆ selectionÆ 
retention; customer involvement in service production 
will likely lead to adaptation (and therefore not 
selection). 
Location Yes Co-location of production and consumption does not 
create any specific issues for the lifecycle model of 
innovation. 
The Problematic Trait of Customer Involvement 
 
Across the three examples evaluated above, it is interesting to note that the most 
commonly accepted (i.e. consensus in the literature) service offering quality (intangibility) is 
readily accommodated by each theory.  Further, with the one exception of co-location (which 
appears to be a non-factor in the evaluation of these theories), the degree of acceptance of a 
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service offering in the literature (see Table 1 above) seems to be positively correlated with the 
“incorporability” score of the characteristic into extant innovation theory.   
 
Table 10: Can Existing Theories of Innovation Accommodate Unique Service Traits? 
 
 Unique Service Characteristics 
Theory Intangibility Simultaneity Heterogeneity Customer  Location 
Architectural Innovation Yes Yes No Maybe Yes 
Disruptive Innovation Yes No Yes No Yes 
Life Cycle Innovation Yes Yes Maybe No Yes 
“Incorporability” Score 
(total possible = 9) 
(3=yes, 2=maybe, 1=no) 
 
9 
 
7 
 
6 
 
4 
 
9 
Degree of Acceptance 
Score (i.e. consensus) 
(from Table 1 above) 
 
12 
 
11 
 
7 
 
4 
 
3 
 
While colleagues have justifiably suggested that the above table provides a false sense of 
objectivity, the fact remains that those service characteristics that are more commonly accepted 
are the same characteristics that present few challenges to existing theory.  No attempt is being 
made here to suggest causation (i.e. the most incorporable are later accepted or the most accepted 
are then incorporated); rather, the purpose is merely to highlight the correlation between 
accepted characteristics and those that fit into extant theory.  Attempts for precision aside, it does 
appear that the most intriguing service characteristic is the differing role of the customer—a 
topic that, upon cursory investigation, seems particularly ripe for research.   
The Service Traits and Our Understanding of New “Product” Development 
 
 This chapter of the dissertation evaluates how the unique service characteristics affect our 
understanding of product development.  In particular, it will evaluate the most commonly 
accepted product development frameworks (Clark & Wheelwright, 1992; Ulrich & Eppinger, 
2004; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992) to determine if they can accommodate the five unique service 
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traits.  I begin with a brief overview of existing product development knowledge, highlighting (a) 
the objectives of a product development process, (b) a generic product development process, 
including variations to the process, and (c) organization of development processes. 
Product Development Process Objectives 
 
The literature suggests that a successful product development process will achieve five 
key objectives: (1) quality assurance via the use of phases and stage-gates (Cooper, 2001), (2) 
coordination by effectively acting as a blueprint of the players involved and the roles they play, 
as well as the appropriate timing of particular interactions (Allen, 1977; Andreasen & Hein, 
1987; Clark & Wheelwright, 1992; von Hippel, 1986; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992), (3) planning 
via the articulation of milestones, timelines, etc. (Smith & Reinertsen, 1998; Thomke, 2003b; 
Wheelwright & Clark, 1992), (4) measurement and management (i.e. a good process allows for 
benchmarking so management can assess the quality of the product development effort) (Cooper, 
2001), and (5) highlighting improvement opportunities by careful documentation of what worked 
and what could be done to improve the process (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2004). 
The Generic Product Development Process 
 
 The product development process accepted in the literature is characterized by a multi-
phase funnel that begins with planning and concept development and ends with production 
(Ulrich & Eppinger, 2004; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992).10   The primary phases in this generally 
accepted product development sequence are strategy and planning (Meyer & Lehnerd, 1997; 
Moore, 1991; Porter, 1980), concept development with market needs analysis (von Hippel, 
1987), system level design (Ulrich, 1995), component/detail design (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991), 
                                                 
10 For an excellent overview/summary of this model, see Ulhrich and Eppinger (2004), page 14. 
testing and refinement (Thomke, 2001; Thomke & Bell, 2001; Thomke, 2003b), and transition to 
production. 
 Beyond the generic product development processes highlighted above, several variants 
have been discussed in the literature.  In addition to industry specific models such as those for 
the software industry (Cusumano, 2004; Cusumano, 1991) and the automobile industry (Clark & 
Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano & Nobeoka, 1998; Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990), Ulrich and 
Eppinger discuss development models for technology-push products, platform products, process-
intensive products, customized products, high-risk products, quick-build products, and complex 
systems.  Each is a variant on the generic product development process, albeit with minor 
modifications to the process flows. 
Organization of the Product Development Process 
 
 The next major subject in the product development literature has to do with the 
organization of R&D and other product development efforts (Allen, 1977; Andreasen & Hein, 
1987; Clark & Wheelwright, 1992; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992).  Four primary organizational 
forms have been described in the literature: (1) the Functional Organization in which a general 
manager oversees functional “silos” of marketing, engineering, operations, etc., (2) the Project 
Organization in which a general manager oversees multi-functional teams organized around 
particular projects in which project team members report only to the general manager, (3) the 
Lightweight Project Matrix Organization in which the general manager oversees functional silos 
but project teams exist and report to lightweight project managers, and the (4) Heavyweight 
Project Matrix Organization in which the general manager oversees multi-functional teams that 
also report to the heads of their functions (Hackman, 2002; Hayes, Wheelwright, & Clark, 1988). 
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Figure 2: Various Organizational Forms of Product Development Efforts 
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Source: Ulhrich & Epplinger, 2004, as adapted from Hayes et al, 1998 
. 
 A fifth and related area of the product development literature has to do with patents and 
the protection of intellectual property rights associated with new products.  There is a vast 
literature on intellectual property rights and the various means of protecting them (i.e. 
copyrights, patents, trade secrets, etc.).  While this literature is beyond the scope of this effort, an 
interested reader should consult Richard Stim’s excellent overview of intellectual property (Stim, 
2000) for a discussion of basic concepts. 
In a quest to determine if the unique service characteristics merit special attention from 
the development literature, the following table addresses each of the major product development 
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literature findings through the lens of the five service traits.  The first table below evaluates the 
generic product development process for its ability to incorporate the service characteristics. 
 
Table 11: Generic Product Development Processes and the Service Traits 
 
Characteristic Incorporate? Comments 
Intangibility Maybe Intangibility (by itself) does not affect the nature of the 
product development process; in combination with 
heterogeneous offerings and fickle customers, however, 
intangibility places greater “reputation risk” upon the 
development process for services than it does for products. 
Simultaneity Maybe The fact that service production and consumption is 
simultaneous means that it is impossible to test service 
quality without interaction with customers.  Products can be 
completely produced and evaluated by quality control 
personnel before being introduced to customers.  Such a 
process is impossible with services.  However, situations in 
which the product is highly standardized, normal product 
development processes seem not to be disrupted as 
dramatically. 
Heterogeneity Maybe Heterogeneity of “offerings” due to the inherently 
inconsistent human role prevents the incorporation of any 
quality control and/or standardized production 
methodologies.  It is conceivable, however, that design for 
manufacturing methods can be used to minimize the 
heterogeneity of the service offering. 
Customer  No A key process in the product development process is 
“testing and refinement.”  Given that a service inherently 
involves interaction with the customer (and all 
accompanying uncertainty), typical testing and refinement 
processes lead to reputation risk. 
Location Yes Co-location of production and consumption does not create 
any specific issues for the product development processes 
outlined above. 
 
As the table above shows, services do not necessarily fit into the generic product 
development process particularly well.   One service characteristic seems to generate a bulk of 
the incorporation difficulty: customer involvement.  Although simultaneity leads to all sorts of 
“pre-production” testing issues, standardization of the service seems to mitigate this impact.  
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Meanwhile, however, customer involvement leads to the introduction of massive, uncontrollable 
uncertainty.  The specific development process variants outlined in Ulrich and Eppinger (2004) 
all exhibit similar process flows (i.e. all of them have a “testing” phase) and will therefore not be 
evaluated here; these variants face the same issues as the generic process. 
The next table evaluates the ability of the organizational prescriptions for the product 
development process to incorporate the five service traits. 
 
Table 12: Organization of the Development Process and the Service Traits 
 
Characteristic Incorporate? Comments 
Intangibility Yes Intangibility increases the “reputation risk” of a 
company vis-à-vis new offerings, but it does not affect 
how the development process should be organized.   
Simultaneity Maybe The fact that service production and consumption is 
simultaneous means that it is impossible to test service 
quality without interaction with customers.  Customer 
facing (traditional “front office”) and support 
(traditional “back office”) functions need to be 
combined to holistically manage the offering.  Again, 
the same situation as discussed above arises with 
respect to highly standardized services that behave 
more like products.  In these situations, the simultaneity 
conditions do not appear to be as problematic. 
Heterogeneity Maybe The fact that the offering is inherently inconsistent due 
to human involvement leads to a greater dependence 
upon standardization and perception management.  
Aside from affecting the relative importance of the 
customer-facing functions, it does not directly affect 
organization of the development process. 
Customer  No Given the traditional role of the marketing department 
as extracting information from/about the customer and 
the traditional role of the operations department to 
“produce” the offering, service operations personnel 
need to be thought of as multi-functional as they both 
produce the offering and interact with the customer. 
Location No The organization of development processes generally 
centers around an R&D or other centralized 
development department.  Given the dispersed nature 
of service delivery, any “service R&D” effort 
necessarily needs to be distributed and decentralized.  
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Revisiting the Problematic Trait of Customer Involvement 
 
Note the problematic role of the customer in the production process and the need for a 
joint productions/marketing function vis-à-vis new service development.  It is also interesting to 
observe that the development of new services seems to be a more distributed endeavor than 
product development, driven by the co-location of production and consumption.  Further, 
simultaneity is again cause for problems among services that are not particularly standardized, 
demanding that the service “experience” be holistically delivered by front and back office 
production staff.  In those cases in which the service is highly standardized (UPS and/or FedEx, 
for instance), the simultaneity condition is not as problematic.  A customer can drop off a 
package in New York, go home, and then allow the manufacturing of the delivery service to 
begin – resulting in the arrival of the package 18 hours later in Seattle.   
The management of the “quality assurance function,” however, requires special 
incorporation of the simultaneity element.  Specifically, difficulty arises due to the dual-role 
played by service operations personnel – as both producers of the service and interaction points 
with customers (traditionally a marketing role).  This dual role implies that concepts such as 
“design for manufacturing” must be modified in the service development process to include 
customers. Thus, service development efforts – particularly those that focus on the “production” 
element (the “design for manufacturing” equivalent in services) – need to be organized 
differently by incorporating the customer in a traditionally operations/manufacturing only 
function.  Customer involvement and simultaneity thus drive the need for a “design for service 
delivery” function that is broader (from a participant perspective) than the design for 
manufacturing process. 
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Given the inability of the new product development literature to fully incorporate nuances 
specific to services, it seems necessary that the processes and organizational methods be 
modified for effective new service development.  As noted above, intangibility does not provide 
meaningful complications to the generic development process or the appropriate organization of 
the development effort.  Further, customer involvement seems to represent the most problematic 
characteristic for incorporation into theory—necessitating the need for further investigation.   
Service Innovation and New Service Development – Where Do We Stand? 
 
 This chapter discusses two topics in the literature – service innovation theory and new 
service development–in an effort to synthesize what is known and what is yet to be learned.  The 
goal is to comprehensively connect all of the prior research on the topic to formulate the current 
“state of the art” on the topic of service innovation and service development.   
Service Innovation Theory 
 
Despite the unique service characteristics noted above, many scholars have concluded 
that traditional, product-focused theories of innovation are applicable to services (Guile & 
Quinn, 1988a).  In fact, almost all work on services innovation has focused on either 
demonstrating the existence of innovation activities within services firms (Miles, 1993; Sundbo, 
1997), demonstrating the applicability of product innovation management tactics to services 
(Guile & Quinn, 1988a; Potts, 1988; Quinn, 1988) or articulating the role of innovation in 
service company strategy (Coyne, 1989; Cusumano, 2003a; Cusumano, 2003b; Lopez & 
Roberts, 2002; Meyer & DeTore, 1999; Quinn, Doorley, & Paquette, 1990; Thomas, 1978). 
Recently, Europeans scholars have been increasingly focused on service innovation, with 
scholarship concentrated at Lille University in France (Gallouj, 2002a, b; Gallouj & Weinstein, 
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1997), the University of Manchester in the UK (Miles, 1993, 2000; Miles & Boden, 2000; 
Tether, 2003; Tether & Metcalfe, 2003), the Science and Technology Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) at the University of Sussex (Hull & Tidd, 2003; Hull, 2003; Tidd & Hull, 2002, 2003a, 
b), and Roskilde University in Denmark (Sundbo, 1997, 2000).  Recent US academic research on 
service innovation has focused narrowly on service R&D/experimentation (Thomke, 2003a) and 
customer loyalty management (Hart, 1988, 1990; Heskett et al., 1994; Heskett et al., 1990; 
Heskett et al., 1997; Sasser et al., 1991; Sasser et al., 1978; Schlesinger & Heskett, 1991).  
One particularly intriguing theory developed in Europe is worth highlighting because of 
its direct comparability with traditional innovation theories.  Richard Barras describes service 
innovation as a “reverse product cycle” (Barras, 1986, 1990).  He argues that incremental 
innovation precedes an era of ferment and that the era of ferment is punctuated with a 
discontinuity through a new service offering.  In particular, improvements in the efficiency of 
delivering existing services lead to quality improvements, eventually yielding new service 
offerings.  He draws examples from the financial services industry, where he notes how 
computer technologies led financial services firms to improve existing offerings before providing 
entirely new services (Barras, 1990). 
Given that the reverse product cycle does not dispute the concepts of incremental 
innovation or the importance of a discontinuity, the model boils down to a question of timing.  If 
the reverse product cycle theory holds, periods following incremental innovation (i.e. after the 
adoption of a standard sub-service) should lead to an increased level of sub-service variation, 
which in turn should result in a new service offering.  Therefore, is the reverse-product cycle any 
different than the product lifecycle theory of innovation articulated by Abernathy, Utterback, 
Tushman, Anderson and others? 
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Perhaps the dearth of service-specific innovation theory is the result of poor conceptual 
understanding of the primary innovation process – new “offering” development.  If the field has 
failed to advance its understanding of new service development (or if it has concluded that new 
service development is not meaningfully different than new product development), then it seems 
unlikely that new service innovation theories will emerge. 
Our Understanding of New Service Development  
 
 Two excellent review articles have done a decent job of summarizing the new service 
development literature, one from the marketing perspective (Johne & Storey, 1998) and another 
from the operations angle (Menor et al., 2002).  Both pieces are incomplete, for various reasons, 
thereby meriting the current effort.  For instance, Johne and Storey (1998) base their review (and 
organization of the literature) upon the following two definitions: “ Service Product – The 
predominantly intangible core attributes which customers purchase” and “New Service 
Development – The development of service products which are new to the supplier.”  For 
reasons outlined above, the basic premise of the review leads to a gross mischaracterization of 
what constitutes a service.  Intangibility is the most commonly (and one might argue least useful 
from the perspective of developing theory) accepted characteristic of services and the one that 
has received the most attention from the product development community.  Further, a quick 
review of the annotated bibliography provided by Johne and Storey yields a shocking lack of 
breadth: of the 59 articles summarized in a short paragraph, none are from journals that cater to 
the production or operations community (i.e. not one journal with “production” or “operations” 
in the title of the publication).  Not surprisingly, most citations are from marketing-community 
oriented journals. 
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 The main review article from the operations community (Menor et al., 2002) does a better 
job of crossing communities (7 of the 131 citations are from journals with “marketing” in the 
title of the publication and  17 of the 131 citations are from journals with “productions” or 
“operations” in the title of the publication) and focusing upon the key service characteristics 
highlighted in this discussion (it addresses the traits of intangibility, simultaneity, and customer 
involvement).  It too, however, is biased in favor of operational issues with 2 of the 14 research 
opportunities highlighted by the article NOT focused upon operations, production, service 
engineering, or service design. 
 The goal of this section, then, is to provide an integrated research review that is 
“community-agnostic” to synthesize findings related to new service development, independent of 
the functional academic community in which the research was published.  To begin, it is 
probably useful to understand why the marketing and operations literatures do not cross-pollinate 
as much as one would expect, particularly in the realm of services.  Key to understanding the 
bifurcated approach to service development is the literature’s definition of a “new service.”   
 Most “new service” definitions in the literature are based heavily upon the existing and 
accepted “new product” definitions in the literature.  In particular they build upon the Booz-
Allen & Hamilton new products framework: according to the management consultancy, six main 
types of product development efforts exist: (1) new-to-the-world products, (2) new product lines, 
(3) product line extensions, (4) product improvements, (5) repositionings, and (6) cost reductions 
(Booz-Allen&Hamilton, 1982).  At the root of this definition is an understanding that new 
offerings can have elements of “newness” for customers (and markets) and elements of newness 
for firms (i.e. the producers of the products).   
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These two primary types of “newness” stress the party to whom the newness applies.  
While I have described these as “supply-side” and “demand-side” innovations in earlier work 
(Mansharamani, 2005), others have described them as “internal” or “external” (Menor et al., 
2002).  The distinction is that developments may be new to the production process (i.e. primarily 
affecting the firm or the technology used by the firm) or may be new to the customer (i.e. 
primarily affecting the customer or the market in which the development is offered).  Particularly 
noteworthy is that in the realm of products, the “internal” vs. “external” distinction is the same 
line that distinguishes operations from marketing, leading to a “siloed” approach in which 
marketing researchers focus upon concept development, customer needs, and market receptivity 
while operations researchers focus upon production.  
Within the services domain, the distinction between customer and firm newness seems 
useless.  Given simultaneous production and consumption and the inherent involvement of the 
customer in the production process, the distinction lacks merit and may, in fact, be of negative 
value and obfuscate a true understanding of a service development process.  Even the “service-
specific” development literature, however, seems intent on describing the “type of newness” as 
important.  “New to the company” and “new to the marketplace” (Cooper & Edgett, 1999) and 
“internal” and “external” newness (Bitran & Pedrosa, 1998; Johne & Storey, 1998; Menor et al., 
2002) remain part of the service development literature vocabulary.  
Despite these shortcomings, the new service development literature does offer a great 
deal with respect to the process by which new services are created.  Two main topics are 
addressed in the literature: (1) the process of new service creation and (2) organization of new 
service development efforts.  The remainder of this chapter will address these two topics and 
conclude by evaluating the gaps in this literature. 
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The Process of New Service Creation 
 
 The processes used to develop new products are usually based upon a funnel and/or 
stage-gate method.  In fact, it is considered best practice among product development 
organizations to implement and use a stage-gate process (Griffin, 1997).  Within the new service 
development literature, several authors suggest the implementation of a process (Bitran & 
Pedrosa, 1998; Cooper, 2001) similar to the stage-gate process used with product development.  
Even models that seem a bit more fluid than the stage-gate model (See Scheuing & Johnson, 
1989) continue to be sequential.  With few exceptions (Alam, 2005; Edvardsson et al., 2000; 
Gustafsson & Johnson, 2003), the service-specific literature seems merely to suggest a rigorous 
application of the new product development processes to the service domain (Meyer & DeTore, 
1999; Thomke, 2003b). 
 The exceptions tend to focus on the role of the customer.  Alam (2005) suggests that the 
customer be involved earlier in the service development process than would be the case in a 
product development effort and Gustafsson et al. (2003) take the discussion one layer deeper and 
evaluate the processes of successful service development efforts at SAS Airlines and Telia 
Mobile and conclude that successful service development processes include immersion with 
customers.  The research conducted on SAS included 1500 hours of videotaped footage, 2000 
photographs, and thousands of interviews, surveys, and “in-person” experiences of the service 
alongside of customers (acting as a customer) to develop a new service.  All of this was done in a 
quest to determine the customer experience.  The process was significantly more than “asking 
customers what they want…it’s an explicit process of deciding where to direct your energy, 
immersing yourselves in customers’ lives, and working with customers to generate, design, and 
test new ideas” (Gustafsson & Johnson, 2003, p. 144). 
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Organization of New Service Development Efforts 
 
While some have suggested that the management of services firms (i.e. not just their 
development efforts) needs to be radically revamped (Quinn & Paquette, 1990), the organization 
of services firms as a topic of discussion is beyond the scope of this sub-section.  Rather, the 
focus here is upon the organization of the development efforts within service firms. 
Case studies conducted by Frank Hull at American Express, Merrill Lynch, AIG, Bankers 
Trust, Chubb, Chase, Morgan Stanley, PaineWebber, and other service companies led him to 
conclude that most successful new service development efforts were multifunctional with teams 
crossing all primary business functions (Hull, 2003).  Empirical work on US and UK service 
companies concluded that the most successful new service development efforts were organized 
in one of four configurations: (a) project-based, (b) mass customization oriented, (c) cellular, and 
(d) organic-technical (Tidd & Hull, 2002).   
The project-based organization is a matrix organization in which individuals have dual 
reporting responsibilities to both a functional and project head; the mass customization 
configuration was characterized by the heavy involvement of customers in the development 
process; the cellular format organized a team of cross-trained and co-rewarded individuals into a 
team (not that different from the project based organization other than that it consisted of team-
level identity formation rather than individual identity retention); and the organic-technical 
organizational method was effectively the use of co-located, cross-functional teams.  Although 
three of these formats resemble the matrix organizations discussed above (Hayes et al., 1988), 
the mass customization configuration is novel and merits further investigation.  It is the only new 
service development contribution that incorporates some of the key service characteristics that 
generic product development organizational theory has not considered. 
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Service innovation scholar Jon Sundbo has also evaluated the organization of service 
development efforts and concluded that three primary models for development exist: (1) the 
industrial model, (2) the professional associates model, and (3) the managerial model (Sundbo, 
2000).  The industrial model separates production and R&D efforts.  In Sundbo’s investigation of 
service firms, this model was rare although did appear among standardized mass service firms 
(telecommunications, electricity, etc.).  The professional associates model makes new service 
development a priority for all associates and distributes the process among everyone at the firm.  
Not surprisingly, this model appeared almost exclusively among small to medium professional 
services firms.  Finally, the managerial model was the most common format in which new 
service development activities were distributed throughout the organization but were not 
centralized around a common R&D department. Other scholars have also noted the conspicuous 
lack of R&D efforts in service companies (Miles, 2000; Preissl, 2000; Sundbo, 1997).    
SUMMARY: Articulating the Holy-Grail of Service Innovation 
 
Fundamentally, the problem of customer involvement in service production is driven by 
the variability that customers introduce into the operations of a service company.  The dichotomy 
in the literature described above (marketing vs. productions/operations) is worth revisiting from 
the perspective of how each literature approaches the concept of variability.  The two disciplines, 
interestingly enough, take completely opposite perspectives on the issue of variability 
(independent of the source of the variability).  Operations and production management scholars 
have a deep-rooted aversion to variability and seek to eliminate it in any way possible.  They 
strive for lean production, economies of scale, and “six-sigma” quality vis-à-vis consistency (El-
Haik & Roy, 2005; George, 2003).  The very essence of operations theory is the elimination of 
any variability. 
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Marketing scholars, however, are always seeking to differentiate offerings.  They crave 
variability as it is synonymous with differentiation.  Variability allows for different marketing 
positionings and therefore allows firms to distinguish their offerings from those of their 
competitors.  Fundamentally, differentiation is what – marketers believe – combats the inevitable 
forces of profit-dissipating competition and commoditization.  Thus, the very essence of 
marketing theory is the eager embracement of any variability.   
Given human involvement in any process inherently creates variation, it is not surprising 
that the marketing and operations literatures take different approaches to handling the topic of 
customer involvement.  Marketers want to make products more service-like, thereby allowing 
greater differentiation of the offering.  Operations research scholars want to make services more 
product-like, thereby eliminating variability and allowing for greater efficiency. 
Thus, if one conceptualizes a two by two grid capturing the variables of interest that arise 
from the problematic role of customer involvement in service production – scale and 
differentiation – a four quadrant grid is formed as shown below.  Note that both of the 
dimensions are of interest because of the unavoidable variability introduced by customer 
involvement in the service production process.  Products have historically been conceptualized 
as having little differentiability, while services have been thought of as having high 
differentiability.  With respect to scale economies and the capability for variability-reducing 
efficient production, services were thought to exhibit low scale while products were believed to 
have tremendous scale driven by efficient manufacturability.  Hybrid offerings exhibited a 
weighted average of the pure versions of products and services and were hence restricted to a 
linear combination of the two – thereby constraining the “hybrid” category on the diagonal 
between high differentiation/low scalability and low differentiation/high scalability.  In fact, 
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even the marketing and production/operations literatures constrained themselves to movement 
along this diagonal – with marketing scholars seeking a migration towards services and 
operations researchers advocating movement towards products.   
  
Figure 3: The Scalability – Differentiation Framework 
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In earlier work (Mansharamani, 2005), I described how many service innovations can be 
interpreted as business model transformations in which a service is either “productized” or a 
standardized “product-like” service is differentiated via “servicization.”  This dissertation builds 
on that finding by evaluating the impact of strategic service innovations on a company’s offering 
strategy (as described on a 2x2 grid as shown above) vis-à-vis the two primary offering 
characteristics driven by variability caused by customer involvement in service production.   
Given my prior conceptualization of a one-dimensional spectrum ranging from pure 
products to pure services, such a framework now aligns with the framework of the literature 
Mansharamani  Page 95 
presented above along the diagonal axis connecting pure services (high differentiation and low 
scalability) and pure products (low differentiation and high scalability); the “interaction” effect 
of scalability and differentiation (i.e. the other diagonal) is a current addition to my evolving 
framework and a new contribution made in this dissertation. 
Colleagues and others have argued that the “holy grail” I articulate above is merely a new 
label for the previously articulated concept of mass customization.  While there are indeed many 
similarities, there are also numerous differences.  As articulated in the introduction above, mass 
customization is inherently about the configuration of standardized modules in a manner 
consistent with a customer’s needs.  The essence of differentiation is antithetical to the very 
standardization upon which mass customization rests: differentiation is about treating different 
customers differently.  It is about producing offerings in a manner that prevents commoditization 
via imitation. In short, differentiation is about different treatment of different customers. 
The next chapter turns to a review of strategic service innovations at two leading service 
firms with the explicit intention of contextualizing their impact on the company’s offering on the 
quadrant shown above.  While this approach is by design limited and inevitably will be 
incomplete, it will nevertheless shed some light upon various issues of concern to innovation and 
strategy scholars – including topics such as product vs. service business models as well as 
standardization vs. differentiation strategies. 
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Chapter 3 – Innovation and Scale in the Service Context: A 
Look at UPS and The Apollo Group 
 
Given the dissertation’s focus on strategic service innovation, this chapter looks at how 
two leading service companies have approached innovation.  The chapter builds on prior work of 
this author (Mansharamani, 2005) on the topic of service innovation at United Parcel Service and 
The Apollo Group.  For both of the following cases, I provide the following: (a) a brief history of 
the company, paying particular attention to the evolution of the company’s strategic focus, (b) a 
short overview of the company today, (c) a summary of the competitive landscape facing the 
industry and the companies operating within it, (d) a description of the company’s self-declared 
operating strategies, (e) descriptions of service innovations designed, developed, and deployed 
by the company as well as a short discussion of how the service innovations fit into my 
differentiation-scalability framework, and (f) a short conclusion that summarizes each 
company’s approach to service innovation and evaluates how they have done competitively 
within their industry. 
Innovation in Global Delivery Services: UPS and “Configurable Solutions” 
United Parcel Services: The Making of “Brown”11 
 
 The origins of UPS date back to 1907 when an enterprising 19-year-old, James E. Casey, 
borrowed $100 from a friend to establish his own messenger company in Seattle.  The company, 
the American Messenger Company (AMS), was one of many messenger services in the town and 
faced stiff competition.  Casey dealt with the competition by instituting “strict policies of 
customer courtesy, reliability, round-the-clock service, and low rates” (UPS, 2004).  The 
                                                 
11 Unless otherwise noted, most of the facts regarding the history of UPS are taken from the author’s interviews at 
the company or the company’s online corporate history (http://www.ups.com/content/corp/about/history.html).  
company’s primary offerings at that point included running errands, delivering packages, and 
conveying messages and documents.  AMS preceded the founding of the US Parcel Post system 
by six years. 
 By 1913, several developments led the company to re-evaluate its strategic direction.  
Improvements in the telephone and automobile greatly reduced the need for the company’s 
messenger services, and Casey determined it prudent to merge the company with competitor 
Evert McCabe.  As part of the combination, the new company was named Merchants Parcel 
Delivery and shifted its focus from message delivery to parcel delivery.  The company purchased 
its first car (Ford Model T) in 1913.  By 1918, three of Seattle’s largest stores were customers. 
 From 1919-1930, the company expanded into neighboring California.  In addition to 
beginning operations in Oakland, CA, the company acquired a Los Angeles-based “common 
carrier” service provider in 1922.  To help signify the common high quality service among the 
different geographic pockets in which it operated, the company changed its name to United 
Parcel Service.  Common carrier services were distinguished from traditional delivery services in 
that they provided automatic daily pickup calls, automatic return of undeliverables, and 
streamlined billing.  These services, although limited to the LA area until 1952, would prove 
essential in fueling the company’s later growth. 
The young UPS began retail delivery operations in NYC during the 1930s, but “by the 
early 1950’s it was clear that contract service to retail stores was limited.  UPS managers began 
looking for new opportunities while the core business remained focused on retail delivery” (UPS, 
2004).  In 1953, the company began offering common carrier services in Chicago.  The company 
also began offering air based delivery options in 1953, with two-day service available between 
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major cities on the East and West coasts.  By 1978, UPS “Blue Label Air” (which utilized 
existing capacity in the commercial airline fleet) was available in all 50 states. 
The desire to grow the business through the addition of common carrier services led UPS 
into regulatory battles against the United States Postal Service.  In fact, UPS engaged in legal 
and regulatory negotiations with various state and federal authorities throughout the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s in a quest to obtain authorization to ship freely across all 50 states.  Success 
was slow, and arrived in pieces.  After gaining authority to begin interstate service between Utah 
and Montana, the federal government granted UPS authority to connect its service in Arizona, 
Idaho, and Nevada.  Eventually, the company secured the right to connect its common carrier 
services in every state. 
 By the 1980s, UPS was established as the country’s leading parcel delivery service.  
Nevertheless, in response to airline schedule and route disruption during the 1980s deregulation 
of the airline industry, UPS began to assemble its own jet cargo fleet.  The quickening pace of 
American business led to the introduction of Next Day Air service, and by 1985, the service was 
available through the 48 contiguous US states.  International expansion marked the 1980s, with 
service being offered between six European countries and the US.  In 1989, UPS began domestic 
delivery service in Germany.  Over a period of less than two years, UPS went from a third-party 
managed fleet of 80 aircraft visiting a handful of other countries to a company operated airline 
that employed over 1000 pilots and visited over 200 countries.  
 By 1993, the company was averaging more than 11.5 million deliveries a day.  In order to 
keep track of all these deliveries and the whereabouts of each package, the company began 
investing heavily in IT systems.  Between 1986 and 1996, UPS spent over $4.7 billion on 
technology to improve package processing efficiency.  Ground package tracking was a service 
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that UPS began offering in 1992, and in 2003, UPS.com’s online package tracking tool crossed 
the 1 million tracking requests a day landmark.   
 In the late 1990s, UPS once again found itself re-examining its strategic direction.  
Sources of future growth were not obvious.  UPS management decided that “the company’s 
expertise in shipping and tracking positioned it to become an enabler of global commerce, and a 
facilitator of the three flows that make up commerce: goods, information, and capital”(Sanderlin 
et al., 2003).  UPS managers immediately began acquiring or forming companies to fulfill the 
new vision.  To facilitate acquisitions, UPS went public in 1999 and has since made three major 
acquisitions, as well as several smaller purchases.  First, the company acquired the Fritz 
Companies for $450 million in stock.  Second, a mere six days later, UPS acquired First 
International Bancorp for $78 million in stock.  In March 2001, it purchased Mailboxes Etc, a 
retail facing logistics service provider that has since been rebranded “The UPS Store” and over 
2004 and 2005, the company acquired Sinotrans Air, UPS Yamato Express, Menlo Worldwide 
Forwarding, Lynx Express, Messenger Service Stolica, and Overnite.12  These recent 
acquisitions were motivated by the dual objectives of broadening the UPS global footprint and 
diversifying the services UPS was offering to its clients.13 
Management recently formed UPS Supply Chain Solutions, an integrated supply chain 
solutions provider that streamlines the coordination of logistic, global freight, financial, mail, 
consulting, and optimization services to enhance customer performance.  UPS either formed or 
acquired companies that gave it capabilities to supply each of these services.  Today, UPS 
                                                 
12 Sinotrans Air was an express mail carrier operating in 23 cities in China, UPS Yamato was a joint venture in 
Japan which UPS now owns entirely, Menlo Worldwide Forwarding was a freight forwarder, Lynx Express was a 
parcel carrier in the United Kingdom, Messenger Service Stolica was a parcel and express mail carrier in Poland, 
and Overnite was a logistics provider specializing in less-than-truckload (LTL) transportation services in North 
America. 
13 Sinotrans, Yamato, Lynx, and Stolica were all geographic-footprint enhancements to the UPS network while 
Menlo and Overnite both expanded the types of services that UPS offers its customers. 
Supply Chain Solutions delivers an integrated solution fulfilled by UPS Capital, UPS Logistics 
Group, UPS Freight Services, UPS Mail Innovations, and UPS Consulting (Sanderlin et al., 
2003).  Although UPS Supply Chain Solutions has been losing money since its beginning, the 
company is expected to post its first annual profit in 2007, the company’s 100th year of 
operations. 
An Overview of UPS Today 
 
UPS is the world’s largest commercial and residential package delivery company and a 
growing provider of supply chain services.  The company recorded revenues of over $42 billion 
in 2005 and is expected to grow 5-8% per year for the foreseeable future.  Based in Atlanta, UPS 
operates the ninth largest aircraft fleet in North America with approximately 600 aircraft.  
During 2005, the company delivered more than 3.75 billion packages and documents (averaging 
more than 14.8 million deliveries per day).  The company operates in more than 200 countries 
and has delivery and pick-up capabilities at every single address in the United States and Europe.  
On an average day, UPS serves more than 7.9 million customers via a fleet of more than 91,000 
delivery trucks, motorcycles, vans, tractors and cars around the world.  The company also allows 
customers to interact with the company via one of 6,700 retail branches (branded as The UPS 
Store, Mailboxes Etc, or a UPS Customer Center) as well as through 17,000 authorized outlets 
and more than 40,000 drop boxes.  As of December 2005, UPS employed more than 400,000 
employees around the world. 
Mansharamani  Page 101 
Mansharamani  Page 102 
UPS is today organized as more than ten separate companies, ranging from the familiar 
cargo delivery services to UPS Capital (a bank to assist with inventory and trade export 
financing) and The UPS Store.14  The company’s 2005 Form 10-K notes: 
 
Although our primary business is the time-definite delivery of 
packages and documents, we have extended our capabilities in 
recent years to encompass the broader spectrum of services known 
as supply chain solutions, such as freight forwarding, customs 
brokerage, fulfillment, returns, financial transactions, and even 
repairs.  We are also a leading provider of less-than-truckload 
(“LTL”) transportation services.  We have established a global 
transportation infrastructure and a comprehensive portfolio of 
services and integrated solutions.  We support these services with 
advanced operational and customer-facing technology.  Our 
supply chain solutions provide visibility into moving inventory 
across the global supply chain. (UPS 2005 Form 10-K) 
 
While UPS earns a bulk of its revenues (and an even higher percentage of profits) from 
domestic package delivery (2005 package revenues were $36.6 billion), the fastest growing 
segments include international package delivery and non-delivery services.  From an overall 
financial perspective, the company has performed swimmingly, posting phenomenal operating 
results over significant periods of time.  Over the last five years alone, the company has grown 
revenues from $30 billion to $43 billion, operating profits from $4 billion to $6 billion, and net 
income from $2.4 billion to $3.9 billion.  
                                                 
14 Other businesses include UPS Air Cargo, UPS Freight, UPS Consulting, UPS Professional Services, UPS 
Logistics Technologies, UPS Mail Innovations, UPS SonicAir, and UPS Supply Chain Solutions. 
Mansharamani  Page 103 
The Competitive Landscape 
 
Although UPS competes with many companies in each segment of its business, there is 
really only one primary competitor that has the scale and breadth of capabilities to offer services 
comparable to UPS – Federal Express.  After a short discussion of the US Postal Service, which 
is occasionally thought of as a competitor, the discussion turns to Federal Express, the strategy it 
has adopted for competing with UPS, and a look at the performances of UPS and FedEx. 
The United States Postal Service 
 
 The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) is a branch of the US government’s executive 
branch.  USPS delivers more than 200 billion pieces of mail each day to over 144 million 
households and businesses via the efforts of its more than 700,000 employees.  USPS generates 
more than $70 billion of annual revenue, serves more than 7.5 million customers each day, and 
operates a network of more than 37,000 Post Offices. 
 While the USPS does in fact compete with UPS on several offerings, it is so 
meaningfully different than UPS that it does not make sense to consider it a true competitor for 
various reasons.  First, USPS is a government entity and as such is motivated by different 
objectives (ubiquity of service vs. profitability of service, etc.).  Second, as estimated by 
Citigroup,15 most of the USPS revenues come from first class mail – a service that UPS does not 
even offer.  Third, USPS express and priority mail tends to be more letter or document oriented – 
versus the UPS and FedEx foci on small packages, goods, and documents. 
In addition, USPS actions in recent years indicate that it might be better to think of it as 
either a customer or complementor of the UPS or FedEx offering suite.  This is particularly true 
                                                 
15 See Citigroup Equity Research dated November 13, 2006 and titled “UPS: More UPSide for Big Brown” 
given that both UPS and Federal Express handle large portions of USPS domestic air 
transportation needs via outsourced service.   
Federal Express 
 
 Federal Express is the original pioneer of express deliveries in the United States.  The 
company, which started operations in 1973, was founded by current Chief Executive Officer 
Fred Smith and currently operates in numerous businesses that compete head-on with UPS.  The 
company today is organized into four distinct operating units: (1) FedEx Express, (2) FedEx 
Ground, (3) FedEx Freight, and (4) FedEx Kinkos.  FedEx Express is the original worldwide 
express transportation and delivery services company; FedEx Ground is a provider of small-
package ground delivery systems, FedEx Freight is a US-focused regional less-than-truckload 
freight services company, and FedEx Kinkos is a document/printing solutions provider.   
 It is interesting to note that Federal Express and UPS did not directly compete until 1982 
when UPS introduced its Next Day Air offering.  Further, Federal Express did not enter into any 
of UPS’s historical businesses until 1998 with its acquisition of Caliber Systems, a ground 
transportation business.  Nevertheless, the companies today compete on several fronts and for the 
same customers.  Unlike UPS, however, that conceptualizes itself as a total supply chain 
solutions provider helping synchronize commerce, FedEx thinks of itself in distinctly network 
terms; the company’s 2006 annual report summarizes this perspective eloquently:  “FedEx is a 
network of networks, allowing for tailored solutions that meet the needs and expand the 
possibilities of our customers.”  It should not be surprising that the company also sets its strategy 
to optimize the network: according to the company’s 2006 Form 10-K: 
 
Through the use of advanced information systems that connect the 
FedEx companies, we make it convenient for customers to use the 
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full range of FedEx services.  We believe that seamless information 
integration is critical to obtain business synergies from multiple 
operating units…We manage our business as a portfolio—in the 
best interests of FedEx as a whole, not a particular operating 
company (Federal Express 2006 Form 10-K). 
 
Management’s operating philosophy is to compete via a portfolio of companies, which, to use 
Chief Executive Officer Fred Smith’s terms, are “operating independently, competing 
collectively, and managed collaboratively.”    
 Specifically, the company’s Form 10-K highlights three strategic initiatives that the 
company is pursuing in support of its efforts to compete: (1) optimizing and expanding the 
Federal Express network, particularly in markets such as China and India, (2) increasing the 
capacity of the FedEx Ground and FedEx Freight networks while also expanding the FedEx 
Kinko’s network, and (3) “emphasizing the ‘compete collectively’ part of our core strategy 
through service improvements and focusing our employees and contractors on delivering the best 
customer experience in the industry, resulting in better alignment across the entire FedEx 
network” (Federal Express 2006 Form 10-K). 
A Humble Strategic Vision: Organize Global Commerce  
 
Given its impressive track record of operating performance, UPS finds itself today facing 
one of its largest challenges to date: figuring out a way to sustain the growth.  Before diving into 
the company’s stated strategies, I first describe what management feels are its strengths that help 
it compete against other logistics service providers.  According to the UPS 2005 Annual Report, 
the company differs from other competitors in the logistics market in the following manners: (1) 
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global reach and scale, (2) technology development and usage, (3) a broad, flexible range of 
services and integrated solutions, (4) customer relationships, and (5) the distinctive UPS culture.   
Each of these five points merits brief discussion.  While the company’s presence in the 
US is obvious to almost everyone here in America, the fact that UPS has air hubs in Germany, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Philippines demonstrates the company’s global 
footprint.  UPS has operated in Europe for over 30 years and has a developed air and ground 
business comparable to its US business.  It further serves more than 40 Asian countries and 
territories, and is the largest air cargo carrier in Latin America and the Caribbean.  As mentioned 
earlier, the company has operations in over 200 countries. 
UPS is a leader in developing and using technology.  In addition to the package tracking 
capability offered to customers, the company has extensively utilized technology in sorting 
facilities and created technologies that enable customers to link to real-time package information.  
UPS also offers integrated e-commerce solutions allowing online merchants to directly integrate 
with UPS to manage, monitor, and provide their clients with visibility into the supply chain. 
The broad, flexible set of services and integrated solutions are best summarized in the 
company’s 2005 Annual Report: 
 
Our express air services are integrated with our vast ground 
delivery system – one system handling all products.  The integrated 
air and ground network enhances efficiency, improves productivity 
and asset utilization, and provides us with the flexibility to 
transport packages using the most reliable and cost-effective 
transportation mode or combination of modes (UPS 2005 Annual 
Report). 
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The fourth UPS strength—the company’s customer relationships—is fairly self-
explanatory and stems from the other UPS strengths listed above as well as the company’s 
longevity (celebrating 100 years in business during 2007).  The fifth and final strength is the 
UPS culture.  In addition to having a long-standing “employee-owner” approach to incentive 
compensation,16 the company has a strong tradition of promoting from within: 
 
…this policy makes it generally unnecessary for us to hire 
managers and executive officers from outside UPS.  The vast 
majority of our management team began their careers as full-time 
or part-time hourly UPS employees, and has spent their entire 
careers with us.  Our chief executive officer and many of our 
executive officers have more than 30 years of service with UPS 
and have accumulated a meaningful ownership stake in our 
company (UPS 2005 Form 10-K). 
 
The UPS operating strategy, which leverages the five strengths just discussed, focuses on 
sustaining the growth trajectory the company has developed over the last five years through 
continued US and international expansion fueled by two primary foci: (1) providing 
comprehensive supply chain solutions that enable greater customer visibility into their entire 
“moving inventory” supply chain, and (2) leveraging leading-edge technology and e-commerce 
solutions to drive transportation and logistics management services. 
In an effort to provide comprehensive supply chain solutions, UPS has acquired or built 
35 million square feet of distribution space and more than 1000 facilities worldwide.  These 
facilities are utilized to help support the supply chains of both large and small companies in 186 
countries globally.  UPS has also focused on helping manage these supply chains, rather than 
                                                 
16 The UPS employee stock ownership program began in 1927. 
simply providing elements used in them (such as warehouses, distribution centers, etc.). As such, 
the company has helped its clients redesign supply chains and reorganize supply chain processes 
and movements of inventory.  UPS also provides air, ocean, and ground freight transportation 
services, customs brokerage, and financial services including letters of credit, inventory 
financing, and trade finance. 
The use of technology is a key strength of the company.  Again, the objective here is to 
assist UPS customers by providing easy-to-use technology that streamlines shipment processes 
and provides appropriate shipment information on an as-needed and real-time basis.  
Technologies enabling simplified global logistics management (such as TradeDirect, which is 
profiled below among the UPS service innovations) as well as electronic information services 
(such as Quantum View, a technology that enables customers to proactively track inbound and 
outbound packages) serve as strategically important capabilities that build and deepen customer 
relationships, as well as drive additional revenue to the core delivery business. 
As important as the company’s current strategy is its plan for what it hopes to be in the 
future.  Fundamentally, a company’s strategic vision is the ultimate “agenda-setting” mechanism 
for its innovation priorities.  As current Chairman and Chief Executive Mike Eskew notes, the 
company has a vision of becoming the preferred supplier of total supply chain management 
across global, multimodal supply chains:  
 
Today, of course, we are more than just a delivery company…we 
manage networks, or more precisely, we optimize networks. Our 
integrated small package business is evidence of our skills in this 
area …as we move outside of our core and take on additional 
modes of transport or brings our skills to bear, we see optimizing 
networks means more than just transporting goods from point A to 
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point B, it means having the right product mix on each asset to 
maximize returns.  It also means managing the entirety of the 
network, from the planning stage to the injection point to the 
actual transportation, staging, redirecting shipments, even product 
returns along with all the necessary supporting customer service 
surrounding each of those activities.  Sometimes this means 
managing the movement of goods using our own assets, and 
sometimes it means leveraging third-party networks such as rail 
and ocean. And optimizing a network involves more than 
managing just the physical movement of goods…it means 
managing informational requirements for each shipment as well.  
A network is much more than just a trade link.  When you 
synchronize the technology across the global, multimodal 
transportation network, you really have something unique.  And 
that’s what we are creating.17 
Service Innovation as Configurable Solutions 
 
Over the 100 years of its history, UPS has undergone numerous business model 
transformations.  This section of the UPS study analyzes three extremely important strategic 
service innovations designed, developed and deployed by UPS management—namely, the 
decision to (a) offer common carrier services throughout the United while also building a 
supporting airline business, (b) introduce non-package services into the suite of offerings 
presented to current and potential customers, and (c) develop an integration service – known as 
Trade Direct -- to help customers better manage their cross-border supply chains via a suite of 
already existing UPS standardized offerings. 
 
                                                 
17 Presentation by Chief Executive Officer Michael Eskew at the September 2006 UPS Analyst Day. 
Common Carrier Services: Standardizing the Service 
 
 The 1953 decision to begin offering common carrier services outside of the Los Angeles 
area was a major business model transformation for UPS.  Common carrier service entailed the 
commitment on the part of the company to move goods between particular locations – regardless 
of volumes.  This strategic service innovation changed the business from a point to point service 
into a network-based service.  Common carrier services effectively standardized the 
transportation offering so that it began to resemble the characteristics of product businesses.  The 
common carrier model was a means of “productizing” the offering by creating a high fixed cost 
operating model that enables economies of scale.  Given the company’s commitment to drive a 
particular route, the effective marginal cost of an additional package was close to zero, thereby 
mimicking the dynamics of a “product model.” 
  Once management decided to pursue common carrier services around the country, the 
company’s strategy was straightforward: seek regulatory approval to transport packages and 
documents within and across any of the 50 United States.  As noted in the company’s history, 
this was no easy feat and took the company almost 30 years to accomplish.  Having built the 
network, the company began resembling a high capital intensity service company with standard 
“product-like” offerings.  Revenues increased dramatically, margins increased with additional 
volume, and the company entered a virtuous cycle of increasing growth and profitability.  
Individual service differentiation was lost as the company scaled. 
 Thus, the key strategic decision that enabled growth through the early 1980s was the 
implementation of the common carrier model.  It inherently changed the economics of the 
business by creating a network model with economies of scale, versus the previous contract 
delivery model in which the company got paid for effort expended.  By the early 1980s (as the 
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air service offering was gaining momentum), however, UPS management began to realize that 
they were dependent upon air fleet operators, leaving UPS vulnerable to their “product” quality.   
To mitigate this vulnerability, UPS built its own airline specifically to support its now 
thriving products business.  UPS management’s decision to build an airline was in direct reaction 
to misaligned incentives between its suppliers and its own needs.  In order to control service 
quality and manage uncertainty, the company decided to vertically integrate.  Tom Weidemeyer, 
Chief Operating Officer of UPS and former president of UPS Airlines, noted in 2002 how the 
decision unfolded: 
 
First off, we couldn’t lease enough space in the bellies of 
airplanes, so we went out and bought some.  Now we didn’t have 
any expertise in running an airline, so the first thing we did was 
turn those aircraft we owned over to somebody else to operate 
them.  And we said, “We need to have this service level.”  Over 
time, that grew from six aircraft that we bought back in 1981.  By 
the time we got to ’87 or ’88, we had 80 aircraft. And we had four 
different operators trying to maintain the service level that we 
believed was necessary for our customers.  But our service level 
objectives were not intrinsic to their businesses…And so, in the 
summer of 1987, we announced to the world that the following 
spring, we were going to be an airline.  We marched down that 
path…put 1,000 pilots on the payroll in the space of about 8 
months…hired the mechanics, and went outside and hired some 
management expertise (Weidemeyer, 2002). 
  
Thus, the driving consideration of the airline entry decision was to align the service delivery 
professionals’ incentives with those of UPS.  By reducing supply side uncertainty, UPS was able 
to successfully wrestle control of critical service quality drivers from suppliers.   
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How did the decision fare vis-à-vis corporate profitability?  While it is difficult to tease 
apart the impact of this decision upon the company’s financial performance, some facts speak for 
themselves: Net margin increased from 6.5% in 1987 to 7.1% in 1998, EBITDA margins 
expanded from 14% in 1987 to 17% in 1998, and revenue grew more than 250% over the same 
time frame.  (Note that I specifically chose a 10 year window post the development of the in-
house airline to measure the success of the airline.)   
Thus, the common carrier strategic service innovation was ultimately an effort to 
standardize the delivery service.  By controlling the airline, the company also enabled itself to 
gain control over the service production activities, thereby eliminating transaction costs 
associated with an un-integrated model.  In the language of the framework I presented above, the 
common carrier innovation was a diagonal move towards more “product-like” offerings. 
 
Figure 4: The Common Carrier Service Innovation 
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Respectfully Complementing: The Addition of Non-Package Services 
 
Given its success and the size of the business in the late 1990s, combined with its relative 
dominance of the domestic delivery market, UPS management found itself struggling to maintain 
its growth rate.  The company held a series of strategic meetings to discuss future strategy.  A 
key outcome was a redefinition of the company’s mission to one it focused on enabling global 
commerce.  Former Chairman and CEO Jim Kelly eloquently summarized the logic of the UPS 
decision to grow through non-package services during an interview with the Harvard Business 
Review: 
 
We know we need to reach far beyond our core business, but in 
ways that respect and complement it.  A few years ago, we 
undertook an effort to rethink our mission and charter.  Instead of 
seeing ourselves as just a package delivery business, we defined 
our purpose more broadly as enabling global commerce.  It’s 
certainly true: we serve 8 million shippers and receivers a day and 
move about 6% of the US GDP.  But global commerce involves a 
lot more than delivering goods; it’s just as much about moving 
information and money.  So now we think in terms of all three of 
those flows as we create broader offerings for our customers and 
push deeper and deeper into their supply chains (Kirby, 2001). 
 
A big reason for this change, notes Kelly was the emergence of e-commerce (Kelly, 
2000).  Kelly argues that the traditional world, in which suppliers push their products through 
distributors into retailers and ultimately to customers, had transformed into a world in which 
end-users pull desired products and services through the system.  Kelly also predicts this change 
will combine with globalization in an explosive way, resulting in “the convergence of once-
independent flows of goods, information, and finance.” 
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Weidemeyer describes the new focus as enabling the company to get a larger portion of 
the supply chain dollars.  By expanding UPS’s focus to include the flow of goods, information 
and finances, “we’ve gone from the ability to participate in six cents of every logistics dollar 
spent to all 100 cents of the dollar,” notes Weidemeyer.  “We now do warehousing…pick and 
pack…billing and phone center answering, financing inventory, and service parts logistics, just 
to name a few specific pieces of the supply chain picture” (Weidemeyer, 2002). 
This expansion of services is an excellent example of service innovation targeting 
economies of scale.  By taking the time to understand customer needs, UPS has leveraged its 
trusted advisor position into selling additional services.  As these services begin to generate 
momentum, the company standardizes the offering – thereby driving economies of scale.  
Further, if UPS is able to convince multiple parties to consolidate their warehousing and service 
parts logistics (to name a few specific supply chain functions) under a single UPS roof, they 
generate substantial economies of scale.  In fact, notes Weidemeyer, “Today we’re trying to 
convince Dell and Gateway, and potentially Best Buy, to be in the same warehouse that UPS is 
now going to maintain, take the returns, repair them, and then replenish or replace them for the 
ultimate customer…to synchronize commerce for our customers”(Weidemeyer, 2002). 
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Figure 5: The Non-Package Services Innovation 
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UPS Trade Direct: A Configurable Solution in Action 
 
The UPS Trade Direct service offering was designed and developed by UPS to 
accomplish one primary objective: increase the efficiency of UPS customers in their supply 
chains by minimizing the need for capital intensive warehouses, distribution centers, and in-
house logistic services supporting cross-border trade.  To do this, the company decided to 
develop a configurable solution that allowed customers to use a bundle of UPS services that 
allowed for seamless origin country pickup, origin country transportation, customs brokerage 
and clearance services, destination country transportation, and destination country delivery. 
Trade Direct was initially started in the North American markets, due in large part to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement which facilitated cross-border trade.  With time, 
however, the service has been expanded to include ocean container movements as well as 
international small packages and LTL shipments.  Further, the service was initially designed to 
accommodate new needs being developed by the global outsourcing phenomenon – and therefore 
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even to this day has an “inbound” bias of packages that are picked up abroad, transported to the 
United States, and then delivered to customers.  As of December 2005, Trade Driect services 
were available for 70 international origin ports and 5 US entry ports.  Examining the language 
used by UPS to describe the service, however, indicates that the “inbound” emphasis seems to 
have faded away and the offering is now being generalized. 
 
The service combines our small package, freight and brokerage 
capabilities to create an integrated, streamlined, and economical 
door-to-door solution for customers with complex cross-border 
distribution needs.  The Trade Direct service consolidates 
individually labeled packages or pallets into one movement across 
borders.  When the goods arrive in the destination country, 
packages are deconsolidated and entered into the UPS system for 
delivery, often eliminating the receiving, sorting and handling 
necessary in distribution centers.  This service significantly cuts 
the supply chain cycle from point of origin to consignee.  It 
provides our customers with faster time to market, reduced costs, 
increased visibility and better management of their global supply 
chain.  (UPS 2005, Form 10-K) 
 
Fundamentally, the consolidated Trade Direct service consists of numerous standardized service 
offerings that UPS had already been developing.  As such, the service innovation of Trade Direct 
services is simply a repackaging (in a menu-driven, “configurable” manner) of existing UPS 
capabilities as a “new service.”  Such a combinatorial approach to service innovation is an 
attempt by UPS to layer a differentiated service on top of already existing standardized services.  
In fact, the figure below summarizes the UPS conceptualization of the Trade Direct service as an 
integrative service: 
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Figure 6: UPS Trade Direct  
 
 
 
Even CEO Mike Eskew thinks of Trade Direct as a “configurable solution” that combines 
multiple UPS capabilities.  Nevertheless, he notes, although the service simply leverages existing 
capabilities, it does so in an integrated manner that simplifies the lives of customers: 
 
Our Trade Direct cross border shipping service is a good example 
of how we have taken advantage of multiple capabilities and 
developed a configurable solution.  We have combined LTL, small 
package and brokerage services with technology and made it a 
standard product and then we armed thousands of our sales force 
with knowledge to position this product with our customers…They 
have placed value in a product that reduces their overall 
transportation inventory and brokerage costs. It helps them 
streamline their shipping processes.18 
 
                                                 
18 Presentation by Chief Executive Officer Michael Eskew, op cit. 
Thus, the Trade Direct service innovation is really an integration service that is layered 
on top of the company’s standard offerings.  This attempt to differentiate the standardized UPS 
services offered against point-solutions competitors (i.e. companies that provide only one 
element of the solution such as only transport or just customs brokerage, etc.) resulted in a 
“configurable solution” of the standard offerings.  This solution is merely a bundle of already 
standardized services.  In short, Trade Direct is a mass customized offering that uses the prior 
standard services as components of its dynamically configured solution. 
Another way to conceptualize the Trade Direct service is that it takes individual, 
differentiated customer needs and translates them into a bundle of various UPS services, each of 
which is by itself quite standard.  In this logic, UPS Trade Direct is a configuration service that 
drives business towards the standardized offerings. It allows UPS to scale a set of standard 
offerings in dynamic bundles.  The diagram below contextualizes the Trade Direct solution in 
my framework of differentiation and scalability. 
 
Figure 7: Trade Direct Service Innovation 
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Summary: Repeatability as the UPS Service Innovation Mantra 
 
UPS has been amazingly successful over a very long period of time, in no small part 
because of its ability to consistently adapt to the needs of its customers.  Although many of the 
service innovations developed at the company are extraordinarily different in strategic focus, 
they all share one thing in common: they are based upon repeatable, scalable, product-like and 
standard offerings.  This should not be a particularly surprising outcome, given the relative 
homogeneity of the UPS management team.  Further, given the heavy operational experience in 
the backgrounds of those same senior managers, the fact that they seek to reduce variability in 
the service production process is highly expected.  
Current Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Mike Eskew recently noted that the 
aspirations of UPS have taken it into areas traditionally thought to be non-scalable, customized 
solutions.  Eskew disagrees with the assertion that the business is not scalable, stating that it is 
better to think of the UPS services not as pure services, but rather as “configurable solutions” 
that leverage and feed business to the existing standard suite of UPS offerings.  In addition to this 
linkage with the core transportation business, Eskew notes the importance of having these 
solutions be scalable: 
 
It is important to note that UPS does not aspire to be in the 
contract logistic business for its own sake.  We are not going to be 
everything for everyone.  We are in the configurable solutions 
business.  Configurable solutions are created when there is a 
common network of assets as well as standardized IT systems and 
processes that can be used by a number of customers 
simultaneously.  These solutions are characterized by two key 
attributes: (1) they are linked to the transportation network where 
our core competencies lie; by linking our solutions to 
Mansharamani  Page 119 
Mansharamani  Page 120 
transportation we will capture more of a customer’s transportation 
spend (2) they have to be repeatable. This means that the solution 
can be productized – defined as a standard offering that can be 
marketed and sold by our worldwide sales team to multiple 
customers.19 
 
Figure 8: Contextualizing the UPS Service Innovations 
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Fundamentally, the ultimate value of these strategic service innovations is found in their 
competitive impact.  As can be seen in the following charts which compare UPS against its 
primary competitor, Federal Express, UPS has done extraordinarily well against its competition 
in recent history.20 The goal of scaling the business seems to have worked quite well and UPS 
has managed to maintain superior margins and profitability.   
                                                 
19 Presentation by Chief Executive Officer Michael Eskew, op cit. 
20 Note that the data contained in the charts are obtained from company filings with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  UPS data are for the fiscal year ended December 31 on the year presented.  Federal Express data are 
for the fiscal year ended May 31 on the year presented.  While the different dates may result in a slight confounding 
effect in any one year comparison, such effects will ultimately work themselves out and result in, over longer 
periods of time, comparisons of similar metrics. 
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Graph 2: EBITDA21 Margins, Federal Express vs. UPS 
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Graph 3: Operating Income Margin, Federal Express vs. UPS 
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21 Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization.  EBITDA is generally thought of as a decent 
proxy for the company’s cash flow generation. 
 The standardization push at UPS has impacted the company’s competitive position in 
numerous ways.  One of the key developments vis-à-vis this standardization strategy is that it 
lowers customer switching costs, something that can prove quite detrimental to a company’s 
long-term strategy and performance as competitors may layer differentiated services on top of 
commoditized, standard offerings.  In light of this risk, it is particularly interesting to note that 
the stellar UPS performance has resulted in the FedEx strategic initiative to focus on providing 
the “best customer experience in the industry” (Federal Express 2006 Form 10-K), a very direct 
attempt on their part to change the basis of competition to one in which scale drives success to 
one in which differentiated service is sought by customers. 
Innovation in For-Profit Education: Standardizing Education at The Apollo Group 
Rebel with a Cause: John Sperling’s Creation of the Apollo Group 
 
 San Jose State University Professor John Sperling founded The Apollo Group in 1973.  
Sperling vehemently opposed the rigidity and lack of accountability of traditional non-profit 
education service providers and sought to create a new model for education targeting the needs 
of adult learners.   
 In 1972, the university asked him to teach a series of classes for police officers and 
teachers to learn how to deal with juvenile delinquents.  Experimenting with a new pedagogical 
technique, he brought in working experts with relevant experience (rather than teaching classes 
himself).  Further, he divided the class into groups and required the completion of a relevant 
project.  Students loved the method and sought a degree program with similar practical 
relevance.  Eventually, he and two of his students founded the Institute for Community Research 
and Development (ICRD), in direct reaction to academia’s rejection of his ideas: “My university 
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said they didn’t need no more stinkin’ students, that they had all they can handle….They told me 
to go back and behave—be a professor”(Breen, 2003).   
 In March 1976, Sperling turned the operations over to his cofounders and began a new 
quest—the creation of a new, for-profit university dedicated to the needs of working adults.  
Sperling initially formed the Institute for Professional Development, Inc. as a university seeking 
accreditation.  One of the main suggestions the accrediting body gave him in order to improve 
the chance of securing accreditation was to clarify the distinction between IPD and ICRD, Inc.  
“We chose to change the name of IPD, Inc. and, after long discussions and with much 
trepidation, the Board of Directors decided on University of Phoenix” (Sperling, 2000).  
Eventually, the University did gain accreditation.22  Overcoming regulatory barriers to establish 
a stable presence proved elusive.   
                                                
Over the next twenty years, Sperling desperately struggled to grow the business, often 
pushing the company to the brink of bankruptcy.  Sperling admits to making many mistakes, 
including overexpanding: “I can attribute all of them to frustration/boredom/naivete,” he notes.  
This “frustration/boredom/naivete,” however, is what also led Sperling to purchase a defunct 
distance learning company in 1989, a move that created the University of Phoenix Online.  It 
took more than 5 years to move the classroom experience online, but the “factory” is now built.  
Today, the University of Phoenix Online generates several hundred million dollars in revenues a 
year and accounts for a substantial portion of the company’s growth.   
During the early to mid 1990’s, Apollo looked at dozens of potential acquisitions, but 
consummated only two transactions—the purchase of Western International University, a small 
accredited college in Arizona that had about 900 students at the time, and the acquisition of the 
 
22 Gaining accreditation is not a small accomplishment and involves extensive regulatory review of curricula, 
teaching standards, and general management processes.  For a better understanding of accreditation processes and 
standards, please visit www.ed.gov.  
College of Financial Planning, the country’s leading provider of financial planning training and 
education service. 
Background: Bringing Education to Working Adults 
 
 The Apollo Group is the world’s largest private provider of higher education services and 
offers educational programs at 256 campuses and learning centers (as of Summer 2006) in 39 
states, Puerto Rico, Mexico, the Netherlands, and British Columbia.  As of May 2006, combined 
degree enrollment was in excess of 323,000 students.  2005 revenues were $2.3 billion (up from 
$770 million in 2001) and net income was $445 million (up from $107 million in 2001).  The 
Apollo Group operates through four wholly-owned subsidiaries—The University of Phoenix 
(“UOP” or the “University”), the Institute for Professional Development (the “Institute” or 
“IPD”), the College for Financial Planning (the “College” or “CFP”), and Western International 
University (“Western” or “WIU”).   
 The University of Phoenix, a member of the North Central Association of Colleges and 
Schools, currently has a national footprint of locations that offer undergraduate, graduate, 
doctoral and non-degree programs in subjects including Accounting, Criminal Justice, Nursing, 
Finance, Retail Management, Education, and Business.  The University of Phoenix also offers its 
educational programs online through the University of Phoenix Online, the world’s leading 
online university.  Approximately 60% of the University’s students receive some level of tuition 
assistance, most from their employer.  The 23,000 members of the professional faculty at the 
University of Phoenix all hold either masters or doctoral degrees.  The University of Phoenix is 
constantly rolling out new degree and non-degree programs, having grown the list of available 
programs by more than 50% in the past 5 years. 
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 The Institute for Professional Development, according to the most recent Apollo Group 
annual report, “provides program development and management consulting services to 
regionally accredited private colleges and universities (client institutions) who are interested in 
expanding or developing their programs for working adults.”  Services offered by the IPD 
typically include curriculum development, market research, accounting/back office support, and 
program design.  The Institute currently offers these services to regionally accredited client 
institutions at 22 campuses and 39 learning centers in 25 states.  Its business model is somewhat 
unique in that it provides these services in exchange for a share of tuition revenues generated 
from the adult learning programs they help create or manage. 
 The College for Financial Planning, headquartered near Denver, CO, provides 
educational programs in the field of financial planning.  Current programs include Certified 
Financial Planner (CFP) certification preparation, the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 
certification preparation, as well as a Master of Science Degree in Personal Financial Planning.  
The College also administers and/or runs certificate and degree programs at various University 
of Phoenix locations around the United States. 
 Western International University is an accredited school that offers undergraduate and 
graduate degree programs via physical campuses in Arizona (Phoenix, Chandler, Scottsdale, and 
Fort Huachuca) and through joint venture agreements in India and China.  Apollo acquired WIU 
in 1995 and it today is one of the fastest growing segments of the business.  The Axia College of 
Western International University is a recent expansion by the Apollo Group to capture the 
business of working adults with little or no college experience via a computerized education 
delivery system.  Axia offers associate degrees in business, criminal justice, general studies, IT, 
and other subjects worldwide. 
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The Competitive Landscape 
 
The market for for-profit education is large and highly fragmented.  Market definitions 
are murky at best, but Citigroup estimates the postsecondary education industry to have 
generated more than $300 billion in revenues in 2005, with approximately $17 billion of it being 
captured by the for-profit operators.  Although a substantial majority of the revenues continue to 
fall to traditional not-for-profit community colleges, colleges, and universities, the for-profit 
sector continues to gain market share and has grown at significantly higher rates than the 
postsecondary education industry.  This section of the chapter focuses upon the largest for-profit 
education companies, with special attention to their strategic orientations.  In particular, only 
companies that had revenues greater than $500 million in their latest reported annual results23 are 
included in this section.24  The list of Apollo’s main competitors, after these adjustments, 
includes Career Education Corporation, Corinthian Colleges Inc., Education Management 
Corporation, and ITT Educational Services.  
Career Education Corporation 
 
Career Education Corporation is a postsecondary education provider focused on 
providing career-focused learning.  The company is the “world’s largest on-ground provider of 
private, for-profit, postsecondary education” (Career Education 2006 Form 10-K) and has been 
increasingly focused on growing its online business.  The company’s enrolled student population 
as of December 31, 2005 was over 100,000 students, including approximately 32,000 students in 
                                                 
23 Note that all data are taken from each of the company’s Form 10-Ks, as filed with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Data for each of the companies are as follows: Career Education Corporation, December 31, 2005; 
ITT Education Services Inc., December 31, 2005; Corinthian Colleges Inc., June 30, 2006; and Education 
Management Corporation, June 30, 2005. 
24 Note that one company that was excluded which meets this criteria is DeVry, Inc.  The decision not to include it 
was driven by the company’s orientation towards professional, graduate education as well as professional 
certifications such as the CPA and CFA designation.  In short, it was excluded because it more closely resembles a 
training and certification company than a postsecondary education services provider and competes for a different 
segment of customers. 
online programs.  The company operates more than 80 campuses in the United States, Canada, 
France, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as several “virtual 
campuses” on the Internet. 
Career Education separates its operations into two business units: (1) the Colleges, 
Schools, and Universities (“CSU”) segment, which offers doctoral, master’s, bachelor’s, 
associate’s, and degree and diploma programs in business, visual communications, design 
technologies, healthcare, culinary arts, and IT via  a physical, on-ground network of learning 
locations; and (2) the Online Education Group (“OEG”) segment, which offers degree programs 
in IT, computer science, business, visual communications, criminal justice, and education 
through the American InterContinental University Online (“AIU Online”), Colorado Technical 
University Online (“CTU Online”) and Stonecliffe College Online brands. 
Although the company’s growth strategy has historically focused on acquisitions of “on-
ground” education companies, the latest annual filings indicate the company is now focusing 
upon (1) growth in its OEG segment via the development of robust online curriculum delivery 
models, (2) growth in the CSU segment via the opening of additional locations and branches, (3) 
strategic acquisitions that might benefit from inclusion in the Career Education network, (4) 
international expansion, particularly via the online delivery model, and (5) the development of 
“new initiatives” in the online arena that can enhance the company’s growth trajectory in virtual, 
accredited, degree-oriented education.   
Corinthian Colleges 
 
Corinthian Colleges is a career-oriented postsecondary school operator that had more 
than 64,500 students enrolled in its programs on June 30, 2006.  The company offers associate’s, 
bachelor’s, and master’s degrees via a network of 95 colleges in 26 US states and 33 colleges in 
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seven Canadian provinces.  Corinthian Colleges’ offerings are vocational in nature, and the 
targeted consumer of its services is a relatively young student (18-24 years in age) that has little 
or no college experience and is seeking an entry-level position in a white collar profession such 
as healthcare, business, criminal justice, or technology. 
Corinthian operates via five divisions: (1) the Florida Metropolitan University division, 
which consists of 14 campuses focused on degree-granting programs in healthcare, business, 
criminal justice, and IT; (2) the Corinthian Schools division, which operates 45 diploma-granting 
schools focused on healthcare and business fields; (3) the Titan Schools division, which operates 
36 campuses offering diploma and degree programs in aircraft frame maintenance, power plant 
maintenance, automotive repair, and diesel technology; (4) the CDI Education Postsecondary 
division, which operates the company’s Canadian network of 33 colleges offering diploma 
programs in healthcare, business, and IT; and (5) the Pegasus division, which operates the 
company’s two online properties – FMU Online and Everest Online. 
Corinthian’s operating strategy is focused, according to the company’s 2005 Form 10-K, 
on four main elements: (1) enhancing growth at existing campuses, (2) establishing additional 
locations, (3) making strategic acquisitions, and (4) expanding the suite of online offerings.  The 
first tactic is focused on the development and acquisition of new curricula that the company 
plans to distribute through its existing schools network.  The second element of the Corinthian 
strategy is to expand the network through organic “newbuilds” or branch locations, thereby 
increasing venues for the curriculum distribution strategy.  Although acquisitions remain a major 
element of the company’s strategy, as well as its historical origins (of the company’s current 
campuses, 95 were acquired), management is today focused on acquisitions that enhance the 
value of the network (i.e. the acquisition has curriculum that can be offered elsewhere, etc.).  
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Finally, because only 3,878 students were enrolled (less than 7%) in online degree programs, the 
company is looking to grow this element of the business as yet another distribution venue for the 
curricula. 
Education Management Corporation 
 
Education Management Corporation is a postsecondary education services provider that 
has been operating in the United States for over 40 years.  As of June 2005, the company had 71 
primary campuses located in 24 states and 2 Canadian provinces.  Total student enrollment 
exceeds 66,000.  The company began operations in 1962 and today offers a range of diploma and 
degree programs (associate’s through doctoral) in media arts, design, fashion, culinary arts, 
behavioral sciences, health sciences, education, information technology, legal studies, and 
various business fields.  During early 2006, the company was taken private by a group of private 
equity investors led by Goldman Sachs and Providence Equity Partners. 
The company offers its academic programs through four distinct educational institutions: 
(1) The Art Institutes, (2) Argosy University, (3) Brown Mackie College, and (4) South 
University.  According to the company’s 2005 Form 10-K, “Art Institute programs are designed 
to provide the knowledge and skills necessary for employment in various fields, including 
graphic design, media arts and animation, multimedia and web design, game art and design, 
animation, video and digital media production, interior design, industrial design, culinary arts, 
photography, and fashion” (Education Management 2005 Form 10-K).  Programs typically run 
18-48 months.  Argosy University offers doctoral and master’s degree programs in (a) clinical 
psychology, counseling and education, (b) business administration, and (c) health sciences.  
Brown Mackie Colleges, which operates 22 campuses throughout the Midwest US, offers 
associate’s degree programs in healthcare, business, IT, legal studies, and design technologies.  
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Finally, South University, with four campuses in the southeastern US, offers undergraduate and 
graduate degree programs in business, legal studies, IT, and healthcare. 
Education Management’s operating strategy is based on six elements: (1) emphasizing 
graduate outcomes and student career advancement, (2) developing new locations, (3) increasing 
the use of shared service locations, (4) creating new academic programs, (5) rolling out existing 
programs to additional schools, and (6) expanding the online business. 
ITT Educational Services 
 
ITT Educational Services, which was founded in 1969, is focused on offering 
technology-oriented postsecondary degree programs within the United States.  As of December 
31, 2005, the company had approximately 43,000 students enrolled in 81 ITT Technical 
Institutes in 32 states.  Although ITT has historically targeted associate’s degree candidates, 26% 
of the student body today is seeking a bachelor’s degree.  Further, the company has also begun to 
diversify away from its technical curricula and now offers degree programs in business and 
criminal justice. 
The company’s strategy has been, and continues to be, focused on achieving economies 
of scale.  To do this, ITT focuses on six primary strategic efforts: (1) growing its core schools 
and programs by recruiting previously un-addressed student segments (i.e. working adults) while 
enhancing its presence among the traditional market (i.e. recent high school graduates); (2) 
broadening the company’s geographic footprint by opening new campuses and learning centers; 
(3) vertically expanding the curriculum by offering more bachelor’s and master’s degree 
programs; (4) increasing the number of programs through acquisition or development in 
additional fields of study; (5) extending the total program duration through increases in the 
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percentage of students enrolled in bachelor’s programs, and (6) expanding economies of scale 
with new curriculum delivery efforts, most notably in the online space. 
Summary & Comparative Data 
 
As is clear from the data presented above, the four primary competitors to Apollo seem to 
have taken a more “downmarket” focus vis-à-vis their students’ educational objectives.  For 
instance, it is noteworthy that more than 90% of Corinthian’s students and 70% of ITT’s students 
are pursuing either a diploma or an Associate’s degree, while more than 80% of Apollo’s 
students are seeking a Bachelor’s degree or higher.  The summary table below segments the 
students at each of the companies by program type: 
 
Table 13: Student Objectives by Company 
 
Company Students Diploma Associates Bachelors Masters Doctorate 
Apollo 300,000+ 0% 16% 57% 26% 1% 
Career Ed 100,000+ 14% 38%  -- 47% -- 1% 
Corinthian 65,000+ 64% 29% 5% 2% 0% 
Ed Mgmt 66,000+ 7% 35% 44% 5% 9% 
ITT 43,000+  -- 73% -- 26% 1% 0% 
 
 The other noteworthy insight that emerges from the above competitive discussion is that 
most companies are trying to rapidly develop their online offerings.  Corinthian, Education 
Management, and ITT Education each have fewer than 5,000 students enrolled in their online 
curricula, while Career Education has slightly more than 30,000.   Apollo, the clear leader in the 
online education market, has more than 100,000 students pursuing degrees via its virtual 
campuses. 
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The Apollo Strategy 
 
 The Apollo Group is arguably the most successful company in the history of for-profit 
educational service.  It has more than 30 years of experience operating in the industry and has 
developed a strategy that is based on the following singular objective: “to be the leading provider 
of accessible, high quality education for working adult students and a preferred provider of 
workplace training to their employers.  We are dedicated to improving the nation’s workforce by 
delivering measurable results, providing accessible programs, and developing efficient and 
effective education programs and solutions” (Apollo Group 2005 Annual Report). 
 In furtherance of this mission and vision, the Apollo Group pursues numerous strategies, 
each of which is designed to increase the size and scope of the company’s offering set.  In 
particular, the company is trying to (a) establish new University of Phoenix campuses and 
learning centers, (b) expand its student base in Associates degree programs, (c) establish new 
IPD relationships, (d) expand the educational programs offered, (e) expand access to programs, 
and (e) pursue international expansion opportunities.  While most of these strategies are self-
explanatory, they do not explain how the company has successfully competed in a highly 
fragmented, highly regulated industry for many years.  The company answers the question by 
pointing to four primary competitive strengths and advantages it uses to compete: (1) accredited 
degree programs, (2) experienced faculty resources, (3) current and relevant standardized 
programs, and (4) proven benefits to employers. 
 Because of the regulatory environment facing for-profit education, accreditation 
generates a host of competitive advantages against non-accredited institutions.  In particular, if 
accredited, an institution is eligible to provide students with access to Title IV federal financial 
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aid programs.  Further, accreditation allows the institution to grant credits that will likely be 
accepted at other accredited institutions. 
 Given the difficulty of finding experienced as well as capable faculty to teach in an un-
tenured, contract environment, the Apollo Group’s 30 years of operational history has given it a 
substantial jump on new entrants in terms of recruiting faculty.  Further, because the University 
of Phoenix has such an established brand, it is also able to be more discriminating vis-à-vis 
faculty hiring criteria—resulting in a more accomplished and capable faculty.  Because the 
curriculum development model is profiled below, I will defer discussion about it to the following 
section about service innovations at Apollo. 
 The proven benefits to employers again stems from the company’s long operating 
history.  Over the years, Apollo Group schools have developed working relationships with many 
of the largest employers near the schools, allowing qualified employers to both teach classes as 
well as provide input on the curriculum.  As a result, the University of Phoenix is recognized as a 
valuable and useful training ground for companies to send their upwardly-mobile executives.  
Further, for those students who use their time at the University of Phoenix to transition 
professionally, the University of Phoenix brand has proven to be an asset due to these 
relationships with local employers. 
Service Innovation as Standardization 
 
 The Apollo Group undertook two major service innovations: (a) the institution of 
centralized curriculum development and refinement and (b) the FlexNet hybrid online – onsite 
learning delivery model.  In both of these cases, the essential change brought about by the 
service innovation was a standardization of the offering in a quest for scalability. 
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Given that each of these three cases has to do with the learning and teaching process (the 
“offering” of an education service provider), it is important to first understand the overall 
philosophy of teaching and learning at the Apollo Group, as embodied in the company’s teaching 
and learning model—one of the company’s key strengths.  The company designed, tested, 
refined, and some might say perfected its teaching model to meet the needs of working adults.  It 
allows students who hold full time positions to fulfill their personal and professional obligations 
while simultaneously achieving their educational objectives.  According to the 2005 Form 10-K,  
 
Students attend weekly classes.  In addition, at University of 
Phoenix, students also meet weekly as part of a three to five person 
learning team.  Learning team sessions are an integral part of 
each University of Phoenix course.  They facilitate in-depth review 
of and reflection on course materials.  Members work together to 
complete assigned group projects, and develop communication and 
teamwork skills.  Courses are designed to facilitate the application 
of knowledge and skills to the workplace and are taught by faculty 
members who possess advanced degrees and have professional 
experience in business, industry, government, or other professions.  
In this way, faculty members are able to share their professional 
knowledge and skills with the students (Apollo Group 2005 Form 
10-K). 
 
Other components of the Teaching/Learning model are summarized in the table below, which is 
taken from the company’s 2005 Form 10-K and highlights the six key elements of the Apollo 
Group education delivery model: (1) curriculum, (2) faculty, (3) learning environment, (4) 
library and other learning resources, (5) sequential enrollment, and (6) academic quality. 
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Table 14: The Apollo Group Learning / Teaching Model for Degree Programs 
  
Element Details on Apollo Group Philosophy / Approach 
Curriculum Curriculum is designed to integrate academic theory and professional 
practice and their application to the workplace.  The curriculum provides 
for the achievement of specified educational outcomes that are based on 
input from faculty, students, and students’ employers.  The standardized 
curriculum for each degree program is also designed to provide students 
with specified levels of knowledge and skills. 
Faculty Faculty applicants must possess an earned masters or doctoral degree 
from a regionally accredited institution and, in order to teach at 
University of Phoenix, faculty must have a minimum of five years’ 
recent professional experience in a field related to the subject matter in 
which they seek to instruct (other than those teaching in general 
education or related subjects). 
Learning  
Environment 
Courses are designed to encourage and facilitate collaboration between 
students and interaction with the instructor.  The curriculum requires a 
high level of student participation for purposes of enhancing learning 
and increasing the student’s ability to work as part of a team. 
Library and  
Other Learning 
Resource Services 
Students and faculty members are provided with electronic and other 
learning resources for their information and research needs.  Students 
can access these services directly through the Internet or with the help of 
Learning Resource Services research librarian. 
Sequential  
Enrollment 
University of Phoenix and Western International University students are 
enrolled year round and complete classes sequentially, rather than 
concurrently.  This permits students to focus their attentions and 
resources on one subject at a time and creates a better balance between 
learning and ongoing personal and professional responsibilities.  Axia 
College students are enrolled in courses that are nine weeks in length and 
are offered in pairs to complement each other. One week will emphasize 
reading and discussion; while the following week will emphasize a work 
project; the assignments alternate so that during each week the student 
will be reading in one class and completing a project in the other. 
Academic  
Quality 
The Academic Quality Management System at University of Phoenix 
was designed to maintain and improve the quality of programs and 
academic and student services.  This system includes the Adult Learning 
Outcomes Assessment, which seeks to measure student growth in both 
the cognitive (subject matter) and affective (educational, personal, and 
professional values) skills. 
Source: Apollo Group  2005 Form 10-K 
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Centralized Curriculum Development and Management  
 
 Founder John Sperling specifically designed the Apollo teaching model to meet the needs 
of working adults.  However, it also allows the business to develop more scale than traditional 
education service delivery.  Specifically, the teaching model allows the Apollo Group to 
standardize education into a “product-like” offering.  A key component of the University of 
Phoenix teaching model is the utilization of centralized curriculum development experts.  Rather 
than allowing for idiosyncratic and customized course content that caters to the whims of 
particular faculty, standard course modules that include class lesson plans, course objectives, 
desired outcomes, and specific assignments to reinforce course goals are centrally developed.   
A “corporate” curriculum development group selects all textbooks and course materials, 
removing variability in service quality due to instructor differences (Cappelli & Sledgister, 2003; 
Childe & Newell, 2003).  In addition to effectively acting as a service guarantee (students know 
before they take the class exactly what they will learn), the standard format allows product-like 
recurring profits.  It also allows the company rapidly to bring faculty up to speed by effectively 
automating the teaching process.  Further, because the curriculum is centralized, Apollo can 
reduce its dependence upon faculty members to arrive with courses in hand or possessing the raw 
intellectual capability to design and develop the course materials.  As a result, the centralized 
curriculum has enabled its unique approach to faculty (i.e. the supply) management; Apollo has 
successfully avoided the burden of carrying underutilized people as pseudo-fixed costs.  The 
company does not tenure faculty and courses are contracted for on a single class basis, providing 
Apollo greater management flexibility.  
Thus, the centralization of the curriculum took what might have otherwise been a highly 
differentiated offering (based upon each individual professor’s style and judgment of what 
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material was most important to teach) and made it a standard, almost cookie-cutter offering.  The 
approach was essential to make the business scale while maintaining a consistent offering.  The 
figure below summarizes the centralized curriculum innovation in the familiar 2x2 quadrant. 
 
Figure 9: The Centralized Curriculum Innovation 
 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n
H
ig
h
Lo
w
Scalability
HighLow
Centralized Curriculum
“Cookie-Cutter 
Curriculum”
Unique, Professor-
designed courses
 
 
FlexNet: A Hybrid Online-Onsite Learning Delivery Model 
 
Another element of the teaching model that demonstrates the power of service innovation 
is the flexibility in location and time of service delivery.  In particular, the company’s University 
of Phoenix FlexNet offerings have allowed it to decouple the simultaneity and collocation of 
service production and consumption.  While not exactly “inventory,” catalogs of student-teacher 
interactions in an online threaded discussion “room” allow other students to consume the 
education anywhere in the world at anytime.  FlexNet also allows the company to alter the time 
and location of the service delivery.  It differs from the traditional classroom-only and online-
only offerings by offering students a hybrid model: rather than attending all classes on site, 
students attend the first and last class in person and complete all other coursework online. 
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An ancillary benefit of this alternative delivery model is a reduction in the physical plant 
needed to support the students.  Further, FlexNet multiplies the addressable market by an order 
of magnitude.  In addition to attracting students from markets that do not justify a physical 
presence, altering the timing and location of service delivery creates a market that includes 
billions of potential adult students from around the globe.  It is not impossible for a Japanese 
businessman to attend the first class of a course while in the US on a professional trip, return 
home and continue participating in the class, and then return for the final class and exam.  As 
noted in the 2005 Apollo Annual Report: 
 
2005 underscores an ongoing emphasis on innovation and its 
impact on enrollment.  Part of the formula is finding new ways to 
leverage existing technologies and programs.  Growth of the 
University of Phoenix FlexNet program, which combines the face-
to-face and online modalities, is one of the year’s major success 
stories.  As of August 31, 2005, there were 15,400 students 
enrolled – a 54% increase over the previous year.  During the 
year, nine campuses added FlexNet capabilities, for a total of 59 
locations, including 10 that are FlexNet only (Apollo Group 2005 
Annual Report). 
 
When combined with the standard nature of the curricular offering, the FlexNet delivery 
model really breaks location constraints inherent in a physical classroom to provide for greater 
scalability.  In evaluating the innovation relative to the differentiation – scalabilty framework, 
Flexnet takes an unscalable (i.e. only “x” students can fit in a classroom) and undifferentiated 
offering (i.e. the curriculum is standard) and makes it like a standardized product.   
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Figure 10: The FlexNet Hybrid Delivery Innovation 
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Summary: Standardizing a Historically One-Off Offering 
 
One consistent theme has emerged with respect to Apollo’s innovation efforts: it seeks to 
scale by distributing standard offerings via an increasing system of physical and virtual locations. 
 
Figure 11: Contextualizing the Apollo Group Service Innovations 
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 These two strategic service innovations have helped Apollo operate against its primary 
competitors, by increasing the company’s scale and profitability.  As the charts below 
demonstrate, Apollo has managed to generate greater profits from each dollar of revenues as well 
as each dollar of invested capital than its peers.  Further, while many of the other competitors 
have achieved their growth and margin expansions via acquisition-driven strategies, Apollo has 
successfully grown its revenues and profitability through scale-enhancing service innovations 
like the standardized curriculum and FlexNet delivery model. 
 
 
Graph 4: EBITDA Margins, Apollo vs. Leading For-Profit Education Competitors 
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Graph 5: Return on Invested Capital, Apollo Group vs. Industry Competitors 
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Source: Citigroup Equity Research report entitled “What’s a Degree Worth?” dated Feburary 17, 2006 
 
 
 The longer-term strategic impact of these two developments on the firm’s prospects is 
less clear.  In particular, it is possible that the standardization of the curriculum might have a 
cancerous effect: by creating an open and obvious standard education offering within a 
transferable credit system, the inherent nature of the offering is that it lowers switching costs 
dramatically and forces price-based competition.  Thus, although the company has had 
tremendous initial success with the standardization of the curriculum, this may be in large part 
due to their meeting of unfulfilled needs within a virgin market.  Over time, it seems inevitable 
that price-based competition will intensify, leading to commoditization of the offering. 
Summary: Service Innovation as Standardization? 
 
Although every manager in a service company would agree that an offering which was 
both scalable and differentiated is the objective of any strategic innovation or service 
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development process, very few have been able to “crack the code” that gets them to the holy-
grail of service strategy – the scalable and differentiated service.   
A review of the five strategic service innovations that took place at UPS and the Apollo 
group illustrates the inherent difficulty of accomplishing this objective.  Perhaps because of the 
size and experiential backgrounds of it senior managers, UPS is focused on creating repeatable, 
productized solutions that leverage their existing network.  Given the company operates a high 
fixed-cost global network, virtually every endeavor is focused on what several managers call 
“feeding the beast” by increasing the volume of delivery business.  Understanding that customer 
needs are not all identical, the company has approached the quest for differentiated service by 
designing “configurable solutions.”   
Although the concept sounds like it might entail some degree of individualization and/or 
differentiation, the reality is that these configurable solutions are merely mass customization 
(Pine, 1993) or menu-like configuration bundles of existing (and standardized) services.  While 
they may influence customer behavior in the short run, these configurable solutions are subject to 
competitive pressures that will eventually result in dissipating profitability as competitors begin 
to replicate the suite of services.  A quick glance at the Federal Express website indicates that the 
company is beginning to replicate various bundling / configurable solutions. 
Likewise, the Apollo Group’s approach to service innovation is one focused on scale.  
Again, perhaps due to its size as the world’s largest education institution, the company is heavily 
focused on standardizing its offering to increase scalability.  The company would rather have 
large scale distribution of cookie-cutter content than highly-differentiated educational offerings 
that are based on a handful of unique curriculums or superstar faculty members. Centralized 
curriculum development and management removes the variability associated with the latter 
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approach.  Further, it enables the development of economies of scope as additional campuses 
bear no curriculum development costs and additional curricula can be “pumped” through the 
distribution network of campuses and learning centers.  Likewise, the FlexNet offering mitigates 
the constraints of physical classroom space, as the “FlexNet only” learning centers accommodate 
many multiples (perhaps as many as 20) of the students accommodated by traditional campuses 
and also assure that testing and evaluation procedures are sound. 
The quest is for “needle-moving” strategic service innovations that can help a company 
grow its business at a faster rate than its costs (i.e. scale) seems to be the objective of many 
service firm business development agendas.  The easiest manner to accomplish this objective is 
to standardize an offering so that it may be “mass-produced” to participate in a large market.  
Standardization, however, is synonymous with commoditization and—barring other competitive 
advantages to combat competition—leads to eventual profit-dissipating pressure.   
Revisiting the scalability – differentiation framework in generic terms is worthwhile at 
this point in a quest to answer the question of “Why isn’t scale enough?”  After all, despite the 
concerns about commoditization, both UPS and the Apollo Group seem to have performed quite 
well.  As mutual fund marketers know all too well, past-performance does not guarantee future 
results.  So too is the case with both UPS and Apollo.  A truly useful lens would allow managers 
and industry analysts to sense (if not predict) a priori the deterioration of performance.  The 
figure below has the original scalability-differentiation framework presented above with gold 
arrows representing the nature of competition among firms.   
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Figure 12: The Scalability-Differentiation Framework with Competitive Dynamics 
 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n
H
ig
h
Lo
w
Scalability
HighLow
Pure 
Products
Pure 
Services
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 In
di
vi
du
al
iz
at
io
n
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 C
us
to
m
er
 P
ow
er
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 S
w
itc
hi
ng
 C
os
ts
Increasing Standardization
Increasing Supplier Power
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 T
hr
ea
t o
f S
ub
st
itu
te
s
Inc
rea
sin
g T
hr
ea
t 
Of
 En
try
Hybrids
Competing on Price / Cost
Competing on Experience
Holy 
Grail
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n
H
ig
h
Lo
w
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 In
di
vi
du
al
iz
at
io
n
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 C
us
to
m
er
 P
ow
er
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 S
w
itc
hi
ng
 C
os
ts
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 T
hr
ea
t o
f S
ub
st
itu
te
s
 
 
The above figure illustrates the fundamental problem of pursuing a scale-oriented strategy.  Such 
an approach may produce a temporary competitive advantage, but is unlikely by itself to be the 
source of enduring profitability.  Standardization by its very nature seems to reduce switching 
costs, increase customer power, and increase the threat of substitutes.  Correspondingly, a 
differentiated strategy would result in decreased customer power, increased switching costs, and 
decreased threat of substitutes.  Thus, it seems that standardization equals commoditization.  Is it 
possible to have a scalable offering that is not commoditized?  Harrah’s answers this question 
affirmatively, while debunking the notion that large companies are so focused on scalability that 
they willingly accept the eventual commoditization that accompanies scale.  The chapters that 
follow investigate how Harrah’s chose to compete in a ruthlessly competitive “high-stakes” 
environment via a focus on the customer experience, and how that focus lead to a scalable 
service differentiation strategy. 
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Chapter 4 – Harrah’s Entertainment and the Gaming Industry 
 
Before we dive into the detailed case study of Harrah’s Entertainment and its service 
innovation strategy, it is extremely important to understand the industry context in which 
Harrah’s operates.  This chapter of the dissertation describes Harrah’s Entertainment’s position 
in the gaming industry with a particular focus on the company’s strategic stance vis-à-vis its peer 
companies.  As a precursor, the chapter begins with brief profiles of the customer and the market 
for which casino companies compete.  The chapter then turns to an overview of the “current-
day” Harrah’s Entertainment before reviewing the main US casino operators and their respective 
strategies.  A brief section on casino industry attitudes regarding technology precedes the 
chapter’s summary of the competitive dynamics that characterize the industry.  The chapter 
concludes by comparing Harrah’s to its main US competitors vis-à-vis its operating performance 
as measured by return on invested capital. 
Casino Gamblers: A Profile of the Customer 
 
Many politicians and policymakers outside of the casino industry fear that casinos are 
accompanied by a host of social and public problems—primarily driven by the availability and 
possibility of big winnings.  Problem gamblers, they assume, are the norm in environments near 
casinos and some might even go so far as to suggest that casinos create problem gamblers.  As a 
result of these perspectives, the American Gaming Association and several other organizations 
representing the casino industry have conducted extensive studies investigating who actually 
gambles in casinos.  Perhaps the most informative of these sources are the National Profile Study 
conducted by Roper Reports and the US Gaming Panel survey conducted by TNS.  The National 
Profile Study includes a nationwide sample of 2,000 adult men and women who were surveyed 
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in their homes, and the US Gaming Panel includes a nationally representative sample of 14,437 
of adults chosen from 57,205 respondents to a survey of adults age 21 and over.  These two 
studies serve as the basis for a report composed by Harrah’s entitled A Profile of the American 
Casino Gambler.25  In most cases, non-gambler data is obtained from the US Census. 
To begin, casino gambling is not as unusual as most individuals expect.  A ten year study 
conducted by the Scripps Survey Research Center at Ohio University found that 58% of adults in 
the United States have gambled in a casino at least once.  Further, almost 53 million US residents 
gambled in a casino in 2005, making an average of 6.1 trips to the casino.  The TNS survey, as 
summarized in the Harrah’s report, also found that 
 
Casino gambling is a very popular entertainment for US adults.  
More than 25% of Americans age 21 and older gambled at a 
casino at least once during 2005, and Americans made more than 
320 million visits to casinos.  Adults with annual household 
incomes exceeding $95,000 are the most likely to visit a casino.  
This group has a casino gambling participation rate that is 55% 
higher than that of the lowest income bracket [under $35,000]. 
 
The report goes on to indicate that casino gamblers are also more likely than non-
gamblers to have a white collar job and to have attended at least some college.  In addition, “the 
median household income of casino gamblers is almost $8,000 higher than the national 
median.”26   
                                                 
25 Unless otherwise noted, all the facts relating to casino gamblers presented in this sub-chapter are from the 
Harrah’s summary report, which is available via www.harrahs.com.  
26 Harrah’s Survey 2006: Profile of the American Casino Gambler, page 18. 
The surveys also asked many questions about the behaviors, value systems, and financial 
sophistication of the respondents.  The findings of these differ across gamblers and non-
gamblers, the most interesting of which are summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 15: Casino Gamblers vs. Non-Gamblers 
 
Metric / Issue Casino Gamblers Non-Gamblers 
In control of spending and 
borrow only when necessary 
57% 44% 
Higher savings this year 23% 16% 
Living day to day 17% 23% 
Generally optimistic about the 
future financial situation 
78% 68% 
Asked by others for their 
opinion on how to invest 
20% 12% 
Have enough money to live 
comfortably in retirement* 
46% 37% 
Able to count on income from 
investments and savings** 
50% 33% 
Own High Definition TV 11% 8% 
Own Digital Camera 37% 26% 
Homeownership Rate 78% 72% 
Purchased current car new 50% 44% 
Like to be the first to try new 
restaurants 
21% 12% 
View work as a career 58% 48% 
View work just as a job 42% 51% 
Donated money to a social 
issue in the past 12 months 
33% 20% 
* Asked of non-retirees; ** Asked of retirees. 
Source: National Profile Study conducted by Roper Reports, as cited in Harrah’s Survey 2006: Profile of the 
American Casino Gambler. 
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The TNS survey results also have findings about casino gamblers preferences vis-à-vis 
the casino games.  The table below summarizes what the casino gamblers declare as their 
favorite casino game. 
 
Table 16: Favorite Casino Games, TNS survey results 
 
 
Game 
% of Casino 
Gamblers 
% of Male 
Gamblers 
% of Female 
Gamblers 
Slots/Video Poker 71% 63% 79% 
Table Games 
     Blackjack 
     Roulette 
     Craps 
     Live Poker 
14% 
9% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
21% 
13% 
2% 
3% 
3% 
9% 
5% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
Other 5% 5% 5% 
Don’t Know 9% 10% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: US Gaming Panel, as cited in Harrah’s Survey 2006: Profile of the American Casino Gambler. 
Global Casino & Gaming Market Size and Segmentation 
 
The global casino and gaming market, according to DataMonitor, consists of “all forms 
of online and traditional betting on sports, lotteries and slot machines, as well as gambling in 
casinos or bingo halls” (Datamonitor, 2003, 2006).  The value of this market, defined in this 
way, was $298.7 billion in 2005 – following expansion at a CAGR of 6.3% over the 2000-2005 
period.  A primary driver of this growth has been the expansion of online gambling.  
Datamonitor also estimates this growth to continue, albeit at a slightly lower CAGR of 5.3% 
over the 2006-2010 timeframe. 
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Graph 6: Global Casino & Gaming Market Size (US$ billions) 
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          Source: DataMonitor 
 
The industry can be segmented in two primary ways – by geography and by type of game.  From 
a regional perspective, the US represents ~28% of global gaming revenue and is approximately 
half the size of the Asia Pacific region.  The traditional casino business falls into two sub-
segments (casinos and machines) and in aggregate represents slightly less than 45% of the global 
market.  The two graphs below summarize these market segmentations: 
 
Graph 7: Global Casino & Gaming Market Segmentation by Region and Game Type 
Global Casino & Gaming Market, 2005
US,
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Source: Datamonitor      Source: Datamonitor 
Mansharamani  Page 149 
Even when one looks just at the United States, which is the largest gaming market as an 
individual country, the growth trends mimic the overall global industry trends.  In the US as 
elsewhere, casino revenues grew due to (a) additional casinos, (b) expansion of existing casinos, 
and (c) increased betting (frequency and amount) within existing casinos.  The emergence of 
“racinos” and Indian reservation casinos has also fueled the market.  In fact, the overall trend 
towards increased gaming entertainment expenditures by global consumers is a generic outcome 
of the global economic expansion that has taken place over the past 20+ years.   
 
Graph 8: US Commercial Casino Gross Gaming Revenues (US$ billions), 1989-2005 
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 Source: American Gaming Association 
 
The map below, developed by the American Gaming Association, demonstrates the 
geographic footprint of the US casino industry by type of casino.  As of December 2005, there 
were 11 states that offered traditional casino gambling, 11 states that had approved racetrack 
casinos, 28 states that had tribal casinos, 5 states with legalized card rooms, and 6 states with 
electronic gaming devices (primarily video lottery). 
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Figure 13: US Gaming Locations by Type 
          
US Gaming Locations, by Type
Traditional Casino 455
Racetrack Casino 29
Tribal Casino 406
Card Room 545
Electronic Gaming Device 10,247
 
Source: American Gaming Association, State of the States 2005 
Harrah’s Entertainment Today 
 
Harrah’s Entertainment is today the world’s largest casino entertainment company with 
2005 revenues of more than $7 billion (over $9 billion pro-forma for the Caesar’s acquisition).  
As of December 31, 2005, the company operated 20 land-based casinos, 11 riverboat or dockside 
casinos, 4 Indian reservation casinos, 2 cruise ship casinos, 1 greyhound racetrack casino, and 1 
thoroughbred racetrack casino in two destination markets (Atlantic City and Las Vegas) and 
numerous frequency markets.  Harrah’s employs more than 85,000 individuals.   
Although the company operates through three primary brands (Harrah’s, Caesars, and 
Horseshoe), Harrah’s also has some of the most prominent casino gaming brands in its portfolio– 
including the Flamingo (the first and original casino hotel located on what later became the Las 
Vegas Strip), Bally’s, Paris, the Rio, and Showboat.  In addition, the company also owns The 
World Series of Poker brand.  It has the broadest US presence of any gaming company and also 
currently operates a casino in Uruguay as well as Ontario.  Recently announced plans include 
expansion into the United Kingdom via the acquisition of London Clubs International and the 
building of casino resorts in Slovenia, Spain, and the Bahamas.  Although future growth will 
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undoubtedly be driven by international expansion, Harrah’s is today a US-centric company.  
Finally, on December 20, 2006, Harrah’s Entertainment announced that it had reached an 
agreement with private equity firms Texas Pacific Group and Apollo Management to take the 
company private for $90 per share.  As Loveman notes in the press release announcing Harrah’s 
acceptance of the Apollo/TPG offer, “this is a change in ownership, not a change in direction.” 
From a strategy perspective, Harrah’s competes on customer experience – meaning that 
the company uses information technology to gather data on customers, to determine their value 
to the company, and then to deliver service commensurate with that value.  Harrah’s does this in 
the frequency markets in which it competes as well as the two destination markets in which it 
operates.  The company has not competed to date with other casino operators based on the idea 
of building a “must-see” destination property. 
 
Figure 14: Harrah’s Entertainment, US Footprint 
 
 
     Source: Harrah’s Entertainment 
 
Harrah’s divides its operations into five geographic reporting segments: West, East, North 
Central, South Central, and Managed/Other.  The table below indicates which properties are in 
each segment.   
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Table 17: Harrah’s Entertainment Properties by Geographic Segment 
West East North Central South Central Managed/Other 
Harrah’s Reno Harrah’s Atlantic City Harah’s Joliet Harrah’s Lake Charles Harrah’s Ak-Chin 
Harrah’s Lake Tahoe Showboat Atlantic City Harrah’s Kansas City Harrah’s New Orleans Harrah’s Cherokee 
Bill’s Caesars Atlantic City Harrah’s Council Bluffs Harrah’s Louisiana Downs Harrah’s Prairie Band 
Harrah’s Las Vegas Bally’s Atlantic City Bluffs Run Horseshoe Bossier City Harrah’s Rincon 
Rio  Harrah’s St. Louis Horseshoe Tunica Punta del Este (Uruguay) 
Caesars Palace  Harrah’s Metropolis Grand Tunica Windsor (Ontario) 
Paris  Horseshoe Hammond Sheraton Tunica SS Crystal Symphony 
Bally’s Las Vegas  Caesars Indiana Grand Biloxi SS Crystal Serenity 
Flamingo Las Vegas   Grand Gulfport  
Reno Hilton     
Flamingo Laughlin     
Imperial Palace     
 
Revenues over each of the past three years have grown in each of these segments with one 
exception – the East was basically flat for 2004.  The chart below summarizes revenue trends 
over the past three years. 
 
Graph 9: Harrah’s Entertainment Revenue by Segment (US$ million), 2003-2005 
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Further, in light of the competitive context outlined later in this chapter, the following table 
demonstrates the heavy focus of Harrah’s upon slot players, as demonstrated by the significantly 
higher number of slots (relative to tables and/or casino square feet) than competition at properties 
of comparable size. 
  
Table 18: Harrah’s Property Statistics 
 
 
Property 
 
Rooms 
Casino Square 
Footage 
Slot 
Machines 
Gaming 
Tables 
Harrah's Reno  928 57,000 939 56 
Harrah's Lake Tahoe 531 57,554 869 73 
Harvey's Lake Tahoe 740 63,375 892 89 
Bill's - 85,000 236 23 
Bally's Las Vegas 2814 66,367 1276 66 
Paris Las Vegas 2916 85,000 1190 100 
Rio All Suites 2522 106,971 1231 110 
Harrah's Las Vegas 2526 90,941 1504 103 
Flamingo Las Vegas 3545 76,763 1593 114 
Caesars Palace 3364 128,980 1490 214 
Harrah's Laughlin 1545 47,000 2940 34 
Imperial Palace 2640 75,000 980 51 
Ak-Chin 148 48,000 950 31 
Rincon 653 69,949 1598 60 
Harrah's Atlantic City 1630 147,077 3416 108 
Showboat Atlantic City 1331 124,159 3637 112 
Bally's Atlantic City 1744 225,756 5466 215 
Caesars Atlantic City 1220 130,917 2826 136 
Joliet 204 39,160 1188 23 
Metropolis 258 30,985 1177 30 
Harrah's Council Bluffs 251 28,006 1072 25 
Horseshoe Council Bluffs - 78,811 1875 62 
North Kansas City 392 60,133 1851 62 
St. Louis 502 120,000 2833 94 
Cherokee 576 88,000 3400 40 
Prairie Band 297 34,878 1158 32 
Horseshoe Bossier City 606 29,860 1591 62 
Louisiana Downs - 14,918 1399 0 
Horseshoe Tunica 507 63,000 1806 154 
Grand Casino Tunica 1356 136,000 2185 160 
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Sheraton Tunica 134 31,000 1121 72 
Lake Charles 263 - - 0 
Harrah's New Orleans - 125,119 2113 117 
Caesars Indiana 503 87,000 2058 136 
Horseshoe Hammond - 48,273 1993 55 
Punta del Este 296 44,500 493 63 
Casino Windsor 389 - - 0 
 
An Overview of the Main US Casino Operators 
 
Although the US casino market is highly fragmented and has hundreds of competitors, 
seven major casino and gaming competitors have emerged as a result of the tremendous 
consolidation that has taken place over the past 10 years: (a) MGM Mirage, (b) Wynn Resorts, 
(c) Las Vegas Sands, (d) Station Casinos, (e) Ameristar Casinos, (f) Boyd Gaming, and (g) 
Harrah’s Entertainment.  This section provides an overview of Harrah’s six primary competitors, 
with brief discussions about their current operating strategies and their approach to attracting 
(and retaining) customers.  These competitors vary on several dimensions of strategic orientation 
which will be discussed below. 
MGM Mirage 
 
Overview 
 
MGM Mirage is one of the largest gaming companies in the world with concentrated 
exposure to the Las Vegas destination market.  The company has a heavy real-estate 
development component to its operations.  As declared in the MGM Mirage 2005 Form 10-K 
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the spring of 2006, “we believe we own 
the world’s finest collection of casino resorts.”  MGM Mirage was formed through the April 
2005 merger of the Mandalay Resorts Group and MGM Grand. The company employs over 
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70,000 individuals and reported 2005 revenues of $6.5 billion.  MGM Mirage today has a market 
capitalization of over $11 billion. 
The company is today the largest owner/operator of casinos on the famed Las Vegas strip 
and generates more than 80% of its operating earnings from the Strip; the table below 
summarizes key statistics about the company’s Las Vegas Strip properties. 
 
Table 19: MGM Mirage Property Statistics, Las Vegas Strip 
 
 
Property 
 
Rooms 
Casino Square 
Footage 
 
Slot Machines 
 
Gaming Tables 
Bellagio 3,933 155,000 2,409 143 
MGM Grand 5,044 156,000 2,593 172 
Mandalay Bay 4,756 157,000 1,949 127 
The Mirage 3,044 118,000 2,056 109 
Luxor 4,403 100,000 1,778 88 
Treasure Island 2,885 90,000 1,800 64 
New York, NY 2,024 84,000 1,867 85 
Excalibur 3,990 100,000 1,762 73 
Monte Carlo 3,002 102,000 1,726 74 
Circus Circus 3,764 133,000 2,364 92 
Source: MGM Mirage 2005 Form 10-K 
 
In addition to eight other Nevada properties located in Primm, Reno, Jean, Laughlin, and 
Henderson, the company also operates casinos in Mississippi, Michigan and Illinois.  In addition 
to these owned and operated casino resorts, the company has equity interests in four casinos in 
Nevada, New Jersey, Illinois, and the United Kingdom.  Further, the company has a 50% 
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ownership stake of MGM Grand Macau.  In total, MGM Mirage owns, operates, or has 
significant investments in 26 casino resorts.   
 
Strategy 
 Given the heavy focus on a destination market (Las Vegas), MGM Mirage’s strategy is 
heavily based on creating desirable destinations for casino gamblers.  After acknowledging the 
highly competitive nature of the market(s) in which it competes, the company’s 2005 annual 
report declares that its means of operating in these environments is based on 5 primary methods: 
 
 (1) Locating our resorts in desirable leisure and business travel 
markets, and operating at superior sites within those markets,  
(2) Constructing and maintaining high-quality resorts and 
facilities, including luxurious guest rooms along with premier 
dining, entertainment, and retail amenities,  
(3) Recruiting, training, and retaining well-qualified and 
motivated employees who provide superior and friendly customer 
service,  
(4) Providing unique, “must-see” entertainment attractions, and  
(5) Developing distinctive and memorable marketing and 
promotional programs. 
 
Given these stated methods of competitive strategy, it is not surprising that the company 
conceptualizes its market in a manner far different from many of its non-Vegas centric peers.  
The 10-K states that  
 
our company’s facilities also compete for gaming customers with 
hotel-casino operations located in other areas of the United States 
and other parts of the world, and for leisure and business travelers 
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with non-gaming tourist destination such as Hawaii, Florida, and 
cruise ships.  Our hotel-casinos compete to a lesser extent with 
state-sponsored lotteries, off-track wagering, card parlors, and 
other forms of legalized gambling in the United States. 
 
 MGM Mirage is also a major Las Vegas real estate developer with interests in residential, 
commercial, hotel, retail, and casino developments currently underway.  The largest of these 
projects is Project CityCenter, a mixed-use development on 66 acres located between the 
Bellagio and Monte Carlo on the Las Vegas Strip.  According to the company, Project 
CityCenter will feature a 4,000 room casino resort, two 400-room non-gaming boutique hotels, 
470,000 square feet of luxury retail shops, restaurants, and entertainment venues, and almost 2.3 
million square feet of residential space in over 2,900 luxury condominium units.  As stated in the 
10-K, “as currently contemplated, we believe Project CityCenter will cost approximately $7 
billion, excluding pre-opening and land costs.” 
Wynn Resorts 
 
Overview 
Wynn Resorts is a two property casino company that has 100% ownership of the Wynn 
Las Vegas and Wynn Macau properties.  Founder Steve Wynn is a Las Vegas legend who has 
been involved with the development of the Golden Nugget, The Mirage, Treasure Island, and the 
Bellagio (among other properties).   From 1973 until 2000, Wynn was Chairman, President & 
Chief Executive Officer of Mirage Resorts.  The Wynn Las Vegas opened in April 2005 and was 
the most expensive casino resort ever built, with a price tag exceeding $2.7 billion for a one-
location property.  The Wynn Macau in the Macau Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China opened in September 2006 and is aimed at tapping the fastest 
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growing casino market in the world.  Steve Wynn is thought to be one of the most experienced 
casino hotel executives in the world, and his two-property company today has a market 
capitalization of over $6.5 billion. 
In addition to the offerings listed in the table below, the Wynn Las Vegas has 36 fairway 
villas on an adjacent 18 hole golf course, 6 private-entry villas, a baccarat salon, private VIP 
gaming rooms, 22 food and beverage outlets, a nightclub, Ferrari and Maserati dealerships, and 
several entertainment venues. 
 
Table 20: Wynn Resorts Property Statistics 
 
 
Property 
 
Rooms 
Casino Square 
Footage 
 
Slot Machines 
 
Gaming Tables 
Wynn Las Vegas 2,674 111,000 1,960 137 
Wynn Macau 600 100,000 N/A 350 
 
Strategy 
 Four key tenets of the Wynn Resorts strategies are listed in the company’s latest 10-K: 
(1) capitalize on the ‘Wynn” brand, (2) attract and deliver high-quality service and amenities to 
high-end gaming customers, (3) utilize extensive marketing mechanisms to attract high-roller 
and premium customers, and (4) capitalize on the Macau opportunity.   
With respect to the Wynn brand, the company believes the name “Wynn” is now firmly 
associated with “luxurious surroundings, upscale design, distinctive entertainment and superior 
amenities, including fine dining and premium retail offerings” (Wynn Resorts, 2005 Form 10-K).  
The second strategy is clear – focus on the high-end, premium customer.  The third element, 
marketing to the high-end customer, is driven by the fact that this two-property casino company 
has satellite marketing offices in Tokyo, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Taiwan, Vancouver, 
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and Southern California.  The fourth strategy—relating to Macau—merits special attention, 
primarily due to the market’s potential.  Wynn Resorts describes the opportunity in its 10-K: 
 
The government of Macau has expressed its desire to transform 
Macau into the tourist destination of choice in Asia.  The Chinese 
government has also gradually relaxed its travel and currency 
restrictions, allowing mainland Chinese citizens from certain 
urban centers and economically developed areas to visit Macau 
without joining a tour group and increasing the amount of 
renminbi that Chinese citizens are permitted to bring into Macau.  
With approximately 100 million people within a three hour drive 
and nearly 1 billion people within a 3-hour flight from Macau, 
Wynn Macau is located in what we believe will be one of the 
largest and fastest-growing gaming markets in the world. 
 
Fundamentally, Wynn Resorts epitomizes the “build it and they will come” strategy to casino 
development.  It is telling that the company’s discussion of strategy does not even mention the 
gaming experience, and one of the first slides in the company’s investor presentation is entitled 
“Follow the Non-Casino Revenues.”  The slide highlights the “beautifully appointed rooms,” 
“prize winning chefs,” “showrooms,” “unique high-end retail,” and “on-site golf course.”  The 
slide concludes with Steve Wynn’s strategic philosophy: “casino revenues are a result of the 
overall experience.”  
Las Vegas Sands 
 
Overview 
Las Vegas Sands is an integrated casino resort property developer that currently owns 
three properties: The Venetian Resort Hotel Casino and The Sands Expo and Convention Center 
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in Las Vegas and The Sands Macau Casino in the Macau Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China. It is also in the process of developing additional properties on the 
Las Vegas Strip, the Cotai strip in Macau, and recently won a concession from the Singapore 
government for development of an integrated resort at Singapore’s Marina Bay.  Further, the 
company is working with the Zhuhai Municipal People’s Government in China to masterplan the 
development of a leisure resort complex on Hengqin Island.  Founder Sheldon Adelson, a 
respected serial entrepreneur who had his first big success with the founding, growing, and 
eventual sale of the trade show COMDEX, entered the Las Vegas market in 1989 with the 
intention of revitalizing demand in the city by attracting conventions and trade shows.  Las 
Vegas Sands is today the most-valuable gaming company in the world with an equity market 
capitalization in excess of $30 billion.  Key statistics about the company’s two existing 
properties are listed in the table below. 
 
Table 21: Las Vegas Sands Property Statistics 
 
 
Property 
 
Rooms 
Casino Square 
Footage 
 
Slot Machines 
 
Gaming Tables 
The Venetian 4,027 116,000 1,728 140 
Sands Macau 50 172,000 930 440 
 
Strategy 
 The Las Vegas Sands 2005 annual report summarizes the company’s strategy succinctly 
and directly: “Our primary business objective is to become a leading worldwide operator of 
premium destination resorts with significant casino components and uniquely branded gaming 
entertainment properties in order to drive superior returns on invested capital, increase asset 
value and maximize value for our stockholders.”  The report continues onward to describe the 
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company’s strategies for achieving these objectives in two markets: (1) Las Vegas, and (2) 
globally.   
 The Las Vegas Sands strategy in Las Vegas is based upon the creation of “a unique, 
world-class, ‘must-see’ destination resort complex that caters to premium clientele.”  To do this, 
Las Vegas Sands – not unlike Wynn Resorts—focuses on the non-gaming activities.  In addition 
to the general expansion of facilities at the company’s Venetian in Las Vegas, the list of 
activities being pursued to implement the strategy in the company’s 2005 10-K filing includes 
the following: 
 
(1) Drive recurring, predictable high hotel occupancy…through 
events held at our convention facilities which also generate 
significant non-hotel traffic; (2) Capture superior hotel room rate 
through…first class services and high-end resort facilities; (3) 
Target higher-budget customers; (4) Attract world-famous chefs, 
prestigious art collections, premium retailers, and first class 
leisure facilities; and (5) Develop Asian-focused offerings to meet 
the expectations of high-end Asian customers. 
 
While much of the global expansion strategy described by the company caters to the Sands 
Macau’s first-mover status in China, the strategy extends beyond the Macau market and includes 
the United Kingdom, Japan, and Singapore.  Fundamentally, the global expansion strategy being 
pursued by Las Vegas Sands attempts to capitalize on Adelson’s successful strategy of utilizing 
convention-driven destination resorts as a means of economic revitalization.  The strategy is best 
summarized in a single bullet-point buried in the company’s 10-K: “Showcase our successful 
Las Vegas properties to position ourselves as a casino developer and operator of choice and win 
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new development opportunities in jurisdictions that are turning to large scale casino resorts as 
catalysts for economic expansion.” 
Station Casinos 
 
Overview 
Stations Casinos, founded in 1976, is an owner and operator of casinos in the Las Vegas 
metropolitan market and caters to the non-tourist, locals market.  As a frequency-market operator 
situated in a geography that historically has catered to destination market customers, Stations has 
been a primary beneficiary of the growth of Las Vegas and indirectly, the Las Vegas Strip, as the 
major casinos have spurred major population inflows.  The company is an owner/operator of 8 
major hotel casinos (one of which is 50% owned) and 6 smaller hotel casinos (two of which are 
50% owned) in the greater Las Vegas metropolitan area.  Station also manages casinos and 
development projects for Indian tribes in California and Michigan.  Station Casinos is known for 
its loyalty program, value-oriented gaming experience, and high quality of service.  The 
Company currently has a land bank that is the largest collection of undeveloped gaming-licensed 
real estate in the Las Vegas metropolitan area.  Station Casinos reported revenues of $1.1 billion 
in 2005 and employed more than 14,000 people.  The company today has a market capitalization 
over $3.5 billion. 
Key statistics about the company’s 9 owned hotel casino properties in Las Vegas are 
listed below (note the emphasis on parking spots rather than casino square footage due to the 
frequency market strategy): 
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Table 22: Station Casinos Property Statistics, Major Hotel Casinos in Nevada 
 
Property Rooms Parking Spots Slot Machines Gaming Tables 
Palace Station 1,007 2,600 1,845 55 
Boulder Station 300 4,800 2,967 42 
Texas Station 200 5,900 2,450 37 
Sunset Station 457 5,500 2,556 52 
Santa Fe Station 200 2,500 2,591 39 
Red Rock 415 5,000 3,200 62 
Green Valley 496 2,800 2,330 54 
Fiesta Rancho 100 2,700 1,627 13 
Fiesta Henderson 224 1,700 1,423 17 
 
Strategy 
 The company’s operating strategy is based upon three primary principles: (1) Focusing 
on a targeted customer base of high-frequency gamblers, (2) Providing a high-value experience, 
and (3) Employing an innovative marketing strategy to attract customers and establish a high-
level of name recognition.  Thus, the company is a great example of a prototypical frequency 
market casino operator, as the following quote from the company’s 2005 Form 10-K highlights: 
“our operating strategy emphasizes attracting and retaining customers primarily from the local 
and repeat visitor markets.”   Given the repeat nature of the customers, the strategy is squarely 
focused on delivering outstanding gambling experiences to loyal customers, as captured in the 
following excerpt from the company’s 2005 Form 10-K: 
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Because we target the repeat customer, we are committed 
to providing a high-value entertainment experience for our 
customers in our restaurants, hotels, casinos, and other 
entertainment amenities.  We develop regional entertainment 
destinations for locals that include other amenities such as movie 
theaters, bowling centers, ice skating, live entertainment venues 
and child-care facilities.  In addition, we believe the value offered 
by restaurants at each of our casino properties is a major factor in 
attracting local gaming customers, as dining is a primary 
motivation for casino visits by many locals.  Through their 
restaurants, each of which has a distinct style of cuisine, our 
casino properties offer generous portions of high-quality food at 
reasonable prices.  In addition, our operating strategy focuses on 
slot and video poker machine play.  Our target market consists of 
frequent gaming patrons who seek not only a friendly atmosphere 
and convenience, but also higher than average payout rates.  
Because locals and repeat visitors demand variety and quality in 
their slot and video poker machine play, our casino properties 
offer the latest in slot and video poker technology. 
 As part of our commitment to providing a quality 
entertainment experience for our patrons, we are dedicated to 
ensuring a high level of customer satisfaction and loyalty by 
providing attentive customer service in a friendly, casual 
atmosphere.  We recognize that consistent quality and a 
comfortable atmosphere stem from the collective care and 
friendliness of each employee.  We began as a family-run business 
and have maintained close-knit relationships among our 
management and we endeavor to instill in our employees the same 
sense of loyalty. Towards this end, we take a hands-on approach 
through active and direct involvement with employees at all levels. 
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Despite this frequency-market focus, the company also maintains a large real-estate development 
exposure as well and clearly states in its 2005 annual report that “our strategic focus over the 
next five to seven years is to take land held for development and other non-cash producing assets 
(primarily advances to Tribes with whom we have management contracts) and convert those 
assets into cash-producing assets.”  Thus, going forward, it appears Station Casinos will be more 
focused on real-estate development than recent history might suggest. 
Ameristar Casinos 
 
Overview 
 
Ameristar Casinos is a US centric casino owner/operator originally founded in Jackpot, 
Nevada.  The company today caters to avid local gamblers in non-destination cities such as St 
Charles and Kansas City, Missouri; Jackpot, Nevada; Council Bluffs, Iowa; Vicksburg, 
Mississippi; and Black Hawk, Colorado. The company was formed in 1954.  Ameristar reported 
2005 revenues of $961 million and today has a market capitalization in excess of $1.4 billion.  
Details on the company’s seven properties in six markets are listed in the following table. 
 
Table 23: Ameristar Casinos Property Statistics 
 
 
Property 
 
Rooms 
Casino Square 
Footage 
 
Slot Machines 
 
Gaming Tables 
Ameristar 
St. Charles 
- 130,000 3,244 90 
Ameristar 
Kansas City 
184 140,000 3,073 99 
Ameristar 
Council Bluffs 
444 38,500 1,651 36 
Ameristar 
Vicksburg 
149 44,500 1,502 36 
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Mountain High 
(Black Hawk) 
- 67,000 1,456 26 
Cactus Petes 
& Horseshu 
(Jackpot) 
416 29,000 1,009 36 
 
Strategy 
Ameristar describes its casinos as “different” than typical casinos, highlighting the fact 
that “our casinos include the most spacious floors and typically have the greatest number of 
games in our markets…we generally emphasize competitive minimum and maximum betting 
limits based on each market…and we do not depend on high-stakes players.” (Ameristar 
Casinos, 2005 Form 10-K).  Further, Ameristar properties tend to have more dining options than 
other casinos in their markets, and “signature restaurant concepts include warm and intimate 
steakhouses, elaborate buffets with interactive display cooking, and 24-hour casual dining 
restaurants” (Ameristar Casinos, 2005 Form 10-K).  It is interesting to note that the Ameristar 
annual report also emphasizes the non-gaming options, describing how “our dynamic sports bars 
feature the most advanced audio-visual technology in their markets” and the various 
entertainment options at the properties. 
Ameristar Casinos distinguishes itself from the competition via a competitive strategy 
based on four key tenets: (1) developing the highest quality, state-of-the-art facilities in chosen 
locations with a wide variety of amenities; (2) being an early adopter of slot-based technology to 
enhance the customer experience; (3) emphasizing branding and marketing, and (4) taking a 
hands on approach to centralized management.  It is interesting to note that Ameristar effectively 
seeks to be a “local destination” that offers a wide range of amenities to frequent gamblers.  
Management’s belief is that superior facilities with cutting-edge technologies will provide guests 
an exciting and dynamic entertainment experience that will generate return visits:  
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We feel that the number and diversity of our amenities is key to 
attracting customers and developing repeat business. We seek to 
broaden our appeal by offering more amenities than our 
competition. We believe that more choices attract more types of 
customers. Our properties offer restaurants ranging from casual to 
upscale, and customers can choose from entertainment options 
ranging from cabaret lounges and sports bars to outdoor 
amphitheaters and multipurpose entertainment pavilions. Some 
examples of our non-gaming amenities that have proven successful 
are our high-tech Amerisports Bars (Council Bluffs, St. Charles 
and Kansas City), our signature steakhouses, the Falcon and our 
unique Bottleneck Blues Bars. In addition, our properties regularly 
feature nationally known entertainers, including Tony Bennett, 
Boys II Men, Bill Engvall, Merle Haggard, Heart, BB King, 
Martina McBride, Meatloaf, REO Speedwagon, Smokey Robinson, 
Keith Urban, Damon Wayans and ZZ Top (Ameristar Casinos, 
2005 Form 10-K). 
 
Fundamentally, the Ameristar approach is not dissimilar to that taken by Wynn Resorts with 
respect to having non-gaming activities driving the casino business, albeit within a frequency 
market and with slots-oriented customers.   
Boyd Gaming 
 
Boyd Gaming is a diversified casino operator with 18 wholly-owned gambling 
entertainment venues spread throughout nine distinct gaming markets in five US states.  The 
company may be the only competitor to have as geographically diversified a footprint as 
Harrah’s.  In addition to properties in both Atlantic City and Las Vegas, the company also owns 
and operates casinos/racinos in Indiana, Illinois, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida.  Boyd 
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Gaming focuses on both the local frequency markets as well as destination market customers 
within Las Vegas (via the company’s ownership of the Stardust…which is incidentally being 
torn down for the forthcoming Echelon property development).  The company has 
disproportionate exposure to Las Vegas via its seven frequency/local market properties, its 
destination market property on the Las Vegas Strip, and several downtown Las Vegas casino 
properties.  Some of the company’s brands include Sam’s Town, Barbary Coast, Gold Coast, and 
the Borgata (a 50%/50% joint venture with MGM Mirage).  The company was formed in 1952 
and began trading on the NYSE in 1993.  Boyd Gaming reported 2005 revenues of $2.2 billion 
and today has a market capitalization in excess of $4.0 billion. 
 
Table 24: Boyd Gaming Property Statistics 
 
 
Property 
 
Rooms 
Casino Square 
Footage 
 
Slot Machines 
 
Gaming Tables 
Sam’s Town 648 133,000 3,035  40 
Eldorado - 16,000 498 6 
Jokers Wild - 22,500 518 7 
Barbary Coast 197 30,000 590 36 
Gold Coast 711 87,000 2,057 54 
Orleans 1,885 135,000 3,102 68 
Sun Coast 419 82,000 2,434 52 
South Coast 647 80,000 2,366 52 
Stardust (LV Strip) 1,552 75,000 1,299 57 
California  781 36,000 1,104 34 
Fremont 447 32,000 1,090 25 
Main Street Station  406 28,500 900 19 
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Sam’s Town (MS) 1,007 75,000 1,358 39 
Par-A-Dice 208 26,000 1,130 24 
Blue Chip 184 42,500 1,719 47 
Treasure Chest - 24,000 967 40 
Delta Downs 206 15,000 1,462 - 
Sam’s Town (LA) 514 30,000 1,122 26 
Borgata 2,000 124,000 3,572 133 
 
Strategy 
 Management of Boyd Gaming believes that their successes in the past have been driven 
by a five-pronged strategy that has emphasized (1) slot revenues, (2) comprehensive marketing 
and promotion, (3) the Las Vegas locals market, (4) downtown properties focused on Hawaiian 
visitors, and (5) a geographically diversified footprint.  Fundamentally, the company is a slots-
focused company that has recently been attempting to grow its focus upon destination markets 
(Vegas and Atlantic City) while maintaining a prominent role in the Las Vegas locals market. 
 Nevertheless, with that said, the company is in the midst of a major development project 
on the current site of the Stardust on the Las Vegas Strip.  Echelon Place, as the project is 
currently known, will offer 5,300 guest rooms, a 140,000 square foot casino, 25 restaurants and 
bars, extensive meeting facilities, and a 300,000 square foot retail promenade.  The property will 
cost more than $4 billion to develop and will include the Echelon Las Vegas (Boyd-owned and 
operated casino resort) as well as four other branded hotels, ranging from a Mandarin Oriental to 
a Morgans Hotel as well as 1 million square feet of convention center / meeting space.  Clearly, 
Boyd Gaming is in the midst of becoming a more substantial player in the Las Vegas destination 
market. 
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Gaming Industry Attitudes on Technology and Casinos 
 
Given the heavy use of information technology at Harrah’s Entertainment to develop 
scalable differentiated service, an understanding of the industry’s perspective vis-à-vis 
technology use in the casinos is essential contextual information.  I believe it is also important to 
understand these attitudes prior to examining the competitive dynamics that characterize the 
industry, which are discussed in the following section.  Fortunately, a recent industry survey 
sought this perspective, the findings of which were presented at the Global Gaming Expo in 
November 2006.  In a quest to understand the future path of technological developments in the 
casino industry, the American Gaming Association (AGA) recently conducted a survey of 
leading gaming industry insiders and technologists.   
The survey’s findings suggest that technology is an essential part of the gaming industry 
and that’s its use going forward will only become more central.  An overwhelming majority of 
survey respondents (~94%) indicated that the use of technology is critical to a casino’s success.  
6 percent of the respondents went even further and indicated that technology “will determine the 
success of a property more than anything else” (AGA Executive Summary of Future Watch 
Survey).  The research also indicates that successful technology use to date has focused more on 
cost-reduction and revenue generation (33% and 28%, respectively) than on enhancing the guest 
experience (25%).  This is not surprising, given the increasing productivity exhibited by the 
industry over the past several years. 
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Graph 10: Increasing Casino Industry Productivity, 2000-2005 
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When looking ahead, respondents indicated that the most important goal for technology 
in a casino is to improve the customer experience (53% rank it as the first priority); only 7% of 
respondents indicated that the use of technology to lower expenses is their first priority, and 0% 
of respondents said that technology based property-differentiation was their top technology 
objective.  Interestingly enough, despite this focus upon customer experiences, respondents did 
not seem to believe this would actually happen: 
 
While [respondents] firmly believe that enhancing the quality of 
the customer experience should be a major goal for technological 
innovations in the coming years, there is a debate about the extent 
to which this will in fact happen.  Indeed, nearly two-thirds of 
respondents (63%) agree that innovations over the next 5 to 10 
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years will do more to improve back of the house operations than to 
appreciably change the customer experience. 27 
 
While the survey report goes on to discuss findings with respect to downloadable and 
central-server based slot machines, the use of RFID in the casino, and the use of wireless hand-
held gaming devices while in a casino, the most interesting finding (with respect to this 
dissertation) is that “fully 37% of respondents believe that implementation of technology to serve 
functions previously performed by employees can make it more challenging for a particular 
casino resort to create customer loyalty through first-rate customer service.”28  Given this is 
precisely the focus of Harrah’s strategy of scalable service differentiation, it is particularly 
noteworthy that more than one-third of senior executives and technologists in the gaming 
industry find it to be potentially of negative value. 
Competitive Dynamics & Harrah’s Performance  
 
From the above discussion of Harrah’s Entertainment’s six primary competitors, it is 
clear that each has adopted a different strategy to draw its customers.  One of the most important 
distinctions between the casino companies is the choice of market focus: destination market vs. 
frequency market.  Destination or major market operators include MGM Mirage, Wynn Resorts, 
and Las Vegas Sands.  These companies cater to customers who are visiting a destination (i.e. 
Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Macau, etc.) that is known for casino gambling and presents these 
customers with various options in terms of casino venues.  Several of Harrah’s properties are in 
the destination markets of Atlantic City and Las Vegas. 
                                                 
27 The G2E Future Watch Series: Executive Summary, Las Vegas, NV: American Gaming Association, 2006. 
28 The G2E Future Watch Series, op cit 
Customers of destination markets generally make fewer multi-day trips to casinos than do 
customers of frequency markets that visit more regularly such as drive-in or local customers.  
The primary frequency market competitors are Station Casinos, Boyd Gaming, and Ameristar 
Casinos.  The typical frequency market customer visits casinos on weekend evenings, on special 
occasions, or when friends or family are visiting.  Frequency market customers are drawn by 
local amenities such as high-value restaurants, convenient locations, and friendly staff.  Many of 
Harrah’s casinos are in frequency markets.   
 Two other casino operator distinctions merit attention.  The first, type of player targeted, 
is a simple distinction.  While most destination market operators tend to target high-rollers and 
“big-betting” table players, most frequency market operators tend to focus on the low to mid 
level slot players.  Most of the frequency market competitors realize that this player focus 
requires them to constantly be offering the latest and greatest slot gaming opportunities as well 
as high-quality “value for money” gaming experiences (i.e. higher payout ratios, etc.) .  In this 
regard, Harrah’s is unique as it is a company clearly focused on slot players, yet has a large 
presence in both of the two primary US destination markets – Las Vegas and Atlantic City.   
The last distinction relates to the suite of services used to entice customers to visit a 
casino property.  This distinction has a lot to do with the conceptualization of the casino’s 
offering to customers and tends to align with the market focus.  In the case of major destination 
market casino operators (i.e. MGM Mirage, Las Vegas Sands, and Wynn Resorts), the suite of 
services includes entertainment offerings such as shows, a multitude of restaurants, exclusive 
golf course availability, vogue spas, spectacularly ornate and engaging environments, etc.  
Destination market operators tend to have high-end shopping boutiques (such as the Forum 
Shops at Caesar’s Las Vegas), attention-grabbing public spectacles (such as the fountains in front 
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of MGM Mirage’s Bellagio in Las Vegas), or award winning restaurants (such as Tao Restaurant 
at Las Vegas Sands’ Venetian in Las Vegas).  Fundamentally, destination market casino 
operators are usually competing for attention and therefore need to go “over-the-top” to create a 
sense of novelty, energy, and enticement that draws visitors into the casinos.   
While most frequency market competitors are focused on the gambling experience and 
tend to provide basic, but not spectacular environments within which customers gamble, 
Ameristar Casinos attempts to distinguish itself in frequency markets with a broader suite of 
amenities and more ornate, spacious casinos.  Harrah’s Entertainment is heavily focused on the 
gaming experience and does not attempt to entice customers with spectacular surroundings or 
award-winning spas.  Rather, the company focuses on delivering a high-value gaming experience 
accompanied by friendly, helpful high quality service. 
The table below summarizes the different operating strategies pursued by Harrah’s six 
primary competitors in a perhaps-overly simplified manner.  Nevertheless, the table does lay out 
the competitive context in which Harrah’s operates.  
 
Table 25: Casino Industry Competitive Dynamics  
 
 
Company 
 
Market Focus 
 
Player Focus 
Geographic 
Focus 
Operating  
Strategy 
MGM Mirage Destination Mid – High End 
Customers 
Las Vegas “Must-See” 
Destinations; 
Premier Non-
Gaming Amenities 
Wynn Resorts Destination High End 
Customers 
Las Vegas, 
Macau 
Premier Non-
Gaming Amenities 
(Shopping, Golf, 
Spa, Restaurants) 
Las Vegas Sands Destination High End & 
Asian Customers 
Las Vegas, 
Macau 
“Must-See” 
Destinations; 
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Convention-driven 
Traffic 
Station Casinos Frequency Low-Mid End 
Slot Customers 
Las Vegas Local Amenities 
(Restaurants, etc); 
High Value 
Gaming 
Experience 
Ameristar 
Casinos 
Frequency Low-Mid End 
Slot Customers 
Secondary US 
Markets 
High End Local 
Amenities 
(Entertainment, 
Restaurants, etc.) 
Boyd Gaming Frequency  Low-Mid End 
Slot Customers 
Las Vegas, 
Secondary US 
Markets 
Local Amenities; 
Geographic 
Footprint 
Harrah’s 
Entertainment 
Frequency & 
Destination 
Low-Mid End 
Slot Customers 
Las Vegas, 
Atlantic City, 
Secondary US 
Markets 
High Value 
Gaming 
Experience; 
Customer Service 
 
 
As evident from the above descriptions of Harrah’s six main competitors, competition 
exists in virtually every market and for every type of customer.  When it comes to the Vegas 
market (about 50% of Harrah’s business), it competes with all but one of these players 
(Ameristar does not have a Las Vegas presence).  When it comes to non-Nevada gaming, there is 
occasional competition that usually exists in the form of one or two competitors to a particular 
property.  Finally, the international (primarily Macau) market is extremely crowded with Las 
Vegas Sands as the leading competitor and numerous non-US companies fighting for market 
share (Galaxy Casinos, Emperor Entertainment, Melco, PBL/Crown Casinos, Genting, etc.).   
Despite the seemingly endless supply of companies willing to enter the casino gaming 
business, competition seems to be rational with each company pursuing a slightly different 
strategy.  Outside of the “competing for attention” destination markets in which the definition of 
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(and cost of achieving) “must-see” status is continually rising, competition seems quite rational 
and well-behaved with no two competitors pursuing the same strategy.   
Within this context, Harrah’s is the only national casino company with a presence in most 
major gambling markets (frequency and destination) while catering to the low to mid end slot-
playing customer.  The company focuses on delivering a high-value gaming experience and 
offers a network of properties in which customers can be treated similarly well.  This Harrah’s 
strategy distinguishes the company from its competitors – resulting in a complimentary dynamic 
that seems to be increasing the gaming pie by offering more interesting value propositions to 
customers; Loveman notes: 
   
As each of us goes off to pursue a strategy that everyone 
understands to be relevant to each other but in most cases different 
from one another: MGM Mirage is a real estate/ development 
convention oriented hotelier in Las Vegas with some interests in 
Asia, Steve Wynn builds the greatest mousetraps around in just a 
few places, Sheldon is into the convention business in just a few 
places, Stations is a locals operator in the state of Nevada, and we 
are the only business that has any interest or any capacity to be an 
international distributor of brands in a way that a consumer 
products company often is and the way that we’ve evolved.  And 
that is exactly where we want the industry to be.  Where rather 
than being directly head to head, we find ourselves moving in 
broadly complementary directions, where we can all do well, our 
share prices can all do well, our executive teams can all do well, 
the consumer can benefit, as all of these trains move off in different 
directions (Loveman, 2005c). 
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In terms of the overall Harrah’s strategy of competing on customer experience via 
outstanding service (versus the “must-see” destinations, or exclusive non-gaming amenities such 
as award winning spas, ultra-luxury retail, etc.), the results speak for themselves.  Across 
virtually every metric that one might use to judge the success of Harrah’s scalable service 
differentiation strategy, the company has been wildly successful.  The company has managed to 
grow same store sales over the past six years, cross market play is up almost 50% in that same 
period, and employee productivity has skyrocketed – revenues per employee are up over 100% 
since Loveman arrived in 1998.  As highlighted in the introduction, such gains have outpaced the 
industry.  
 
Graph 11: Strengthening Base Business at Harrah’s Entertainment, 2000-2005 
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Source: Harrah’s Entertainment 
 
 
As Harrah’s effectively applied technology to automate several elements of the business, 
productivity also increased dramatically.  The strategy set by Loveman resulted in a substantial 
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increase (>100% between 1998 and 2005) in revenues per employee, something that Showboat 
General Manager Jay Snowden says is “attributable to the Total Rewards program and our tier-
based service differentiation more so than to anything else.”29  The company effectively 
generated more play from its most valuable customers, resulting in disproportionate gains in 
profitability, employee productivity, and financial results. 
 
Graph 12: Improving Employee Productivity at Harrah’s Entertainment, 1992-2005 
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Source: Harrah’s Entertainment, Analysis of Financial Statements 
 
 
Loveman gives credit to the tiered, aspirational Total Rewards for part of the success: “If 
you look at our same-store-sales growth and our overall revenue growth, it is disproportionately 
among those who have advanced through the tiers and consolidated their business with us.  It’s 
exactly what we set out to do” (Becker, 2003). 
                                                 
29 Interview with Jay Snowden, General Manager of the Harrah’s Showboat Atlantic City, via telephone on 
September 1, 2006. 
Finally, the ultimate measure of success vis-à-vis a company’s strategy is how it fared 
relative to its competitors.  Choosing a metric with which to measure such performance is no 
trivial task, given the different asset mixes of each company.  In consultation with several 
leading gaming industry analysts, a consensus seemed to emerge that the single best metric 
through which to gauge a casino management team is return on invested capital (ROIC).  
According to head gaming analyst Joseph Greff of Bear Stearns, ROIC (see the Appendix for a 
definition) is the best measure for determining the strength of a management team: 
 
We believe that ROIC, which measures the un-leveraged 
cash returns generated per dollar invested in the company, is the 
most accurate gauge of a company’s ability to create value.  ROIC 
measures the cash-on-cash returns generated by a company 
independent of its financing and accounting strategies.   
While other performance measures, such as Return on 
Equity, EBITDA returns, and project returns can prove useful and 
serve as proxies for value creation, ROIC…is more effective.  
Whereas the aforementioned statistics can be skewed by leverage, 
stock buybacks, and/or accounting strategies ROIC is relatively 
immune to these manipulations. 
Looking at ROIC enables an investor to determine how 
efficiently a management team runs its assets independent of how it 
chooses to finance those assets.  ROIC affords the investor the 
opportunity to look through various financial strategies and 
accounting procedures and identify the real economic return a 
company’s management is able to generate. 
 
Given the diverse footprint that Harrah’s exhibits, the competitor that appears most 
comparable to the company in terms of breadth, scale, and size is MGM Mirage.  As seen in the 
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chart below, which compares the ROIC metric for Harrah’s and MGM Mirage since 1998,30 the 
management of Harrah’s Entertainment has been able to consistently extract more value from the 
assets at its disposal than MGM Mirage management was able to achieve: 
 
Graph 13: Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”), Harrah’s vs. MGM Mirage, 1998-2005 
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Source: Bear Stearns & Company August 2006 Gaming & Lodging Report.   
 
Some might argue that comparing Harrah’s against one particular company may not 
accurately represent the management team’s true capability and Harrah’s should therefore be 
compared against the entire universe of industry competitors profiled above.  Unfortunately, data 
limitations (several of the companies were not public in 1998) prevent a complete apples-to-
                                                 
30 While the company today is the leading destination Las Vegas casino operator (with Harrah’s in a close number 
two position), both MGM Mirage and Harrah’s grew into these positions via major acquisitions in 2005.  Prior to the 
2005 acquisitions, MGM and Harrah’s were more similar in terms of their property footprints and revenue streams.   
apples comparison, but the chart below compares Harrah’s to an industry composite of gaming 
operators analyzed by Bear Stearns (note the 2005 metric is influenced by expenses associated 
with Harrah’s acquisition of Caesars Entertainment as well as Hurricane Katrina): 
 
Graph 14: Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”), Harrah’s vs. Competitors 1998-2005 
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Thus, it seems that the Harrah’s strategy of competing on customer experience is 
working.  By focusing on enhancing the overall gambling experience of a gaming customer, 
Harrah’s was able to squeeze more profits out of its existing asset base by generating loyal 
customers who returned to Harrah’s because of the service they received, not the “must-see” 
spectacle adjacent to a casino. 
Mansharamani  Page 182 
Chapter 5 – Harrah’s Service Strategy  
 
The evidence presented in the prior chapter about Harrah’s performance versus its 
competitors is compelling evidence that the company has developed an effective competitive 
strategy.  While the prior chapter showed that the strategy of competing on customer experience 
proved effective, this chapter will focus on understanding how Harrah’s executed this strategy.  
Before describing the Harrah’s service strategy, however, it is important to understand how the 
company grew from a single-location bingo parlor operator into the world’s largest gaming 
company as well as how it conceptualizes what it is offering its customers. 
From Bingo Parlor to Gaming Giant: A Brief History of Harrah’s Entertainment 
 
The Harrah’s brand was established in 1937 when Bill Harrah opened a bingo parlor in 
Reno, Nevada.  His initial success at this location led him to open Harrah’s at its present location 
in downtown Reno in 1946.  During the 1950’s, the company went on to purchase several other 
“card clubs” at Lake Tahoe.  In 1970, the company issued 450,000 over-the-counter shares and 
one year later was listed on the American Stock Exchange.  In 1973, 36 years after the 
establishment of Bill Harrah’s first branded operation, Harrah’s became the first casino company 
to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Harrah’s continued to thrive as a public company and in 1980, Holiday Inns acquired the 
company.  At the time, Holiday Inns had over 1600 hotels and ownership interests in two casino 
properties.  By 1985, the combined Holiday Inns – Harrah’s company had a growing and diverse 
list of offerings: Harrah’s casinos, Holiday Inn Hotels, Embassy Suites hotels, and Hampton Inn 
hotels.  To reflect this diversity, the Board of Holiday Inns approved a name change to Holiday 
Corporation.  Bass Plc ended up acquiring the Holiday Inn Hotels in 1989 from the Holiday 
Mansharamani  Page 183 
Corporation, and the remaining collection of brands (Harrah’s, Embassy Suites, and Hampton 
Inn) and assets were spun off into an entity named the Promus Companies.  
In 1995, the Promus Companies again restructured – this time spinning off its hotel 
brands (Embassy Suites and Hampton Inn) into a separate entity.  The remaining business – 
which consisted only of the Harrah’s casino properties – was renamed “Harrah’s Entertainment” 
and again began trading on the NYSE.  The mid 1990’s were characterized by heavy investment 
in the gaming industry by all of Harrah’s competitors, and by 1998, the company was facing 
significant operating difficulties.  As recalled by the McKinsey Quarterly:  
 
When Gary Loveman arrived at the headquarters of 
Harrah’s Entertainment in 1998 as Chief Operating Officer, most 
of its employees weren’t prepared to wager that the Harvard 
Business School professor had what it takes to succeed in the 
gaming business.  “Most people thought I’d leave after 2 years and 
go back to Harvard,” Loveman recalls.  “They thought this would 
be like a kidney stone: it would hurt for a while and then it would 
pass...”  
  A decade ago, as a handful of states began to liberalize 
their gambling regulations, Harrah’s seemed to be on a roll:  it 
quickly expanded outside of Nevada, opening casinos and 
riverboat-gambling venues in several Midwestern and Eastern 
locales.  But as the opening of new jurisdictions ground to a halt, 
competitors noticed the profits Harrah’s was making outside its 
traditional Nevada and Atlantic City markets.  They soon entered 
the arena with attractive casinos, hotels and amenities. With most 
of Harrah’s markets under increasing competition, the company 
began to struggle (Becker, 2003). 
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In 1997, however, the company launched Total Gold, a loyalty program designed to 
mimic the frequent flyer programs developed in the airline industry.  At the time, few if any 
executives understood how the program would evolve into the engine that would drive the 
company’s success in the years to come.  In retrospect, the launch of Total Gold proved to be a 
truly-enabling development in the company’s approach to understanding its customers—one that 
facilitated numerous service innovations in the following years. 
Then CEO Phil Satre convinced then Harvard Business School professor Gary Loveman 
to join the company as COO – which turned out to be a major turning point in the company’s 
performance.  Loveman, who had taught service operations to MBA students and brought a 
brand loyalty and marketing perspective to the company, was an expert in retail industry 
operations and strategies.  In addition to “fixing” the base business, Loveman went on to grow 
the company’s physical footprint – broadening the company’s “distribution” network. 
Between 1998 and 2005, the company grew steadily through regular acquisitions, 
including Showboat, the Rio All-Suite Hotel & Casino, Players International, Harvey’s Casino 
Resorts, Horseshoe Gaming Holdings, Caesars Entertainment, and most recently, Imperial 
Palace.  The graph below displays how acquisitions have helped fuel Harrah’s growth over the 
past 8 years, particularly during the Loveman era.  
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Graph 15: Harrah’ Entertainment Revenues (US$ millions), 1988-2005 
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March 2000 marked another important milestone in the development of the company’s 
strategy – the re-branding and re-launch of the loyalty program as Total Rewards, the first tiered 
loyalty program in the gaming industry.  The ability to segment customers according to worth to 
Harrah’s was unique in the industry and became the root capability enabling service 
differentiation.  Ultimately, however, it was customer motivation for comps and recognition that 
generated customer transaction and behavior data from which customer value and worth insights 
could be obtained.  The fact that slot machine technology allowed for easy tracking of play and 
that Harrah’s was a slot-centric company all supported the success of Total Rewards as the 
primary enabler for customer experience oriented strategy through which Harrah’s approached 
the market.  In short, Total Rewards and the data it gathered enabled the service innovations. 
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Very recent history (i.e. developments in 2006) includes Harrah’s announcement of its 
intention to acquire London Clubs International.  The company also did not get selected for the 
Singapore Marina Bay resort development project – competitor Las Vegas Sands (operator of the 
Venetian in Las Vegas as well as the Sands in Macau) won the concession as it successfully 
executed on its strategy of promoting economic development via casino resort development.  
Harrah’s continues to view Asia as a hole in its footprint and plans to enter the market as soon as 
practical.  Finally, October 2006 brought an unsolicited takeover bid from several private equity 
firms at an unprecedented price of $83.50/share, valuing the total enterprise (including debt) at 
more than $26 billion.  Rumors in late November 2006 also began circulating about a potential 
merger of Harrah’s Entertainment with Penn National Gaming.  On December 20, 2006, 
Harrah’s formally announced that it had accepted a revised $90/share offer for the company from 
the private equity group led by Apollo Management and Texas Pacific Group.   
The Harrah’s Service Offering: Resolution of Uncertain Outcomes 
 
It is meaningless to discuss Harrah’s service strategy if we do not have a good 
understanding of what Harrah’s thinks it is selling.  What is the offering that Harrah’s produces 
for its customers?  What are Harrah’s customers coming to buy?  Although seemingly trite 
questions, understanding the answers to these questions is essential to appreciating fully Harrah’s 
service strategy and its approach to differentiating its offering.   
Las Vegas legend Steve Wynn is probably most representative of the traditional 
conceptualization of a casino’s offering: “People come and want to go to a casino because of the 
high energy, the animation of the space.  Casinos are animated, razz-mataz entertainments… I 
try to give people a space that they and their companions will respond to, and I believe if I do 
that, they will award me with their patronage…” (Wynn, 2005).  Thus, Wynn believes that he is 
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selling ornate, stimulative environments that engage the senses, emotions, (and wallets) of 
customers seeking such stimuli and environments.  Customers are drawn to locations, and as 
typically described by industry pundits, the Las Vegas motto became: “if you build it, they will 
come.”  Wynn is describing a destination market, must-see, high-end focus approach to 
generating casino traffic.  Generating gaming from the patrons is a secondary thought that 
follows from first generating the traffic. 
 Harrah’s Entertainment however, conceptualizes the gaming offering in very different 
terms, namely as one in which a customer seeks the thrill of the actual gambling outcome.  The 
offering the company, therefore, is selling is the anticipation of the resolution of an uncertain 
outcome, the thrill one receives from the process of resolving an unknown.  As Loveman notes, 
Harrah’s is selling an entertainment experience: 
 
The essence of the gambling experience is for our guests 
the realization of an uncertain outcome…a slot machine could 
easily be programmed to give the result of the pull 
instantaneously--it need not cycle through one reel, then a second, 
then a third.  But of course it does that because that’s what builds 
our anticipation… We see a seven, and then a seven, and in that 
last moment, the world is better, the women are better, the men are 
more handsome, we’re alive, we breathe. That’s why your guests 
are there.   
When we deal blackjack, we don’t deal two cards to each 
person first. There’s no mystery in that.  We deal one, and if you 
get an Ace, all of a sudden just as you see the Ace, you’re filled 
with anticipation…or if the dealer pulls a 6, you’re hoping with all 
your heart that she gets a ten. That’s what we sell, that’s the 
energy that brings a person to a casino.  
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They’re not there to make an investment decision.  They’re 
not saying to themselves: ‘you know honey we could do two things 
tonight, we could go to a casino or we could buy the Vanguard 
index fund.’  That’s not it.  They’re buying a form of entertainment 
and our customers know it better than anyone else (Loveman, 
2005a). 
Playing the Cards You’re Dealt: Harrah’s Focus on Existing Customers 
 
  Given the conceptualization of the service offered in terms of an actual gaming 
experience (the resolution of an uncertain outcome, versus the “razz-mataz” environments of 
high-end retail, exclusive restaurants, and spectacular environments), it should not be surprising 
to learn that Harrah’s decided to compete on customer experience – versus the above described 
strategies of creating “must-see” destinations or offering an extensive suite of high-end 
amenities.  Further, it should also seem obvious that this conceptualization of the offering leads 
to a belief that attempting to “grow the market” is a fool’s game, one in which billions must be 
spent to generate “must-see” spectacles that will draw greater and greater pools of gamers.   
At the very root of the Harrah’s strategy, then, is a belief that the company should be able 
to drive additional business from its existing customers.  The strategy was not focused on 
obtaining new customers, but rather on developing greater loyalty of those customers who 
already were visiting Harrah’s properties.  As Loveman notes: “We said that you don’t primarily 
need more gaming; you need more loyalty among players who already know you.  That meant 
orienting the company towards influencing consumer choice.  So the whole strategy was about 
modifying consumer behavior” (Becker, 2003).   
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The 2005 Harrah’s Entertainment Annual Report summarizes this strategy quite 
eloquently, noting that Harrah’s does not attempt to compete on the basis of anything other than 
customer experience:  
 
What distinguishes one casino company’s properties from 
another’s?  In physical terms, not much.  The hardware – slot 
machines, table games, restaurants, hotel rooms, and so on – may 
vary slightly from one place to the next, but the differences are 
mostly negligible from a consumer’s point of view.  That’s why 
Harrah’s has long worked to create a decisive preference for our 
brands through superior service and compelling marketing, both of 
which are enabled by Total Rewards, the gaming industry’s first 
and most successful loyalty program….the relationship-marketing 
and other business intelligence capabilities fueled by Total 
Rewards are constantly bringing us closer to our customers so we 
better understand their preferences, and from that understanding 
we are able to improve the entertainment experiences we offer 
accordingly (Harrah’s Entertainment 2005 Annual Report). 
 
Setting the Objective: Monogamous Customers 
 
To measure the success of the customer experience strategy as it unfolded, as well as to 
provide other managers with mechanisms to gauge progress, Harrah’s management decided to 
focus on three key metrics: (1) same store sales growth – which was intended to be a measure 
of the underlying health of the collection of properties, un-obscured by the effects of 
acquisitions, new “store” openings, etc.; and (2) cross market play, a metric that measures the 
amount of gaming revenue that was earned from players not in their “home market.” Several 
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investment analysts have claimed that cross market play31 can be argued to be an indicator of 
customer loyalty when they’re traveling; and (3) wallet-share, or the percent of a consumer’s 
budgeted expenditure on casino entertainment services that Harrah’s manages to capture.   
In services, wallet share is a measure of both loyalty and trust in a service provider’s 
ability to consistently deliver a quality experience.  Given what he found upon arriving at 
Harrah’s, Loveman immediately used wallet share as a metric upon which he tried to focus even 
frontline employees.  Loveman recounted the dismal state of Harrah’s wallet-share metrics when 
he joined the company in 1998 to employees on the day after the company closed its acquisition 
of Caesar’s Entertainment: 
 
I spent three shifts a day, day after day in employee dining 
rooms talking to employees about the number 36. . .that Harrah’s 
customers across the country gave us only 36% of their spend out 
of their gambling budget.  That is a TERRIBLE number.  You think 
about other services you all buy.  People go to hair salons. . .they 
don’t go to six different hair salons, they don’t wait to see who has 
a coupon at a hair salon.  They don’t say now I got to get my hair 
cut today, “Where is there a sale?”  They go to a place they trust.  
They go to the auto mechanic they trust, they go to the dry cleaner 
they trust, they go to the cobbler they trust.   
Why is it that nobody shows any loyalty to casinos?  The 
reason was we’d never given them any reason to be loyal.  So, we 
made this our mantra. . .that if we could do just a little better.  . 
.get from 36 to 37 and by the way 37 STINKS. . .we could take a 
$14 share price and make it $15 or $16 and then when we got to 
38 we could make it $17 or $18 and we could then go fix all these 
                                                 
31 Thus, if an individual player who is a regular customer at Harrah’s Joliet visits Las Vegas, the gaming revenues 
earned from this customer while in Vegas are considered “cross-market” revenues.   
buildings that needed so much attention and that’s what we 
did…(Loveman, 2005a). 
 
The emphasis that Loveman placed upon building customer loyalty cannot be overstated.  
Having studied the power of brands from an academic perspective, he focused the company upon 
generating a virtuous cycle of brand building driven by customer loyalty that in turn built the 
brand further.  The mechanism through which to do this was differentiated service.  Thus, the 
focus on loyalty generation and brand-building rapidly emerged as objectives by which to 
measure the company’s operating strategy of competing on customer experience; to rally 
employees and managers alike around the development of a successful outcome of having 
serviceÆ loyalty Æ customer transaction data Æ analytics Æ customer value determination Æ 
differentiated service Æ loyalty, etc.  As part of the rallying call, Harrah’s management began to 
describe customers not exhibiting loyalty behaviors as suffering from a “promiscuity” problem: 
 
[W]e referred to it as the customer promiscuity problem, 
the fact that customers were playing with everybody.  And we 
needed them to be monogamous and be true just to us so that we 
could begin to get from 1/3 of their trips maybe to something more 
like a ½.  And if we just made that little progress, we would have 
ourselves one spectacular business.  So the strategy began to 
emerge at that time around the things that we knew we could 
control to influence that problem.   
We had to focus on the gaming experience because really 
that’s all we had across all of the business. We didn’t have a hotel 
in Joliette at that time; we didn’t have hotels in lots of our places; 
we didn’t have great restaurants in many of our places; we 
certainly didn’t have resorts.  The only thing that was common in 
all of them was we had a casino where we could treat people well.  
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So we had to focus on creating an experience which was highly 
oriented towards great gaming.  We had to treat our guests 
extremely well when they were there.  And then we had to use the 
information we could gather about them to make them want to 
come back and see us as we got to know them better (Loveman, 
2005c). 
 
Assuring Scalability through Robust Information Technology  
 
To accomplish the lofty objectives of building brands and gaining customer intimacy, the 
company had to build the appropriate IT systems to support this strategy – systems that 
supported the objective of being able to influence customer behavior by altering the customer 
experience.  The basis upon which the customer experience was to be differentiated was driven 
by the customer’s value and profitability.  Further, the systems needed to project a consistent 
strategy and brand that emphasized high-value gambling experiences accompanied by great 
service that would get to know the customer: 
 
So we worked to build systems that could routinely, against 
millions of customers, do three things.  The first was to attach them 
to a brand – the Harrah’s brand…We have been the only brand 
with a nationwide footprint to pursue traditional consumer brand 
advertising.  It’s been very effective.  Now notice we couldn’t 
promise people we had the prettiest buildings – like Caesars.  We 
couldn’t tell them we have the most beautiful amenities – like 
Paris.  All we could tell them was that they would have a great 
gambling experience and we would surround them with the highest 
quality service…and that was the second piece.  We set about the 
notion that if we could take good care of people, we would build 
their loyalty.   
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Finally, we recognized that all across America, companies 
collect information about us and then they don’t use it.  What if we 
collected that information, and we used it carefully to get ever 
closer to the interests of each of our customers – learning whether 
they liked hotel rooms or restaurants, or cash or gifts, whether 
they traveled with a spouse or without, whether they made their 
trip to Vegas always at the same time or were prone to making 
spontaneous decisions to visit when we needed them to—all kinds 
of information that would craft our relationship. 
These were the three things we did to envelope guests to 
come and see us at places that sometimes were not that great.  But 
it was sufficient to begin a process now six years old of driving 
substantial growth in same store sales (Loveman, 2005a). 
 
As described above, growing the size of the market was not part of the strategic plan; 
rather, deeper knowledge of and greater intimacy with existing players became the over-riding 
objective, and correspondingly, systems were designed to develop customer insight and to better 
understand the player’s behaviors, actions, wagering patterns, and preferences:  
 
We set about building a bunch of self-reinforcing mechanisms that 
enveloped players, as we call customers, with reasons to be more 
loyal.  Part of this effort was to create a brand that they would be 
attached to, and that required a significant improvement in service 
quality.  And part of it was using relationship marketing tools that 
constantly try to develop closer and more valuable interactions 
with players (Becker, 2003). 
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Capturing Reciprocal History via the Total Rewards Loyalty Program 
 
Underlying Loveman’s customer experience based strategy was a dependence upon a 
robust loyalty system (powered by information technology) designed to collect and analyze 
information about the customer.  Ultimately, this strategy was a reflection of the circumstances 
in which Loveman found the company when he joined in 1998 – specifically that Harrah’s had 
two distinguishing elements: (1) locations and (2) customer information: 
 
A lot of the strategies of business, a lot of the great 
strategies in warfare, as I’m told, come from recognizing what you 
don’t have.  And we knew what we didn’t have; we knew we didn’t 
have the most beautiful facilities.  We had places that were in some 
very awkward locations; we had places that made it very difficult 
for the customer to buy what we had for sale. . . .So we started to 
look and see, “What do we have?”  Well we have one thing nobody 
else did.  We had a lot of casinos around the country that had the 
same name.  
And even today we are the only company that operates a 
number of casinos under the same brand name across the country.  
That’s a very important benefit, a very important attribute.  And 
we had one other very important thing.  We knew more about our 
customers than other people did.  Due to some very thoughtful 
ideas from John Boushy and Phil Satre and others back in the 
middle 1990’s we started collecting information about customers 
when they used our recognition program, then called Total Gold.  
And we began to amass a bunch of information about them and we 
had to then figure out what to do with it. . .  We recognized we had 
two big assets.  We had lots of places people could go under the 
same name and we had lots of information about those who visited 
us. . .(Loveman, 2005c). 
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The Total Gold system, referenced in the above quote, was designed as a means to 
reward customers for playing at Harrah’s.  At the time of inception, it was not intended to serve 
as a data gathering mechanism or a means through which to track customer transactions.  It was 
simply a tool to provide a “rebate” to a customer for giving Harrah’s their business and hence 
functioned more as a system by which to reward customers rather than to generate different 
customer behavior.  Senior Systems Architect Patti Lee, who was involved in building the initial 
Total Gold system, observed that  
 
The idea came about that we need a loyalty program, something to 
help encourage cross-market visitation, and a way to reward our 
customers.  And we’re going to give them, as they play on the slot 
machine, a very clear, concise way to earn rewards that they can 
earn at any one of our properties, and redeem them at any one of 
our properties.  And so, if you go to eight of our properties, you 
could accrue them for a big trip to Las Vegas. 32 
 
The conspicuous absence of any mention of “customer value”, “transaction data”, or 
“customer understanding” is noteworthy.  In fact, Loveman notes that the rewards and 
recognition element of the program dominated, without any focus on loyalty generation or 
customer behavior modification.  At the time, the system did not have any customer analytic 
elements and did not use captured customer transaction data in any strategic manner.  The 
emphasis of the program shifted quickly after his arrival:  
 
It was a customer-recognition program then, not a loyalty 
program.  It did not have loyalty incentives.  If you were a $500 
                                                 
32 Interview with Patti Lee, Senior Architect – Information Technology; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
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customer, we would give you $100 in goodies.  But if you didn’t 
come for a year and meantime visited competing casinos, still, the 
next time you came in again we treated you like a $500 guy and 
gave you $100 in goodies.  We changed the program by building in 
loyalty incentives so that as a customer, each time you think about 
visiting a casino, you end up visiting Harrah’s because it’s better 
for you.  So there’s this clear pecuniary and non-pecuniary signal 
that influences decision making (Becker, 2003). 
 
Recognition by Harrah’s senior management team that the data captured in the Total 
Gold system was valuable in understanding customer preferences and behaviors led them to 
realize that Total Rewards was a powerful means of understanding the customer.  In fact, Flippen 
noted that “Total Rewards is today THE data gathering mechanism to understand the 
customer.”33  Fundamentally, the Total Rewards program emerged as a powerful mechanism to 
gain knowledge of customer behaviors and preferences, an essential activity in developing the 
reciprocal history which would later generate customer switching costs, thereby reducing 
customer power and increasing the company’s “edge” over its competitors: 
 
The foundation of our loyalty-building efforts is Total Rewards, the 
pioneering tiered-card program Harrah’s developed in the 1990s, 
which today boasts nearly 40 million members, and nearly 8 
million active members.  The relationship-marketing and other 
business-intelligence capabilities fueled by Total Rewards are 
constantly bringing us closer to our customers so we better 
understand their preferences, and from that understanding we are 
able to improve the entertainment experiences we offer 
accordingly (2005 Harrah’s Entertainment Annual Report). 
                                                 
33 Interview with Joseph Flippen, Director of Consolidated Operations Analysis; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006.  
Emphasis added. 
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Using Differentiated Service to Increase Customer Switching Costs 
 
Understanding the customer, while valuable, was not going to help achieve the goal of 
increasing customer loyalty or of generating phenomenal customer experiences.  In fact, the 
power of Total Rewards goes beyond understanding the customer and lies in the service 
differentiation capability it enables.  Through Total Rewards, Harrah’s is able to focus intensely 
on its most valuable customers with the explicit objective of gaining a larger share of their 
gaming dollars.  As Director of Consolidated Operational Analysis Joe Flippen notes, “We have 
built our whole culture around categorizing our customers and focusing on the customers from 
whom we make money – who are our business.”34   
The best customers receive the best service and many of the service innovation efforts at 
Harrah’s targeted this singular objective: enabling service differentiation.  In all cases, the 
foundation of this capability is the reciprocal history resident in the loyalty management program 
and the tremendous customer data capture capabilities it possesses.  As Flippen notes, “we could 
not differentiate service without Total Rewards because we would not have an evaluation of 
every customer.”35   
Players also earn the traditional complimentary amenities (the “comps”) based on the 
amount of their regular play; these “rewards credits” accrue in a methodology not dissimilar to 
that of earning tier credits.  This desire for “comps” has resulted in over 80% of the gaming 
transactions that take place in Harrah’s casinos being captured in the Total Rewards system.36  
By tracking each member’s gaming transactions (amount wagered, frequency of play, amount of 
play, type of play, etc.), the Total Rewards database became the engine powering service 
                                                 
34 Interview with Joseph Flippen, op cit. 
35 Interview with Joseph Flippen, op cit. 
36 Interview with Jason Pashko, Director of Database Reinvestment & Analytics; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
differentiation by enabling a calculation of customer worth.  In fact, by creating different tiers to 
acknowledge the differing values of customers to Harrah’s, Total Rewards provides the basis 
upon which the company can treat customers differently.   It has the further benefit of producing 
loyalty among its customers via an aspirational element of the program: 
 
Total Rewards is now [2003] a three-tiered loyalty program with 
gold, platinum, and diamond levels.  You can consolidate all of 
your gaming with us in any of our casinos.  The more of your 
gaming you give us, the bigger the rewards, and you go up the 
tiers.  The results of that program have been stunning.  People who 
are close to a gate – from gold to platinum, from platinum to 
diamond – aspire to get over those gates by consolidating their 
business with us.  They know that if they make ten visits to Atlantic 
City – they used to give us three of those visits – they know that to 
get a diamond card they have to give us six visits, and they do so 
(Becker, 2003). 
 
The following table, taken from the Total Rewards website, indicates the different 
services reserved for the different tiers.   
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Table 26: Total Rewards Tier Benefits 
BENEFITS 
   
Ability to earn comps, cash, and offers based on play     
10% discount at Harrah's-owned gift shops     
Ability to earn bonus comps with Total Rewards Visa partner 
program     
Special birthday gift     
Monthly Reward Credit Multiplier Days  
(Platinum - 2x or more & Diamond - 2x or more)  
   
500 Bonus Reward Credits each month     
Tickets to Harrah's shows in Las Vegas, Lake Tahoe, Reno, 
Laughlin and New Orleans  
(Platinum - 2 for 1 & Diamond - 2 free)  
   
Monthly Reward Catalog discount - 30% off exclusive 
merchandise  
   
Exclusive gift during yearly tier status renewal period 
(March/April)  
   
Free tournament entry and hotel stay for the Summer Fest and 
Winter Fest slot tournaments  
(Platinum and Diamond member events in Las Vegas)  
(Platinum - 2 Nights & Diamond – 3 Nights) 
   
Members-only access to Diamond Lounges     
Guaranteed priority service at all restaurants, clubs, hotel front 
desk, Total Rewards center, cashier cage and slots services  
   
Invitations to exclusive events and tournaments at Harrah's, Rio, 
Showboat or Harveys casino  
    
Source: https://www.harrahs.com/TotalRewards/RewardsAndBenefits.do?page=benefits 
 
The ability to qualify for tiers has also been made quite transparent to customers, as an 
incentive to help them consolidate their play with Harrah’s.  While anyone can qualify for Gold 
status simply by registering, it requires 4,000 and 10,000 tier credits37 to qualify for Platinum 
and Diamond status, respectively.  This means that a video poker player who risks $40,000 
during one calendar year will qualify for the Platinum status; $100,000 of “coin-in” would get 
this same player Diamond Status.  Note that for a traditional “reel-slot” player, these amounts 
would be cut in half.  In addition to the three tiers listed above and in all of the marketing 
                                                 
37 Tier Credits definition: $5 of coin-in (i.e. money deposited) into a reel slot machine = one tier credit; $10 of coin-
in on video poker = one tier credit; and according to the Harrah’s website, “For table games and other game types you 
will earn Tier Credits based on your length of play, average bet and the type of game.” 
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materials from Harrah’s, there is also a semi-secret fourth tier known as the Seven Stars Club 
(see next chapter for a full description).  This idea for this tier originated because customer data
suggested there was huge variation within the Diamond tier and that once customers had 
achieved the highest tier, they then would spread their business to other companies in an effort to 
get recognized.  Thus, the Seven Stars tier was designed to recognize the absolutely most 
 
valuabl
 million 
d is worth 50 Gold members,”38 while a “Platinum 
is wort
 is 
evenues 
                                                
e customers. 
Although Harrah’s treats its customer value calculations as confidential and proprietary, 
several interesting metrics were revealed during the course of my research.  Using the 40
members that are part of the Total Rewards system, the company is able to calculate the 
theoretical value of each customer based upon their gaming behavior (wager amount, game 
played, time played, etc.).  Segmenting by tier then creates theoretical customer values for the 
“typical” customer in each tier.   According to senior executives, “one Seven Stars customer is 
worth 555 Gold members” and “one Diamon
h a dozen or two Gold members.”39   
Having these relative value calculations is very helpful in training employees and 
demonstrating the importance of differentiated service.  Training visual aids often display 555 
bodies that take up a poster-sized sheet and are compared to one body that occupies less than 2% 
of a piece of paper.  The key message delivered regarding this value differential to employees
simple and straightforward: “you have to go out and find 555 new customers if you piss this 
customer off.”40  Combined with the fact that more than 80% of the company’s gaming r
originate from less than 20% of the company’s customers,41 it is easy to understand the 
 
38 Interview with Karin Matthews, Director of Gaming Operations, via telephone on August 26, 2006. 
39 Interview with Steven Pinchuck, Vice President of Revenue Management; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
40 Interview with Karin Matthews, op cit. 
41 Interview with Greg Gamsky, Director of Information Technology Solutions; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
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motivation driving differentiated service.  Katrina Lane, Vice President of Channel Marketing, 
notes that “We want to offer everyone great service but we want to offer some people super-great 
service.”42  A final motivation for differentiated service quality is driven by an 
acknowledgement of the company’s asset base: “you know basically we have very fixed assets, 
and so 
ation 
l 
 
ifferent 
verages at the buffet, etc.  As Karin 
Matthews, Director of Gaming Operations, notes: 
e and 
 
nded 
heck-in area, limo services, 
and special valet parking areas.44 
 
                                                
really what we have to differentiate is the service.”43 
This emphasis on scalable differentiated service is diffused throughout the organiz
and into virtually every customer facing department of the casino.  Although one’s Tota
Rewards status is still determined only by gaming value, a valuable customer receives 
differentiated service throughout his/her entire experience interacting with Harrah’s.  Seven Stars 
and Diamond members check-in at a different location than others, they have more qualified and
experienced staff helping them, they then get placed in a different room, they queue in d
areas at the restaurant, they are offered different be
 
We have what we call the “Diamond Lounge” where our best 
customers who are Diamond and Seven Stars get to loung
eat, and there are televisions in there; sometimes there’s 
entertainment.  But it’s just exclusivity all around; it’s a privilege 
and a benefit of being a Diamond or Seven Stars that allows you to
enter these particular places.  Every one of our Harrah’s bra
properties has them.  We also have what we call “Diamond 
Registration”, which is a separate c
 
42 Interview with Katrina Lane, Vice President of Channel Marketing, via telephone on August 15, 2006. 
43 Interview with Jason Pashko, op cit. 
44 Interview with Karin Matthews, op cit. 
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Ultimately, notes Director of Food & Beverage Walter Coffey, it’s about “making some 
people more equal than others.  It really is about differentiating service and finding ways to make 
it more valuable for the customer so they stay loyal…”45  The differentiated service is also 
intended to motivate an aspirational and simultaneously punitive message to the customer.  John 
Bruns, Senior Vice President of Customer Satisfaction Assurance, notes that  
 
Gary gave them a reason to play up and consolidate their play 
through Total Rewards.  You got more goodies.  And he also put a 
pain point on there that if you don’t play with us, that it will start 
hurting in terms of what you don’t get—taking risk at going to that 
competitor, and therefore have that service failure, causing pain to 
you at another property. 46 
  
The quote above captures the essence of generating customer switching costs.  This 
customer switching cost concept is taken a step further because differentiated service that 
initially causes a “wow” slowly turns into an expectation.  This one-way ratchet in expectations 
is something that Food & Beverage director Walter Coffey describes as a “yellow rose”:  
 
If I give you a yellow rose today when you go to the restaurant, 
you think it’s great.  I give it to your wife tomorrow the next time 
you’re in the restaurant, she still thinks it’s great.  But it’s not as 
important.  The third time I do it, it’s still great but it becomes an 
expected thing.  And after a while, I can never take it away from 
you.47 
 
                                                 
45 Interview with Walter Coffey, Director of Food & Beverage Design, via telephone on August 25, 2006. 
46 Interview with John Bruns, Vice President of Customer Satisfaction Assurance; Las Vegas, NV; August 21, 2006. 
47 Interview with Walter Coffey, op cit. 
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 While one interpretation of this “yellow rose” phenomenon is that it creates a constant 
pressure on the service delivery staff to generate service “wows” and differentiate the experience 
given to the best guests, another possibility is that it is the manifestation of a customer switching 
cost.  Although the yellow rose does in fact become an expectation, it may not even be a 
possibility at a competitor’s property.  Thus, by generating customer insight that is deployed in a 
consistent, constantly evolving manner and is shared across multiple properties, Harrah’s has 
created customer switching costs.  The fact that Harrah’s can differentiate its service is not 
unique; many local restaurants are able to do so.  The fact that Harrah’s can do this consistently 
across 40 properties and more than 85,000 employees via its scalable service differentiation 
strategy is unique. 
Future Plans: Feeding the Data-Intensive Service Differentiation Strategy 
 
 What about the customer who spends a great deal of money on non-gaming activities at 
the casino?  Currently, their worth is not recognized by Harrah’s.  A customer may buy $1000 
bottles of wine, spend hundreds of dollars on spa services, and entertain dozens of friends in 
casino restaurants – and still not get acknowledged as valuable.  Given the plethora of other 
(non-gaming) services that are offered at a casino, it should come as no surprise that, according 
to Senior Vice President of Relationship Marketing David Norton, incorporating non-gaming 
transaction data is “the single biggest priority for the Total Rewards team.”48  With over 50% of 
the dollar value of transactions in Las Vegas occurring in non-gaming activities, the company 
needs to acknowledge and understand transaction patterns and customer behaviors in non-
gaming domains: 
 
                                                 
48 Interview with David Norton, Senior Vice President of Relationship Marketing; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
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We want to create the same kind of loyalty as we have created for 
gaming for non-gaming.  We want to recognize our customers.  
Today our Total Rewards loyalty program is only for the gamers.  
We don’t have anything for the non-gamers.  So we are actually 
looking at creating that loyalty program, and that’s going to be a 
focus for us this year, because if you look at even the trend, you 
realize that only 45 percent of revenue generated from Las Vegas 
will be from gaming this year…49 
 
The emphasis on incorporating non-gaming transaction data into the loyalty program was 
driven in large part by the acquisition of Caesar’s Entertainment.  Unlike Harrah’s core customer 
who is a traditional gamer, Caesar’s had attracted a wide variety of customers and had a far more 
diverse customer base – including customers that visited their properties only for the dining, 
shopping, and entertainment services. Director of IT Solutions Greg Gamsky notes that  
 
Caesar’s was good at many, many things that we are not good at.  
They were good at table games and they’re good at retail, they’re 
good at hotel, they’re good at spas, they’re good at restaurants, 
they’re good at entertainment.  They’re good at a whole host of 
things we didn’t focus on.  So the end game for us is to really 
manage on their worth to the company, one parameter being 
gaming, another parameter being non-gaming.50 
 
In addition to incorporating non-gaming transactions into the Total Rewards database 
functionality, Harrah’s strategy includes capturing data wherever possible.  Table games 
represent a huge opportunity, as data capture in table games has historically been more “art” than 
“science” and based on a casino host’s visual monitoring of player betting behavior.  
                                                 
49 Interview with Sunny Tara, Director of Enterprise Architecture and Integration; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
50 Interview with Greg Gamsky, op cit. 
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Transactions captured by a host were never completely accurate – resulting in incomplete 
information about customer worth and value.  Noting the “lagging” state of technological 
sophistication in table games, Harrah’s Vice President for Table Games Gerry Tuthill – a 30 year 
veteran of the casino industry – notes that  
 
Today, in a slot machine, you come up to a slot machine, you put 
your card in and there’s some visibility to what happens.  
Immediately it says, “Hi, how are you?”  It starts recording, and 
you have visibility to your reward credits.  You understand what 
that process is.  You pull the card out, it says, “Thank you very 
much,” it gives you an updated tier score and off you go over to 
the Total Rewards Center to redeem, or you go to a host desk.  Or, 
in future technology, you redeem right at the slot machine.   
In table games, you came up, somebody came around to you at 
some point, took your card, and then gave you his back and walked 
away from you.  He probably then went to a centralized piece of 
furniture in the middle of a pit and did something mysterious.  You 
do not know what he is doing.  And when you are done playing, 
you hoped that he watched your play and that I calculated it 
correctly and that when you were done playing I correctly closed 
out this manual piece of paper, gave it to a input data clerk that 
inputted that data correctly in a relatively efficient amount of time.  
Unfortunately, it wasn’t always relatively efficient, so it might be 
hours before your information was uploaded, hopefully correctly, 
to our host computer system where then you’d be able to go stand 
in line at a Total Rewards Center and get credit for that play.  It 
was a very cumbersome, inaccurate, inexact, inefficient process.51 
 
                                                 
51 Interview with Gerry Tuthill, Vice President of Table Games; Las Vegas, NV; August 21, 2006. 
In an effort to address this inefficient and confusing process, multiple technologies were 
evaluated from leading gaming equipment manufacturers and Harrah’s executives ultimately 
chose the Intelligent Table System, a technology product offered by a consortium of Progressive 
Gaming International, Shufflemaster, and International Gaming Technology.  The system is 
intended to replace the art of table management with a science similar to that currently used with 
slot machines.  In particular, the Intelligent Table System will have three primary components: a 
Table Manager technology (“Table Touch”) allowing for automated data management table-side, 
Chip Manager technologies designed to capture the exact amount bet by each player via RFID 
embedded chips, and Card Manager capabilities designed to track and identify which player has 
what cards – and to link bet amounts with exact odds for each player each bet.  Harrah’s has 
already implemented the Table Manager technologies.  Gerry Tuthill notes the dramatic 
improvement from a customer perspective: 
 
Today you come up to the table and I don’t walk away from you 
anymore; I conduct the transaction at the table.  “Hello.  How are 
you?  Nice to see you Mr. So and So”   I swipe your card, you see 
me do that.  I enter some information, I hand you the card right 
there.  So, in your mind you know you’re getting credit 
immediately.  I’m staying there, watching your play, doing my 
transactions, my estimation.  The presence of technology, fairly or 
not, gives the customer the impression that this is improved 
process because we’re using technology.  What ends up happening 
is when you’re done playing, just like a slot machine, we 
immediately settle you up, and that data is immediately uploaded 
to our host system.  There’s no more wait.  You can request your 
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tier score at the table, you can request comp consideration at the 
table, and we will service you right there.52   
 
What Tuthill has described is the first step in what will be the complete automation of customer 
data capture at the tables.  Next steps will likely include the use of bet and card recognition 
technologies to accurately gauge player worth.  Noting that card and bet recognition are on the 
agenda for 2007 implementation, Tuthill admits that today’s system still has room for 
improvement:  
 
As we calculate customer worth, it’s a very inexact science.  It 
relies on manual and estimated calculations.  We’re moving 
towards duplicating a slot environment that we absolutely capture 
100% accuracy and no estimation.53 
 
Bet recognition will likely be based upon a specialized table equipped with RFID readers 
that will capture transmissions from chips embedded with RFID tags.  Card recognition will be 
based upon optical recognition of cards as they are dealt from the shoe.  Given the uncertainty of 
player betting in a situation with constantly varying odds, card recognition may actually enable 
Harrah’s to gain even greater understanding of customer behavior than is possible in the world of 
slot machines; Ken Weil, senior VP of Gaming Operations, noted his excitement for this 
possibility: 
 
Card recognition, which is coming, and this is not out yet, but 
within the next year we’ll start to see it…and the most interesting 
part is I get to figure out what kind of a player you are.  So if I 
know the cards, and I know how you play – we know theoretically 
                                                 
52 Interview with Gerry Tuthill, op cit. 
53 Interview with Gerry Tuthill, op cit. 
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our house advantage in black jack might be 1.2 percent.  And we 
might know that people generally don’t play perfect strategy, so 
really, maybe, it’s 1.6 percent…But you know what? There are 
some players that are just shitty players, and we’d like to know 
that…because we’d like to invite them back.  So with card 
recognition, if I find out that you’re a perfect player (you’re 1.2 
percent) and the guy next to you is a 4 percent, well, guess what?  
The four percent guy is getting comped tonight…We want to be 
able to reward the person who deserves it more.  So that’s the next 
phase…54 
 
New technologies—such as the card and bet recognition described by Ken Weil above—
will enable greater and greater differentiation capabilities and possibilities.  Further, other new 
technologies will likely also increase the means through which Harrah’s can distribute its 
offering to customers.  The earlier description of how Harrah’s conceptualizes its service 
offering also creates numerous future opportunities that will enhance the company’s ability to 
further differentiate its service.  Loveman notes that his customers are not rash or in pursuit of 
irrational risks: rather, players are in pursuit of “safe risks,” which equates to a service offering 
that should be broadly appealing in a variety of distribution formats: 
 
Our research shows that casino customers really like to 
pursue “safe risks.” They like uncertainty and the excitement of 
being on the edge. They aren't for over-the-top risks, however: for 
example, they like reading mysteries and watching Survivor, not 
bungee jumping. The recent success of reality-TV shows 
demonstrates that there is broad pent-up demand for the type of 
entertainment we offer.  
                                                 
54 Interview with Ken Weil, Senior Vice President of Gaming Operations; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006 
But unlike other forms of entertainment, gaming is hard to 
buy. It's legal only in a limited number of states, and even there 
supply is constrained. I want to create a world where Harrah's 
competes with other forms of entertainment to satisfy these desires.  
For example, I want to have gambling on cell phones and 
interactive TV. I want to distribute the ability for consumers to take 
safe risks (Becker, 2003). 
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Chapter 6 – Scale and Differentiation at Harrah’s  
 
As described above, Harrah’s opted for a strategy based on differentiated customer 
experiences.  In layman’s terms, Harrah’s wanted to understand what its customers were buying, 
the profits generated from those customers, and then give the best service to the best customers.  
The unique element of Harrah’s strategy was scalable service differentiation; effectively treating 
customers as individuals while dealing with hundreds of thousands of customers interacting with 
the company through over 40 properties simultaneously.   
Differentiated Service equals “Luckiness” 
 
Given the relatively “commodity-nature” of the technologies used to deliver this service 
(with relatively few exceptions, slot machines are similar among all casinos and table games are 
likewise very similar among casinos), it became paramount for Harrah’s to provide offerings that 
would enable the customer to feel as lucky as possible.  Before the emphasis on tier based 
service differentiation really took hold, customer surveys indicated that many players felt that 
Harrah’s casinos were not particularly lucky.  John Bruns, head of Customer Satisfaction 
Assurance at Harrah’s, explains how the company measures the customer’s feelings about the 
luckiness of a casino. 
 
So we have three questions on the survey related to luck.  So that 
would be “I feel lucky at this casino,”  “Action and excitement,” 
and “My budget lasts longer.”  Those are three things that relate 
to how the customer feels.  Because they’re coming, feeling lucky.  
They didn’t get up this morning and say, “Gee, I feel unlucky, I 
think I’ll go lose some money.”  They said, “Gee, I feel lucky 
today” or “This is my chosen form of entertainment.  I’m going to 
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go out there and have some fun today and hope to win.”  It’s the 
chance to win.  So all that adrenaline, that anticipation that gets 
going when they’re coming to a casino – these are the three things 
that measure that.55 
 
Given the insight regarding extended time at a casino as an indication of its luckiness, 
Harrah’s realized that one of the things to do to increase the perceived “luckiness of a casino” 
was to keep the customer engaged and entertained for a longer period of time, helping them take 
their gaming budget further in a temporal sense.  According to George Dittman, head of 
Customer Insight for Harrah’s Entertainment, keeping the customer engaged became the 
innovation agenda: 
 
…the more things you can do around the slot machine to keep them 
there and to keep them entertained and involved, the more likely 
they are to have a good experience and because they’re playing 
longer—they’re “luckier” at that particular casino.  The more you 
can keep the customer involved and uninterrupted and the better 
service that you can have with these people, the longer they’re 
going to stay with you and the less they’re going to think about 
losing…even though they ultimately do.56 
 
Melissa Price, Vice President of Slot Services and Operations, notes that the company came to 
adopt a holistic approach to managing perceived luck.  This meant going beyond the guests’ 
perceptions of luck while on the gaming floor; in fact, the whole interaction experience with 
Harrah’s became the subject of interest.  The goal became to eliminate anything anywhere in the 
customer’s experience that might be interpreted to have “busted” their luck. 
                                                 
55 Interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
56 Interview with George Dittmmann, Director of Customer Insight, via telephone on August 15, 2006. 
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One of the things that customers tell us is luck is really important 
to them.  And one of the things that busts their luck is when things 
are hard.  And it could be anything; it doesn’t even have to be the 
slot machine.  It’s could be that I just had a bad experience at the 
hotel desk or I had to wait in line—all of a sudden I’m not lucky 
anymore.57 
 
Thus, from a very general perspective, the strategy of delivering high quality and 
memorable services became about the elimination of any hassle in the interaction experience – in 
short, remove all possible “luck-busting” events so that gamers felt the casino was lucky.  
Combined with a tier-based differentiation strategy of providing exceptional service to the best 
customers, the company’s focus was essentially to make the most valuable customers feel the 
luckiest by minimizing their exposure to “luck-busting” events or scenarios. 
The Strategic Service Innovations: Scalable Service Differentiation in Action 
 
In pursuing a strategy of competing based on customer experiences, Harrah’s has 
developed several new services over the past decade that are worthy of investigation.  This 
section evaluates 3 new services that have been developed, designed, and delivered within the 
Harrah’s network of properties: (1) The Slot Service Dispatch System and the capability of 
delivering differentiated slot service on the casino floor, (2) the Seven Stars program for 
delivering the absolute highest tier of services to the company’s absolutely highest value 
customers, and (3) the Operational Customer Relationship Management capability designed to 
enable real-time service differentiation while customers are still in the casino 
                                                 
57 Interview with Melissa Price, Vice President of Slot Service and Operations; Las Vegas, NV; August 21, 2006. 
For each of these innovations, I provide (a) a detailed description of the new service, (b) a 
contextualization of how it fits into the Harrah’s core strategy of IT-powered service 
differentiation, (c) the impact of the service in terms of its performance (using Harrah’s provided 
performance metrics), and (d) a summary of how the innovation fit into the prior scalability-
differentiation framework.     
The Slot Service Dispatch System (SSDS) 
Description of the SSDS Capability 
 
 Historically, slot machines were run by inserting coins.  In recent years, most slot 
machines have been converted to coin-less systems that take currency bills or tickets 
(representing a cash amount) from other machines.  A historical vestige of this system, however, 
is a “candle” on top of the machine that is lit up by pushing the “change” button.  Recent 
additions to the machines include a card reader that allows the player to insert a loyalty card (the 
Total Rewards card) which will monitor the customer’s play.    
Despite these recent advancements, the machines are still not 100% autonomous.  There 
are a handful of events that may occur at a slot machine necessitating the need for service or 
attention from casino staff.  These events include (a) jackpots that require federal tax paperwork 
prior to payment, (b) paper jams related to the ticket printer that dispenses “ticket money” at the 
end of play, (c) player requests for change, (d) problems with the bill-validator through which 
money is inserted into the machine, or (e) simply a malfunctioning machine.  Player requests for 
service had historically been focused on the need for change (needed more quarters, etc.), but 
today have evolved into change requests (need to break a $100 bill so he/she can insert $20 into 
the machine) or service requests (such as the need for an ashtray).   
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 The Slot Service Dispatch System (SSDS) was designed to help organize these slot 
service requests in an orderly manner.  The idea for SSDS arose from operations staff who 
regularly and frequently interact on a day-to-day basis with customers at the “moment of truth.”  
The combination of the haphazard running from “candle to candle” and the Harrah’s service 
culture focused on differentiation by tier led to the belief on the part of marketers and operators 
associated with the slot floor that things could be done better.   
The fundamental objective of the system was to enable employees to prioritize the best 
customers and deliver to them the best service.  Consistent with the overall Harrah’s strategy of 
competing on customer experience and service quality, the goal of SSDS was actually quite 
objective: reach the best customers within 2 minutes of a service request.  Because the slot 
machines have card readers for players to insert their Total Rewards cards, it’s possible to 
identify the customer at the machine from which a request for service is being made.  Top tier 
customers were to be served first, followed by the next tier, etc. down to the player who did not 
insert a Total Rewards card.  Thus, the system was designed to create waterfall prioritization – 
with Seven Stars first, Diamonds next, Platinum third, and Gold just above the retail customer 
without a card – making the likelihood of a service failure for a Seven Stars extremely unlikely 
while slow service would be more likely for Gold members. 
 Players needing service historically would push a button indicating their need, and a light 
would illuminate on top of the machine.  The main problem with this method of communicating 
service needs, as Jay Snowden, General Manager of the Showboat Atlantic City notes, is that” 
No one ever sees it [the light]…and employees never react to it because people inadvertently hit 
them all the time.”58  Further, VP of Gaming Operations Karin Matthews describes how the goal 
of SSDS was to also standardize the delivery of quality service to slot patrons, removing the 
                                                 
58 Interview with Jay Snowden, op cit. 
Mansharamani  Page 216 
variability of service delivery that is associated with frontline employees that are dispersed 
throughout the gaming floor:  
 
We wanted technology to do the thinking—take it out of the hands 
of the employees so you don’t have the inmates running the asylum 
so-to-speak—which traditionally happens when you don’t have 
management in a confined area with employees.  I liken that to a 
front desk environment or a cage where it’s very easy to see 
exactly what your employees are doing, hold them accountable, 
and raise the bar for quality service delivery.  Slots and beverage 
are more difficult to manage because they’re mobile; and they’re 
scattered all over the floor, and they’re going to random events 
that happen on a slot floor.59 
 
In describing the manner in which these service requests were handled prior to the 
installation of SSDS, VP of Slots Service and Operations Melissa Price notes that another 
objective was to improve service quality, so that the random methodology of handling service 
requests on a “first seen, first serviced” basis would be replaced with an organized algorithm 
based technological dispatch system that would bring some order to the process: 
 
The fact was that at Harrah’s Las Vegas we would handle 100,000 
events in the course of a month.  Because there was so much 
activity going on on the slot floor…a slot host out there servicing 
guests…would see a sea of the candle lights on top of a slot 
machines telling him/her that there’s an issue with that slot 
machine.  So he/she would just run from one to the other—with no 
idea if you’ve been waiting for 30 seconds or you’ve been waiting 
                                                 
59 Interview with Karin Matthews, op cit. 
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for ten minutes…so the concept of slot dispatch was to queue all 
those and organize those based on tier.60 
 
Finally, the SSDS was designed and implemented in a manner that enabled service 
differentiation by tier.  Because the dispatch system also receives data on a player’s Total 
Rewards tier, the system is able to prioritize the service requests so that the most valuable 
players receive service before less valuable players.  Before the prioritization methodology 
linking Total Rewards data with the service requests, the methodology to handle service requests 
was “event to order” meaning that “whatever happened regardless of tier, first in first 
served...and it created a big old mess on the floor many, many times.”61 
Implementing the capability, however, was not without issue.  Service ambassadors 
(casino personnel on the slot floor) soon found that because customers were not knowledgeable 
about the service differentiation that was embedded in the dispatch system, customers would not 
understand why an attendant could not help them while they were walking to their next service 
destination.  Further, employees did not realize the full rationale for the dispatch system and 
would accommodate these “manual” requests for service.  With time, training materials were 
modified to accommodate this situation: 
 
SSDS eliminates the need to chase lights!!!  Because SSDS 
prioritizes the events on the slot floor automatically, it is very 
important to take care of the customers that are dispatched FIRST.  
Occasionally, you will be stopped by other customers while you 
are on the way to your dispatch assignment.  If they require 
assistance with an SSDS event (jackpot, paper jam, or coin jam), 
the following script can help you: “We have an electronic dispatch 
                                                 
60 Interview with Melissa Price, op cit. 
61 Interview with Karin Matthews, op cit. 
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system that automatically tells us which customers need service.  I 
have been dispatched to take care of another customer right now, 
but someone will be dispatched to take care of you right away.”62 
  
Today, the SSDS functions as a tool through which service requests are organized and 
prioritized as well as a tool through which to differentiate service delivery based on a customer’s 
value.  Higher value customers receive better service.  Seven Stars customers will always be 
served (regardless of whether the request is for a change or a jackpot payment) before Gold 
customers.63  This is true, claims John Bruns, until the Gold cardmember is so upset by the lack 
of service that she/he begins to affect the service experience that others around her/him are 
having.64  The performance data, however, suggests that this is rarely a problem and is more 
likely to be addressed with additional staffing rather than in re-prioritization of service dispatch. 
SSDS Fit with Strategy 
 
Given Harrah’s core strategy of IT-powered service differentiation, SSDS fits squarely 
within the company’s strategy.  In fact, it is part of the automation process used in the 
background to help differentiate service to customers in a relatively hidden manner.  While 
Harrah’s always tries to deliver quality service to all of its guests, the objective of delivering the 
best service to the best customers would not be possible without SSDS.  Melissa Price, Vice 
President of Slot Service and Operations, who heads the corporate team that oversees the service 
and operation of the company’s entire slot machine footprint across 40 properties, notes that 
SSDS was originally conceived as “cost-saving technology” that would allow each property to 
reduce its headcount by allowing its service staff to be more efficient.  With time, however, 
                                                 
62 Slot Service Dispatch System training materials; provided by Melissa Price at the Caesar’s Palace (Las Vegas) 
Slot Dispatch Control Room. 
63 Interview with Ken Weil, op cit. 
64 Interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
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SSDS became recognized not only as a back-office efficiency increasing tool, but it also became 
the enabling technology for differentiated service that “squarely fit with the overall Harrah’s 
strategy of providing the best possible service to our best customers.”65 
 Thus, the SSDS capability is highly consistent with and an enabling capability for 
Harrah’s IT-powered service differentiation strategy.  Reviews of internal reports used to 
manage SSDS illustrate it has accomplished the objective of automated differentiation – Seven 
Stars members get served within 2 minutes of their service calls more frequently than Diamonds 
get served within 2 minutes of service requests, etc.  In short, if there is a “service failure” (i.e. 
inability to meet the service standard), the highest tier (and most valuable) customers are most 
insulated from them.  Further, the fact that these metrics hold regardless of time of day, day of 
week, or business of the casino indicate the system also scales. Thus, it seems that SSDS has 
successfully automated service differentiation, thereby helping Harrah’s escape the historical 
scalability versus differentiation trade-off (or balancing act) described in the dissertation’s 
literature review. 
SSDS Performance  
 
The best measure of success for the SSDS system is the ability of the slot service system 
to accomplish the objective of providing differentiated service by customer value/tier.  In an 
effort to measure the performance of the system, Price and the rest of the slots operations team 
partnered with folks from the IT group to design a workflow that allowed data capture on the 
system’s success.  Here’s how the system measured the data: upon the indication of a service 
request or event, a timer begins to monitor the time until resolution.  Upon successful resolution 
of the system, the service ambassador electronically notifies the system that the issue is resolved 
                                                 
65 Follow-up interview with Melissa Price; Las Vegas, NV; November 9, 2006. 
and the event is archived in the system.  Because data is captured on customer tier, event type 
(jackpot, printer jam, etc), and time to resolution, it is possible to see if the system has indeed 
enabled differentiated service.  As can be seen from the table below, the system is working 
swimmingly as Seven Stars customers are receiving quicker service than Diamonds, who in turn 
receive better service than Platinums, which in turn get more rapid assistance than Gold 
members, who likely get better treatment than retail (i.e. “No card”) customers. 
The diagram on the following page is a sample report (the actual February 2006 report) 
generated by Melissa Price and her slot service team.  As you can see from the “Avg” column on 
the right hand side of the slide, the service differentiation strategy is absolutely occurring, with 
Seven Stars members consistently receiving better service than other members.  For instance, 
97% of Seven Stars slot service requests were handled within 2 minutes on Mondays in February 
2006.  This compares with 95% of Diamond requests and 79% of all other requests.  Further, a 
glance down the entire column shows the data for the performance of the service differentiation 
by tier across the days of the week.  As visible from the data, there is not one day of the week in 
which Seven Stars customers do not receive the absolute best service available.   
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Figure 15: Slot Service Dispatch System Performance Metrics 
 
 
Mansharamani  Page 221 
Contextualizing SSDS 
 
 In the language of the scalabilty-differentiation framework presented earlier, SSDS took a 
totally random process (neither scalable nor differentiated) of chasing candles atop the slot 
machines and generated an automated and differentiated service from it. 
 
Figure 16: The Slot Service Dispatch Service Innovation 
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Seven Stars Club 
Description of the Seven Stars Club Tier 
 
The Total Rewards loyalty program has historically had three primary tiers: Gold, 
Platinum, and Diamond.  These tiers are based on a customer’s value to the company—which is 
determined by the amount of capital that they insert into a slot machine or expose on a gaming 
table.  $5 of “coin-in” on a reel slot machine earns a player one tier credit; $10 of “coin-in” on a 
video machine earns a player one tier credit; and table play earns tier credits based upon the odds 
of the game and amount of the bets.  4,000 tier credits earns a player Platinum status, and 10,000 
tier credits earns one the Diamond Status.  Gold status is available to anyone who signs up for a 
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card.  Feeling unable to consistently address the needs of its most valuable customers, several 
managers at Harrah’s realized that a fourth tier was needed…and they proposed the “Seven Stars 
Club,” a tier requiring 100,000 tier credits.  Senior VP of Relationship Marketing David Norton 
describes how this quasi-secret fourth tier was introduced, noting that the real impetus was to 
segment customers into bands of value that justified differentiated service and attempted to 
motivate customers to spend an even greater share of their wallet with Harrah’s: 
 
For one, there’s a huge range within Diamond.  There are some 
people that spend $5,000 a year with us, and there are some 
people that spend $200,000 a year with us.  And it’s really hard to 
deliver consistent benefits and rewards and incentives to that 
broad a group…The other thing that we noticed was that within 
the Diamond tier, even though we earned a lot of revenue from this 
highest tier—in terms of the player’s gaming budget, it was about 
50%.  So even though they reached Diamond with us, they were 
spending as much with somebody else.66 
 
Norton goes on to describe how the best customers have learned to “game” the system.  
They know what it takes to be recognized as the best possible customer at Harrah’s, and once 
they achieve that status, they then begin spreading their gaming entertainment budget elsewhere 
in an effort to get acknowledged by other casinos as a valuable customer.  Norton notes: 
 
We knew we were getting still only about half of the gaming budget 
of our Diamond customers…[We also knew that] once they had  
achieved Diamond status, they had the Diamond services but there 
was no clear hurdle or goal for them to hit going forward.  We 
also learned [from looking at behavior patterns] that perhaps they 
                                                 
66 Interview with David Norton, op cit. 
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were trying to earn the equivalent at a competitor—much like an 
airline, once you’re in that 25,000 miles on American maybe try to 
get it on Delta as opposed to try to get the 50,000—so you have 
more choices.67 
 
Thus, the Seven Stars club was the implementation of an aspirational motivation marketing 
strategy designed to gain wallet share among Harrah’s absolute best customers.   
Implementing a fourth tier, however, within the Harrah’s enterprise was not a trivial task.  
To truly differentiate service in a meaningful manner, every customer facing or customer-
touching employee had to be trained in the value of this customer.  As noted above, the gaming 
analytics folks determined that one Seven Stars member was the equivalent (in terms of value to 
the firm) to 555 Gold members.  This was information that needed to be conveyed and taught to 
everyone from the Housekeeping team through the Valet and Restaurants.  Even such mundane 
functions such as Laundry were involved and therefore needed to understand how each customer 
is to be treated.   
There was also going to be a bunch of customers who would no longer occupy the 
highest rung on the tier totem pole, and the marketing team was particularly concerned about 
how they might react, so those customers were also involved in the process. 
 
We also talked to Diamonds who had no shot—necessarily, to the 
best of our knowledge, analytically—of achieving Seven Stars.  
And, our big concern was we didn’t want to alienate the Diamond 
customer who would no longer be the top tier. And what they said 
was “Well, as long as you don’t take anything away from me, then 
I’m fine.”68 
                                                 
67 Follow-up interview with David Norton via telephone on November 6, 2006. 
68 Follow-up interview with David Norton, op cit. 
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Nevertheless, the conservative element of customer management philosophy (and the 
stakes of offending valuable customers) led Norton and his team to design Seven Stars as a 
“covert” tier—necessitating customer education about how to participate in the production of this 
differentiated service: 
 
We decided to roll-out Seven Stars as a covert tier—meaning that 
the differentiation was going to be pretty subtle, and we actually 
trained the customers:  “Okay, go to the side of the cage, and this 
is where you get your differentiated service.”  So we did that a 
little bit based on a conservative approach.  We’re also listening to 
the lower level Diamonds to make sure we didn’t alienate them 
because they contribute a lot of revenue.69 
 
Once implemented, however, the game switched towards very clear service 
differentiation.  If a Seven Stars member calls up at 800pm on a Saturday and requests a table at 
the completely-full steakhouse, “we’ll get them in within 30 minutes” notes David Norton.  As 
one might imagine, such an approach to restaurant management may produce a great deal of 
difficulty in the ability to honor reservations, etc.  The data analytic approach that is deeply 
embedded within the Harrah’s culture also reared its head with respect to Seven Stars.  Steven 
Pinchuk, head of revenue management at Harrah’s, noted that a simple benefit such as honoring 
the 8pm Saturday night table request can disrupt the restaurant’s functioning, but with 
appropriate data gauging the frequency and likelihood of such events, the company can 
proactively assure top quality service for its top value guests:   
 
                                                 
69 Follow-up interview with David Norton, op cit. 
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Seven stars—great customer, top value customer.  He’s in.  
Doesn’t matter what the restaurant looks like.  What we want is for 
the Revenue Management system to know how often that happens 
and the propensity, and it becomes part of our demand forecast 
and we proactively save that [table] for the customer, and that’s 
proactive guest service.  That Seven Stars member knows that 
suddenly everywhere he goes around Harrah’s – he called in 
Saturday afternoon and got a room.  He called at 8:00pm and got 
into the steakhouse.  He noticed that there’s a boxing match the 
next night; he got tickets.  All of that is revenue management 
behind the scenes…70 
 
Fundamentally, notes David Norton, “the goal is give everybody good service, but 
Diamond customers need to be great, and Seven Stars is whatever you want, within reason.”71  In 
addition to the personalization of benefits conducted at the property level, the company-wide 
benefits that the Seven Stars Club offers its members include the following 7 articulated 
entitlements:  
 
      Table 27: Seven Stars Company-wide Benefits 
 
1. Complimentary Room Guarantee (no advance notice) 
2. Complimentary Annual Trip or Royal Caribbean Cruise Credit 
3. Guaranteed Gourmet Restaurant Seating (no advance notice) 
4. Guaranteed Priority Service 
5. Seven Stars Club Private Selection  
6. Seven Stars Club Logo Merchandise 
7. Complimentary Birthday Dinner  
 
                                                 
70 Interview with Steven Pinchuk, op cit. 
71 Interview with David Norton, op cit. 
Seven Stars Fit with Strategy 
 
 The fundamental premise behind the tiered approach to Total Rewards was to 
simultaneously achieve standardization of services (within a tier) while also differentiating the 
offering (across tiers).  Given the criteria for entering a particular tier is based solely on value to 
the enterprise, and the tiers are designed to differentiate services, the Seven Stars tier is the 
embodiment of the Harrah’s strategy of competing on customer service. 
 The motivation for the Seven Stars tier strikes at the very root of the Harrah’s strategy.  If 
the company’s very best customers are continuing to give some of their gaming expenditures to 
other companies, then Harrah’s needs to compete for those dollars with a better customer 
experience and with more lavish service differentiation.  Seven Stars does exactly that and is the 
essence of the Harrah’s strategy. 
Performance of the Seven Stars Club 
 
Given that the Seven Stars tier was only rolled out in 2004, there is only limited data on 
the performance of the new service.  Nevertheless, the performance metrics that do exist indicate 
that the service has been fairly successful, albeit with a few exceptions.  At the very highest 
levels, an analysis of the number of customers who were playing in 2005 at a level that would 
earn them Seven Stars status is higher than the number of players who would have earned the 
status in 2004 (there is only one year of awardees given the program just started).   
Further, each of these players is worth more (the annual theoretical value to Harrah’s for 
the Seven Stars group rose by more than 22% (compared to the theoretical value of the 2004 
“Seven-equivalent” group).  The group is returning to Harrah’s more frequently, with the number 
of trips up over 12% and the number of days playing is up over 11%.  Enterprise wide, the group 
of Seven Stars customers today represents approximately $1.0bn of theoretical revenue to 
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Harrah’s (up more than 20% vs. the Seven-equivalents for 2004).  Just to make sure that these 
trends were not the result of an overall growth in VIP gaming, David Norton shared additional 
data with me on the overall trends of the VIP market (i.e. Platinum and above). The chart below 
summarizes how VIP gaming has grown in 2004 and 2005 compared with the growth of Seven 
Stars (and Seven-equivalent) customers.  Note that the theoretical value from Seven Stars (and 
Seven-equivalent) members has grown approximately 100% between 2003 and 2005. 
 
Figure 17: Growth in Annual Theoretical Value to Harrah’s (VIP vs. Seven Stars) 
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A chart for the growth in the number of trips made per year across the two categories yields 
similar results: Seven Stars trips grew 56% and 45% in 2004 and 2005, respectively while VIP 
trips grew 16% and 14% in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
Further, in some geographic regions, the ratio of value to Harrah’s for a Seven Stars 
member (vs. Diamond, Platinum, and Gold members) has risen from the numbers discussed 
above.  In Las Vegas, for instance, one Seven Stars customer generates the same revenue to 
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Harrah’s as 670 Gold members, 50 Platinum members, or 14 Diamond members.72   Clearly, the 
Seven Stars program seems to have had a demonstrable impact upon the customer experience 
and has resulted in greater loyalty from the best customers. 
Contextualizing The Seven Stars Program 
 
The Seven Stars program was effectively two separate service innovations.  The first, 
which is based upon the introduction of a separate tier for the very high-end customer spending a 
great deal more than your average Diamond customer, was a service innovation that sought to 
maintain a more finely tuned differentiation (which would imply a movement within the upper 
right quadrant).  Because the service innovation was initially done on a covert basis, however, it 
effectively degraded scalability.  The second service innovation is the “opening” and removal of 
the covert status to regain scalability. 
 
Figure 18: The Seven Stars Innovation 
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72 Seven Stars Program presentation, David Norton, November 2006.  
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Operational Customer Relationship Management (OpCRM) 
Description of the OpCRM Capability 
 
 Operational CRM is a service innovation that has evolved over many years within 
Harrah’s and is based on the belief that the slot machine is a valuable customer touch-point that 
can (and should) be utilized to deliver an expanded suite of services.  Harrah’s recognized that, 
as a company, it was effective at direct marketing – primarily via the mail and telephone.  
Because all such marketing occurred after a customer’s visit to a casino, the marketing 
department thought it might be possible to apply those same direct marketing skills to a customer 
while they were actually in the middle of their visit.73  It differs from analytical CRM which 
focuses on incentivizing another trip from a customer who recently visited a casino.74   
 Perhaps the key functionality of the Operational CRM capability is the newfound ability 
of the slot machine to recognize the guest and via business rules, spur an action of some sort. 
Tim Stanley, Chief Information Officer for Harrah’s, noted that the overall objective of 
Operational CRM was to “use business rules against current and historical data to offer real-time 
offers and incentives…that were delivered to customer or employees via operational touch-
points for a ‘WOW’ or ‘You Know me!?!’ effect.”75  In some cases, this may be recognition of a 
customer who has not visited a property in a while.  Sandeep Khera, Director of the Operational 
CRM program, notes that the operational CRM capability would also be of great assistance to 
employees in enabling them to deliver high value, customized, and personalized service: 
 
…the opportunity here is in making the customer’s 
experience better while they’re on property, so it can be as simple 
                                                 
73 Interview with Marc Oppenheimer, Vice President of Marketing at the Harrah’s Joliet property, via telephone on 
August 14, 2006. 
74 Interview with Sandeep Khera, Director of Operational CRM; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
75 Tim Stanley 2005 All-IT presentation. 
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as we know that they’re sitting at a slot machine, it’s April 26th of 
whatever year and their birthday is on April 26th so we can send 
somebody out to bring them a card and flowers and balloons and 
that’s a surprise for the customer…[or]…we know the customer 
used to be a regular visitor and this is their first time on property 
in three to four months.   
Now this may be a person who, you know, was previously 
casino-hosted and fell out of that or they were a regular visitor but 
maybe some of the staff moved on, so for whatever reason they 
come on property and ordinarily they wouldn’t be recognized and 
now we have a system-based approach to know “Here’s a person 
who was very valuable to us and a loyal guest.  They haven’t 
visited for us for a while” and a chance to go out and meet them, 
so it becomes less important who is the person doing it and more 
important that whoever is doing it has the right information that 
can go up to this guest and introduce themselves and welcome 
them back.76 
 
Building on the success of SSDS, operational CRM was designed to help guests navigate 
a casino’s suite of services from the slot machine.  The concept was to enable the slot machine – 
a primary interaction touch-point for many of Harrah’s most loyal customers – to treat the 
customer with differentiated service.  Mary Dossett notes that Operational CRM is  
 
looking at offering beverage service, potentially hotel reservations, 
dinner reservations, valet, we are looking at all of these 
capabilities as services that we can service to a guest at a number 
of touch-points, with the slot machine being key among them, 
because that’s where the guest spends the most time.77 
                                                 
76 Interview with Sandeep Khera, op cit. 
77 Interview with Mary Dossett, Director of Gaming Technologies; Las Vegas, NV; April 25, 2006. 
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One of the basic premises that drove the development of Operational CRM was that 
customers should be recognized in a consistent manner by all company touch-points78 and that 
the customer information should be updated real-time.  In addition to the obvious positive 
opportunities such information would present for marketing, this real-time information would 
also prevent reinvestment marketing offers (also known as “comps”) from being duplicated in a 
multi-property market: 
 
So and the other thing we want to make sure is we understand – we 
need to know that someone incented – the left hand needs to know 
what the right hand, the right hand needs to know what the left 
hand, right?  So if I incented someone on our property, and then 
the person walks over to the next property, I want to make sure 
that that person – that property B has the visibility that something 
was done to this person at property A.  Because we don’t also want 
to overcomp the guest.79 
 
Tara continues, noting that the real time touch-point allows Harrah’s to deliver offers 
deemed by a customer to be valuable even when the costs to Harrah’s are minimal.  In fact, it 
may even help with demand smoothing for some of the casino’s other services, by channeling 
customers to a venue when lines are particularly short, or giving away perishable tickets to a 
show at the last minute to a particularly unlucky guest: 
 
What we want to be able to do is recognize that [unlucky 
experience] and see how we can make a difference.  So I know I 
have a show that Vikram likes.  And I have extra seating capacity.  
                                                 
78 Interview with Sunny Tarra, op cit. 
79 Interview with Sunny Tara, op cit. 
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I want to ask you, Vikram, right now, do you want four tickets for 
this show?…Or if I know that the buffet lines are short and if 
you’re a gold customer, I may want to push you to a buffet.  Or I 
know that you like this restaurant, so I can push [you to the 
restaurant] if there’s availability.80 
 
The actual Operational CRM functionality was implemented via a series of “rules” that 
were designed to automate a service experience.  These rules were designed to prompt casino 
hosts to interact with valuable customers in a way that differentiated the service delivered to the 
customer and made them feel particularly special.  One explicit goal of the Operational CRM 
service was to make the player feel lucky: as Khera notes, “things that we can do on the floor 
like recognizing birthdays, celebrating winning and things like that add to the perception of 
luck…”81 
Creating such automated service interactions runs the risk of creating a “big brother” 
feeling among customers.  As such, it becomes extremely important to manage customer 
perceptions of how employees know the information that spurred an interaction.  Director of 
Enterprise Architecture and Integration Sunny Tara notes that  
 
… there’s a difference between if I’m a VIP customer and a host 
wishes my wife or my significant other or me a happy birthday – 
[because on the gaming floor] it’s a personal relationship between 
host and player – but I may get offended if I get into a restaurant 
or the spa or at the hotel check in, and a clerk wishes my son 
happy birthday …82 
 
                                                 
80 Interview with Sunny Tara, op cit. 
81 Interview with Sandeep Khera, op cit. 
82 Interview with Sunny Tara, op cit. 
Because of this highly sensitive nature of the Operational CRM effort, understanding the 
actual “rules” or “services” is absolutely essential to understanding the system.  As such, the 
following sub-sections of this section profile the various rules that have been developed and 
implemented via the Operational CRM capability. 
 
A Selection of the OpCRM “Rules” 
 
 Given it is better to think of the OpCRM capability as a platform from which to deliver 
differentiated services (rather than a differentiated service by itself), the following paragraphs 
will elaborate on a handful of the service interaction “rules” that have been designed, deployed, 
and delivered on the casino floor using the OpCRM platform.  In the interests of demonstrating 
both successful and unsuccessful “rules,” three rules are described below: (1) the birthday greet, 
(2) the unlucky visit, and (3) the lucky visit. 
 
BIRTHDAY GREET 
 
 Perhaps the simplest of the Operational Customer Relationship Management rules is the 
“birthday acknowledgment” rule that spurred a casino host to visit a card member on their 
birthday if they were playing in the casino.  Given the popularity among avid players of spending 
their birthday being entertained in a casino, and the perception that someone unsolicitedly 
wishing you well on your birthday is particularly lucky, the technology was easily modified to 
alert casino hosts of important customers that were present on the slot floor on their birthday.   
 A special birthday gift would be delivered to a guest shortly after they arrived on the 
floor, but usually long enough after they sat down that it did not appear as obviously technology 
driven.  Sandeep Khera, Director of the Operational CRM program, notes that “the Birthday 
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guest greet rule existed for all tiers above Gold….it was implemented with great success and 
provided an opportunity to utilize otherwise reactive (and passive) staff into proactive service 
ambassadors.”83 
 
 
UNLUCKY VISIT 
 Given the stochastic nature of the gambling entertainment business and the fact that 
gaming outcomes vary a great deal around a fixed statistical outcome (i.e. the outcomes are 
stochastic), there is a heavy perception around the “luckiness” of a casino experience.  For the 
purposes of analyzing whether a customer is having a particularly lucky or unlucky experience, 
Harrah’s evaluates and compares a customer’s actual win (or loss) against the theoretical loss 
that would have been expected during the time under consideration.  Thus, if a player is involved 
in a game that has an expected house “take” of 10% and risks $1000 over one hour, the expected 
loss is $100.   
Given this expectation, a loss greater than $100 would be considered unlucky, with much 
greater losses being labeled as particularly unlucky.  While the opposite is generally thought to 
be true (i.e. that a loss of less than $100 would be considered lucky), players do not generally 
associate losses with luckiness.  Thus, luckiness can be considered high if a player actually wins, 
and one can assume “unluckiness” if a player’s loss exceeds the theoretical loss that should have 
occurred.  Extensive data exist on customer behavior following a first-time visit to a Harrah’s 
casino – and serve as the primary source of “customer insight” in the service concept 
development process.  The table below demonstrates the logic for why an intervention during a 
particularly unlucky visit may increase the chances of a return visit, particularly if the 
intervention was not expected and might be interpreted as itself a “lucky” event. 
                                                 
83 Interview with Sandeep Khera, op cit. 
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Graph 16: “Luckiness” of First Visit Drives a Customer’s Likelihood of Returning 
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Source: Tim Stanley Presentation to Hotel Technology Symposium, April 2006 
 
 
Harrah’s executives did not know how this metric may have varied over time and decided 
to do some experimentation in actual service settings to determine the impact of prior 
experiences upon the above chart.  In particular, notes Norton, “we did not have a good 
understanding of how luckiness affected likelihood for an individual who was giving us a second 
or third shot.”84  Thus, the team designed several rules to gauge the effectiveness of a service 
intervention on a customer who was having a very unlucky second, third, or fourth visit.  The 
results, listed below, were “not what we originally anticipated, but appear to be quite robust.”85 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Follow-up interview with David Norton, op cit. 
85 Follow-up interview with John Bruns via telephone on November 7, 2006. 
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LUCKY VISIT 
 Given that the “unlucky” service intervention appeared to be working successfully, David 
Norton and others on his team believed that it would only be logical to also celebrate the success 
of customers that were particularly lucky.   As Sandeep Khera notes: 
 
…one of the thoughts we had was, “Well, what about the guests 
that are winning, that are beating us for money?  Let’s go on and 
use it as an opportunity to celebrate and congratulate them.”  So 
we made a bold assumption upfront that those people wanted to be 
celebrated and congratulated.  And so we designed the rule and 
checked it with customers.  The reporting showed that these are 
guests that on this particular trip to a frequency market are 
beating the house and they’re having a win at a certain level; it 
showed up as the numbers (inaudible).  And we designed the rule 
and went out and had that interaction—thinking that it was the 
right one to have – based in part on customer feedback and in part 
on our marketing team’s logic.86 
 
The concept for the lucky first visit intervention was, as noted by Sandeep Khera above, driven 
by both customer feedback and the marketing team’s logic.  The raw customer data indicated that 
the lucky customers were already likely to return and did not necessitate an intervention. 
According to Khera, the outcome was not as positive as anticipated: 
 
Well, the guest reaction was, “Well, what do you mean?  How do 
you know?  Well, yes I’m having a lovely day today, but you know, 
yesterday was a horrible day.  So no thanks; I’m not having a good 
time.”87 
                                                 
86 Follow-up interview with Sandeep Khera via telephone on November 6, 2006. 
87 Follow-up interview with Sandeep Khera, op cit. 
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Further, property managers – who live and die by their customer reactions – responded 
consistently with their customers.  Nevertheless, frontline employees were engaged in a manner 
that helped improve the rule, making the intervention something that the employee engaging the 
customer determined whether it made any sense. 
 
 So we very quickly heard the feedback from the frontline 
basically, you know, somewhat critically saying, “Look.  Okay, we 
trusted you on this.  We gave it a shot.  This is a horrible idea.  You 
know, we need to kill this rule.”  And that’s where again, you 
know, we had this conversation, “Alright, what’s not working?  
Because obviously something is potent here, let’s not just toss it.  
Look, there’s something that’s not working obviously here with the 
approach.”  So we revised the approach.  You know, we said, 
“This is an important plan in the customer’s journey.  Let’s go out 
there, check on them, and based upon their reaction have a 
conversation or not.  But let’s not make the assumption that they 
want to be congratulated.”88 
 
Although the lucky visit rule was not a particularly successful service interaction rule, the 
OpCRM engine has been proven as a capability that enables Harrah’s approach to service 
differentiation in real-time – as demonstrated by the prior rules.   
OpCRM Fit with Strategy 
 
 Harrah’s strategy of competing via outstanding customer experiences is based upon the 
ability of the company to recognize valuable customers and treat them as such – regardless of the 
customer’s touch-point with the casino.  Fundamentally, operational CRM is about doing just 
                                                 
88 Follow-up interview with Sandeep Khera, op cit. 
that while also wooing new customers by managing their perceptions of a casino’s luckiness.  
OpCRM capabilities are fundamentally about differentiating a customer’s experience in a casino 
based upon the type of experience that they have had – in real time.  Thus, the capability allows 
Harrah’s to help improve a customer’s experience while that experience is still taking place.  
 Further, the capability enables Harrah’s to automate service interactions that have 
historically been “hit or miss” and quite random.  The system is highly scalable and can 
accommodate dozens of rules, which when combined with the hundreds of customer experience 
scenarios around which Harrah’s has data (via it’s Total Rewards transaction database), creates 
an impressive automated differentiation capability – thereby allowing Harrah’s to escape the 
scalability – differentiation constraint discussed above. 
Performance of the OpCRM Capability 
 
 As described above, the Operational CRM system consists of various “rules” that drive 
what Tim Stanley has labeled “automagic.”  This subsection of the chapter will evaluate the 
Operation CRM system on two levels (a) the performance of these rules relative to a control 
group that exhibited virtually identical demographic data as well as behavior patterns vis-à-vis 
betting, frequency of visit, etc. and (b) the aggregate performance of the Operational CRM 
system. 
 As can be seen in the table below, the operational CRM rules were not universally 
successful.  Rather, the table below demonstrates Harrah’s ability to hone in on potentially 
promising rules and to roll them out to other properties – all the while continually monitoring the 
rule’s performance.  The table below summarizes April 2005 data for the performance of the 
operational CRM rules at the Harrah’s Louisiana properties. 
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Table 28: Performance of Various Operational CRM “Rules” at Harrah’s Louisiana 
 
 % ADT Gain (Loss) per Customer (vs. Control Group) 
Rule New Orleans 
(11,669 offers) 
Louisiana Downs 
(7,335 offers) 
Lake Charles 
(8,798 offers) 
Unlucky First Visit 1% 1% ( 1% ) 
Unlucky Second Visit ( 7% ) 1% 1% 
Unlucky Third Visit 2% ( 1% ) 10% 
Unlucky Fourth Visit 6% ( 15% )  ( 12% ) 
Frequency Upside ( 4% ) 5% 11% 
Birthday Greet ( 9% ) ( 7% ) 19% 
Seven Stars Greet 0% 13% 0% 
Reactivated Customer 1% 4% 5% 
Decliner  0% N/A N/A 
Source: “Harrah’s Operational CRM Initiative Project Update, April 15, 2005” 
 
Aggregate performance of the Operational CRM system, however, has been absolutely 
stellar when evaluated relative to a control group.  The table below summarizes the results of the 
OpCRM system through the 3rd quarter of 2006. 
 
Table 29: Aggregate Operational CRM Performance 
 
 
Category 
 
Metric 
OpCRM 
Group 
Control 
Group 
Change 
(absolute) 
Change 
(%) 
Length of 
Play (mins) 
319 298 21 7% Trip Play 
(day of 
interaction) 
Day’s 
Theoretical 
Revenue 
528 481 47 10% 
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Day’s Actual 
Revenue 
398 371 27 7% 
P&L Impact 47 43 4 9% 
Trips 3.2 3.1 0.1 3% 
Total 
Theoretical 
Revenue 
1525 1382 143 10% 
Repeat Visit 
(over 3 
months) 
Total Actual 
Revenue 
1339 1195 144 12% 
NOTE: Includes cost of OpCRM service intervention but excludes gaming tax.  
SOURCE: David Norton November Slide Show 
 
 
As one can imagine, the ability to lengthen the amount of time a player stays at a slot 
machine (i.e. length of play) has tremendous impact on the profitability of the firm.  Increasing 
revenues by 12% (for a company that is already on a $9 billion + revenue run rate), is a 
monumental accomplishment and, if the impact held when spread across all properties, would 
result in an additional $1 billion of revenues.  The bottom-line impact of 9% is equally 
impressive and would likely result in a substantial similar revaluation of the company’s shares.   
Contextualizing OpCRM 
 
 The OpCRM capability has accomplished a great deal that was not possible before it was 
developed.  Nevertheless, the service innovations enabled by the OpCRM platform are most 
comparable to the automation of a personalized relationship with a casino host (which is highly 
differentiated but definitively not scalable).   
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Figure 19: The Operational CRM Innovation 
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Summary: Service Innovation as Targeting Both Scale AND Differentiation 
 
The three Harrah’s strategic service innovations highlight the tremendous power of being 
able to achieve both scale and differentiation.  Perhaps due to the strong relationships between IT 
professionals and the “business unit” professionals within Harrah’s, each of the service 
innovations is based on scalable information technology.  Differentiation, the vaccine against the 
commoditizing cancer of standardized offerings, is itself the target of the automation.  Although 
it seems oxymoronic, Harrah’s has effectively standardized service differentiation through the 
automation capabilities inherent in information technology. 
The figure below summarizes how these three Harrah’s service innovations fit into the 
scalability – differentiation framework.  Note the heavy emphasis on movement towards the 
upper right quadrant of the 2x2 grid. 
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Figure 20: Contextualizing Harrah’s Service Innovations 
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An analysis of the three Harrah’s service innovations through a strategic analysis lens 
highlights the heavy impact these differentiation-oriented projects have had on customer 
switching costs.  By utilizing customer history to effectively individualize or create a better 
service experience for the best customers, Harrah’s has effectively created an incentive for these 
customers not to go to competitors—doing so might result in a lower-quality service experience 
with a company that does not recognize or acknowledge that customer’s value. 
Further, for customers with whom Harrah’s has had limited experience, the 
differentiation strategy (via OpCRM) is based heavily on understanding the customer’s potential 
worth.  Via likelihood analysis on millions of customers in the Total Rewards database 
(comparable to actuarial analysis), Harrah’s has developed proprietary models that can 
dynamically bestow a high-value customer service experience upon a customer with whom 
Harrah’s does not have a detailed history.  This dynamic, yet automated, differentiation for 
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unknown customers breaks the earlier dependence upon customer history and overcomes the 
switching costs that a customer loyal to a competitor might bear in moving his or her business to 
Harrah’s.  The interactive effect of these three innovations creates a self-reinforcing 
differentiation mechanism that seems to feed upon itself to generate higher and higher switching 
costs for Harrah’s best customers. 
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Chapter 7 – Supporting the Strategy: Creating A Service-
Oriented Culture Focused on Measurement 
 
 An important step in developing the scalable service differentiation strategy was the 
creation of a service-oriented culture.  At the time Loveman arrived, the company’s employees 
were not focused on service at all; because the demand for casino entertainment far exceeded the 
supply of available gaming opportunities, employees did not focus on customer satisfaction in 
any way.  John Bruns, who heads the company’s Customer Satisfaction Assurance team, notes 
that 
In 1998, what you had at Harrah’s was 50,000 employees that had 
no clue what service meant.  The reason was they didn’t have to be 
nice to customers.  All they did was come to work every day and if 
they pissed off one customer, it didn’t matter because there was 
another one right behind him.  They had, if you will, a seller’s 
market.89 
 
Despite the seeming strength of the business, it turns out that Harrah’s was losing its best 
customers.  Ruthless competition was being waged via huge capital expenditures and the 
development of “must-see” properties – in both frequency and destination markets, and the 
company’s precarious financial condition led the most valuable customers to seek gambling 
entertainment services elsewhere.  As noted by Loveman, Harrah’s main competitors were 
building massive casino resorts requiring enormous sums of money in a classic, “build it and 
they will come” strategy to generate traffic in the casinos.  At the time, it was a game Harrah’s 
could not afford to play.  Las Vegas was the center of the building action, and as noted by John 
Bruns, service was the last consideration on the minds of senior gaming executives: 
                                                 
89 Follow-up interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
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Before 1998, I will submit to you, there was not one company 
focused on service in the gaming industry.  It was simply, if you 
build it, they will come.  It was always, spend more money, build a 
bigger, more magnificent property.  It will – it, in and of itself, will 
create a demand generator, and because the demand is so large, it 
wouldn’t dilute the existing demand.  And it proved itself over and 
over and over again in Las Vegas.90 
 
Further, as Loveman notes, the casino industry has historically had reasons that required a hands-
off, distanced approach to service on the gaming floor.  Security concerns and the need for strict, 
visible distance had historically resulted in formal and stiff employees, frustrated by their 
inability to generate stronger relationships with their customers: 
 
Casino service generally is disappointing all around.  Service is 
hard to deliver in a casino.  Employees are under strict rules to 
ensure there is no corruption.  For example, dealers might want to 
give you a hug, but they can’t, because you might slip something 
into their pockets.  It’s not like a hotel.  So the business had always 
grown up around control.  Service came way down the list, after 
control.  Customers are losing.  They’re tired.  It’s a complex 
service delivery process.  So there are a lot of things that can get 
in the way of good service (Becker, 2003). 
 
It was this lack of focus on service and the customer experience that opened up an 
opportunity for Harrah’s to differentiate itself vis-à-vis competitors with greater financial 
capabilities and resources.  Combined with the enormous power of the Total Rewards customer 
                                                 
90 Interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
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transaction and playing behavior database, this opportunity formed the Harrah’s strategy of 
competing on the basis of customer experience.  
Delivering a Vibe: Training & Enabling Employees to be in a Service Mode 
 
Understanding that frontline employees have the greatest interaction with customers leads 
to a seemingly unfortunate and precarious (from a management perspective) situation in which 
the lowest-paid employees are the ones that have the greatest influence on customer impressions.  
This heterogeneity of service offerings (due to the social nature of any service interaction) drives 
a need to standardize – insofar as possible – service quality.  The primary objective of these 
efforts is to help employees mentally and psychologically “leave their personal baggage”91 at the 
door and focus on their task of serving customers.  By removing (or at least reducing) employee 
“state of mind variability,” consistent service is more likely. 
Several of Harrah’s service innovations are focused upon the creation of a service 
delivery environment in which employees are—to use a phrase used by Don Marrandino, 
General Manager of the Flamingo Las Vegas and the Harrah’s Las Vegas—“delivering a vibe” 
consistent with extraordinary service delivery.  Marrandino (who had been president of the Hard 
Rock Hotel and Casino as well as Wynn Las Vegas) notes that truly great experiences are 
dominated by an energetic “vibe” typical of what a great band might deliver.  It’s a team effort 
that is based on the energy of the various players in a band, and the collection of efforts 
transcends the whole to deliver a memorable experience for the guest: 
 
In the band, people only see seven, eight, nine people on stage. But 
behind that band, there’s t-shirt salesmen, the pilot that flies their 
plane, the stewardess, the catering people, the wardrobe people, 
                                                 
91 Interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
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the agents, the accounting firm, the security detail.  I would draw 
comparison to the most successful bands that ever played.  Why 
are they more successful?  The guitar players play the same C, D, 
G, they’re all playing the same stuff.  The lead singer, Bruce 
Springsteen— arguably the best marketed band of all time—
doesn’t sing better.  There are people singing in lounges that sing 
better than he does.  Why?  I think there’s an interesting 
comparison between bands and our business. I’ve gotten to see a 
lot of the best bands.  How they practice, what they do, what they 
concentrate on…And the best concentrate on one thing – 
delivering a vibe.  Not many businesses try to deliver that.92 
 
So, how does Harrah’s actually help employees get in the “mode” to deliver a vibe?  An initial 
step, notes Ken Weil, was a shift in attention focus to “putting the customer first, rather than the 
task first.”93   This involved recognizing that  
 
[Front-line] employees come to work with problems.  They come to 
work with child care problems, health care problems, 
transportation problems, financial problems.  Employees come to 
work, and because they are front-level employees, they have a lot 
of these problems.  Most management has moved past that, so 
some of these things have been – are not as significant to them in 
their day-to-day life, but to the employees, these are significant 
problems.  So if you look at this group, this idea of transitioning 
from home to work is critically important. As Jack Welsh said in 
his book, “every brain in the game.”94 
 
                                                 
92 Interview with Don Marrandino, Regional President and General Manager of the Harrah’s Las Vegas and the 
Flamingo Las Vegas; Las Vegas, NV; August 21, 2006. 
93 Interview with Ken Weil, op cit. 
94 Interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
In order to help transition employees from home to work, Harrah’s has all customer-
facing departments in the company conduct what are known as “Buzz Sessions.”  These Buzz 
Sessions occur before every shift every day, last for seven to ten minutes, and are often attended 
by senior management of a department and occasionally corporate executives.   
According to John Bruns, the sessions have five key steps: (1) Listen to employees about 
their experiences, (2) Communicate key events that may affect the shift, (3) Reinforce behaviors 
that have proven effective vis-à-vis interacting with customers, (4) Spotlight and highlight 
employees, and (5) Have fun, completing the transition of front-line employees to a context in 
which they’re ready to deliver service to customers with an attitude and demeanor that will 
translate into high customer satisfaction.   
 In addition to the Buzz Sessions, Harrah’s management understood that employees 
needed to be trained in effective service delivery.   Understanding that many frontline employees 
are hourly workers and that time in training can be a financial burden on them, the service 
training was designed to motivate them to take it seriously.  Loveman notes that the management 
also required tests: 
 
We developed a service curriculum, which came out of 
research with our best customers on the issues that really 
motivated their loyalty.  For the first time in the company's history, 
every single employee attended this training. We paid them their 
tipped wages while they were in training; dealers make most of 
their money on tips. If you put them in training and only give them 
their hourly time, they get the message: this isn't really important. 
If you pay them their tipped wages — for the first time in most of 
these people's lives they were in training at tipped wages — that is 
a huge deal.  
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And we ran all these programs 24 hours a day because we 
had people working all shifts. At the Rio, in Las Vegas, for 
example, we ran 200 sessions with 20 people in each to get 
through 4,000 employees in just five months. At the end of the 
program, you had to pass a test — otherwise you could not keep 
your job. You can imagine the anxiety that percolated through the 
system (Becker, 2003). 
Aces in the Right Places: Organizing for Quality Service Delivery 
 
 In addition to using Buzz Sessions to get employees into the work mode, Harrah’s 
conscientiously discriminated in its assignment of employees to various locations within the 
casino.  In particular, those employees who received the most positive reviews were placed in 
areas likely to contain a disproportionate representation of Seven Stars, Diamonds, and Platinum 
customers.  While speaking with various property-level managers, several mentioned the ideas of 
having “aces in the right places.”   
 The logic of focusing on the customer did not stop with the strategic allocation of 
individual human resources; rather, it continued on to include teams and the organization of 
hierarchies within the casino.  In this regard, Harrah’s instituted several organizational and 
staffing re-designs that were centered on creating a better overall experience for the customer.  A 
great example of one such organizational redesign recently took place on the slot floor.   
 Historically, the slot floor was a domain in which numerous departments of the property 
ranging from food and beverage to janitorial and gaming operations would interact with guests.  
Each department was separately run.  Gaming operations employees (slot service attendants, 
etc.) reported to the gaming supervisor on duty during each shift.  Food and beverage employees 
reported to the food and beverage supervisor on duty during each shift.  Janitorial services and 
Mansharamani  Page 250 
Mansharamani  Page 251 
others reported in a similar manner.  Thus, each function was separately run with no single point 
of coordination or orchestration.  As Joe Flippen notes, “there was no one managing the 
customer experience holistically.  There were no independent men that transcended departmental 
lines…Everyone wore different uniforms…and they didn’t talk to each other [across 
departmental lines].”95  
The Harrah’s team changed this by creating a de facto head of customer experience.  
Melissa Price describes the new role as one of complete customer management driven today by 
cross-functional leadership: 
 
It’s really getting to the place of how do you get these cross-
functional teams and maybe at this point it’s just cross-functional 
leadership.  So now I’m a supervisor and I own this zone of 200 
machines, and the beverage people and the slot people that are in 
here all report to me.  And my mission in life is to make sure every 
customer that comes in and out of this zone that I touch them in 
some way, shape or form.  I say “Hi” to them; I say “Good luck”; 
I make sure they have a good experience; I anticipate their drink 
need.  You know, I see if they need change; I just take care of 
them.96 
 
This seemingly minor change, however, did not arise without organizational 
complications and the need to overcome vested interests.  For example, slot attendants and 
janitorial staff have not historically earned tips from customers, which beverage attendants do.  
How will such a vestige of the previous approach manifest itself in the new organizational 
system?  Joe Flippen succinctly summarized the difficulty of managing this process: “It’s going 
                                                 
95 Interview with Joseph Flippen, op cit. 
96 Interview with Melissa Price, op cit. 
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to be tricky.”97  To date, the change seems to have worked well and vested organizational 
interests have been overcome via pooled tips, the customer service bonus which is received by 
every employee for property service scores, and the recent emergence of a general service-
oriented culture. 
 Nevertheless, this is not preventing a continuous improvement effort by the management 
of gaming operations.  Price goes on to describe how cross-functional leadership of customer 
experience management is the first step in the redesign process.  A logical extension, she notes, 
is to extend the cross-functionality from leadership to each employee – in effect making each 
employee responsible for complete customer management: 
 
Step two goes far beyond that where, you know, this vision of every 
one of these supervisors and maybe even all the employees on the 
floor have a handheld and I can literally check you out of your 
hotel, make you dinner reservations.  I’m more like a concierge 
that’s out there to help you with – in your journey of your 
experience…98  
   
This goal of having multi-functioned individuals capable of attending to every need of 
every customer has not yet been achieved; nevertheless, the objective has been set and teams are 
already working on developing appropriate human resources. 
While not directly related to the concept of having highly capable personnel on staff, a 
reduction in employee turnover is highly consistent with having “aces in the right places.”  
Employee turnover is expensive, not only in terms of training and HR processing, but also in 
terms of customer perceptions.  If players are constantly interacting with employees who are 
                                                 
97 Interview with Joseph Flippen, op cit. 
98 Interview with Melissa Price, op cit. 
“new to the job,” then they are de facto dealing with folks who are less informed and 
experienced with Harrah’s and the service culture, etc.   Management has made it a priority to 
reduce turnover: 
 
We also worked on reducing employee turnover. We're very 
careful about who we hire and are doing a better job of nurturing 
people through their first 90 days with us because that's where 
we've been losing everybody. And a lot of it comes from making 
sure employees know what they're being hired into. We take people 
through what we call realistic job previews and get them 
acquainted with the work before they start. And we check in with 
employees the first week they're on the job, the second week, the 
fourth week, the eighth week. We work very hard on supervision 
reviews and so on. We've managed to reduce turnover quite a lot, 
which in turn helps our customer service scores (Becker, 2003). 
          
Employee Jackpot: Incentivizing Employees towards Customer Satisfaction 
 
As a final step in developing a service focused culture, the company designed a bonus 
scheme to incentivize employees to deliver great service.  The scheme put in place allowed for 
every single property-level employee at the company to earn up to $200 extra per quarter if 
service metrics were improved.  Further, a substantial portion of the corporate management 
team’s evaluation criteria was designed around service scores; head of the customer satisfaction 
assurance team at Harrah’s John Bruns notes: 
 
We’re the only company that returns to the employee a bonus 
[based on service quality].  So management bonus is 25% of their 
bonus is attributable to customer satisfaction, and for an employee 
is a potential of $200 a quarter, or $800 for a year, per employee.  
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And since 2001 we’ve paid out $104 million to our employees for 
changing the customer experience, not profit. It’s strictly customer 
experience, changing the customer satisfaction.  So we have truly 
demonstrated not only the commitment to the service profit chain, 
but the cause and effect and being able to anchor those with a 
meaningful incentive, that therefore what gets rewarded gets 
repeated.  So therefore we have – we are improving the employee 
engagement and delivering a better experience for the customer.99 
 
Thus, “the customer satisfaction scale for a property improves, every single employee at that 
property – whether you’re the janitor or the General Manager – gets $200 that quarter.”100  Head 
of gaming operations Ken Weil goes on to describe the simple outlook that frontline, property 
employees have developed towards the service scores:  “People sit there and say, ‘I want to 
improve my service scores, because if I improve my service scores, I will get better compensated 
and better recognized for it.’  So that’s what happens...”101  Issues such as tip allocation and the 
disenfranchisement of certain employees (or groups) within the organization have been made 
secondary to the simple goal of improving customer service scores.  This individual $200 
quarterly bonus has resulted in a very focused team-oriented approach to customer experience 
management. 
In addition to serving as an effective motivator for individual employees, the quarterly 
service has motivated team-oriented service behavior and helped the company overcome the 
inertial tendencies of vested interests.  As the company began to implement some of the strategic 
service innovations such as Operational CRM, casino hosts began to lose power vis-à-vis 
customer influence and with respect to the company.  As is the case in most organizational 
                                                 
99 Interview with John Bruns, op cit. 
100 Interview with Ken Weil, op cit. 
101 Interview with Ken Weil, op cit. 
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change dynamics, those with vested interests seek to slow change.  The pooled CSA bonus 
sought to overcome this dynamic by motivating individuals to act as a group. 
Don Marrandino notes how some hourly workers have begun to think:  
 
If there’s an employee that works with you that is grumpy and 
doesn’t do a great job interacting with customers…and you’re a 
good, upbeat employee, you put your arm around them and say, 
“Hey, you’re screwing it up for me. You know, because I want to 
make the $800 a year bonus scores and I don’t want you to stop 
me...”102 
 
To further reinforce the team based approach to focusing on service delivery, the 
company makes a habit of publicizing the property’s service scores, in real time at each property: 
Loveman states “in the employee areas there are graphs to let them know their service numbers, 
which are based on customer satisfaction surveys. The data come in each week, and employees 
check to see how they're doing” (Becker, 2003).  Although a disenfranchised casino host may be 
making fewer tips than previously, the additional bonus offset some of the loss. 
 Perhaps the biggest indicator of this employee attitude towards service scores is found in 
peer-to-peer training that takes place.  In reviewing several Caesar’s Palace training materials for 
frontline employees (designed by peers), the emphasis on service scores as related to bonuses 
was very blunt: “Since Seven Stars and Diamond cardholders account for 80% of revenue and 
account for 80% of our CSA Performance Payout Scores, it is very important…to provide 
excellent player service.”103  Clearly, the service score based bonus was successful in motivating 
employees to put the customer experience ahead of their personal agendas. 
                                                 
102 Interview with Don Marrandino, op cit. 
103 Slot Service Dispatch System training materials, op cit. 
Get the Facts: Measure, Measure, Measure, & Measure 
 
Having a business academic background, Loveman no doubt had studied the multitude of 
organizational communication problems that arise in large hierarchical bureaucracies.  He was 
particularly concerned with one of the major, well-documented issues: the flow of accurate 
information.  Loveman did not want to suffer from being an insulated chief executive who did 
not receive facts; he even used Caesar’s acquisition as an appropriate time to share examples of 
how this “insulation from reality” can mislead the executive suite:  
 
Now, I don’t know any business like the hospitality business 
that’s so prone to making this artificial reality for its leaders.  I 
live in this bubble.  I stopped at one of these – the gasoline – the 
Thrifty stations the other day, some time ago, and I bought myself 
some Diet Pepsi.  Harrah’s is a Coca-Cola operation, at least for 
the time being.  And I wanted a Diet Pepsi.  So I bought myself a 
six-pack of Diet Pepsi and I threw it in the brown bag and I went 
in my office and every once in awhile I had one.   
A month later I’m in East Chicago, Indiana, which is a 
long way from Las Vegas.  And we’re having a meeting of the 
property management team, and I sit down and everyone’s being 
poured their Coke and their Sprite.  And here comes a waiter with 
a Diet Pepsi.  Now, we don’t have any Diet Pepsis in East 
Chicago.  We’re a Coca-Cola operation.  Now that poor kid – 
somebody has sent this kid out to buy a Diet Pepsi, because 
somebody working in the corporate office got on the phone and 
said that this idiot who runs – is in charge of the company likes a 
Diet – who cares?  It’s a Diet Pepsi.   
If your life starts to work like that, and all of a sudden you 
start to think that what people are showing you has some basis in 
reality and it’s not.  Now, you don’t have quite that severe a 
Mansharamani  Page 256 
problem, but you have a version of that.  As the people who work 
with you are generally trying to make you happy rather than 
making sure that what you’re doing is right (Loveman, 2005a). 
 
So while Loveman sought to get closer to the company’s customers, he did not seek his 
employees’ opinions of customers.  He wanted actual data.  Thus, with the help of other senior 
managers, he redesigned management context at Harrahs to one in which ideas and fact based 
decision-making over-ruled the opinions and hunches that employees had traditionally brought to 
the table.  As Loveman noted during a Summer 2005 speech to his employees: 
 
It’s the idea that wins, not the person who has the idea.  It’s typical 
in an organization that people will defer to the idea of the boss no 
matter how stupid the idea is.  I see it all the time.  People want to 
say that my idea is good just because it’s mine.  That’s ridiculous.  
My idea is no better or worse than yours...it’s just an idea.  It has 
to be held up and scrutinized for its merits.  Either it’s supported 
by the evidence and its analysis and thoughts, or it isn’t.  The fact 
that it’s mine or yours doesn’t matter.  We have to separate ideas 
from people and pursue the great ideas – and not get stuck with 
thinking about who had the idea (Loveman, 2005a). 
 
As will be seen in later discussion, this insistence from top management that ideas be 
scrutinized in a rigorous, analytic manner has resulted in a heavy measurement focus within most 
departments.  For instance, Mary Dossett, Director of Gaming Technologies, notes that 
“Harrah’s measures everything.  It’s one of our strengths.  We do nothing that we cannot validate 
has a measurable positive impact.  And if we discover there’s a negative impact, it’s out of 
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here…”104  Likewise, Jay Snowden, General Manager of the Showboat in Atlantic City, states 
that “pardon the expression, but we measure the s&*t out of everything we deem important…it’s 
all about measuring for success and creating a meritocracy of ideas.”105  In fact, the concept of 
fact based decision-making and measurement arose, unsolicited, in 15 of the 24 interviews that I 
conducted at Harrahs.   
The sentiment is best captured via a direct quote from Gary Loveman, who in 2003 stated 
the following:  
 
We measure everything…testing and measuring is very important 
to us.  When our employees use the words “I think,” the hair 
stands up on the back of my neck.  We have the capacity to know 
rather than guess at something because we collect so much 
information about our customers (Becker, 2003). 
                                                 
104 Interview with Mary Dosset, op cit. 
105 Interview with Jay Snowden, op cit. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
This final chapter concludes the dissertation by articulating the methods of developing a 
scalable service differentiation strategy.  Scalable service differentiation is a horizontal 
movement on the upper half of the 2x2 framework that has been used throughout this 
dissertation, and represents a migration towards the holy-grail of strategic service competition – 
a differentiated and scalable offering.  By differentiating the offering, a firm is insulating itself 
somewhat from the profit-dissipating competitive pressures that commoditize standard, 
replicable offerings.  By creating scalability, the firm is allowing the offering to expand beyond a 
simple niche market and enjoy the profit-enhancing, margin improving benefits enjoyed through 
economies of scale.  In short, scalable service differentiation allows companies to benefit from 
standardization without the corresponding negative commoditizing effect and also benefit from 
differentiation without the corresponding negative efficiency-destroying effect. 
Service Innovations at UPS, The Apollo Group, and Harrah’s Entertainment 
 
A review of the 7 strategic service innovations discussed in this dissertation106 suggests 
that Harrah’s has indeed achieved something remarkable.  Specifically, the three Harrah’s 
service innovations did not have any degradation of differentiation (i.e. downward pointing 
arrows) during the quest for scalability.  This is particularly striking in light of the fact that 
almost all of the UPS and Apollo Group service innovation involved loss of differentiation 
during the process of standardization.  For this reason alone, managers and business academics 
                                                 
106 UPS Common Carrier Services, UPS Non-Package Services, UPS Trade Direct, Apollo Centralized Curriculum 
Development & Management, Apollo FlexNet, Harrah’s Slot Service Dispatch System, Harrah’s Seven Stars Club, 
and Harrah’s Operational Customer Relationship Management program. 
alike should seek a deeper understanding of Harrah’s Entertainment.  The 2x2 diagrams that 
summarized each of these strategic service innovations are replicated below.   
 
     The Harrah’s Innovations 
 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n
H
ig
h
Lo
w
Scalability
HighLow
Operational CRM
Slo
t Se
rvic
e D
isp
atc
h S
yst
em
Seven Stars v1
Seven Stars v2
 
 
     The UPS Innovations     The Apollo Group Innovations 
 
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n
H
ig
h
Lo
w
Scalability
HighLow
Common Carrier Services
Trade DirectNon-Package Services
     
D
iff
er
en
tia
tio
n
H
ig
h
Lo
w
Scalability
HighLow
Centralized Curriculum
FlexNet Hybrid Delivery
 
 
 
Mansharamani  Page 260 
Mansharamani  Page 261 
The pages that follow summarize the scalable service differentiation strategy and lay a roadmap 
for the development and implementation of it.  The theoretical model is presented, along with 
details of the key “ingredients” necessary to effectively implement a scale and differentiation 
strategy.  
Scale and Differentiation in Services: Automating Personalized Experiences 
An Overview 
 
As discussed in the introduction, Harrah’s Entertainment appears to have generated both 
scale and differentiation in its services strategy.   The strategy has resulted in industry-leading 
returns on invested capital, and the company appears more insulated from the vicissitudes of the 
gaming market than its primary competitors. This advantage is based on Harrah’s pioneering use 
of information technology to capture customer behavior data.   
Through Total Rewards, the company’s loyalty program, customers are incentivized to 
let Harrah’s monitor their gaming behavior in the casino.  By capturing actual revealed 
preferences via this transaction data, Harrah’s is able to extract deeper insights from its customer 
base regarding customer demands than is available to companies relying exclusively on stated 
customer preferences obtained via focus groups, surveys, or even customer interviews.  This 
customer data store also serves a valuable predictive function in that the breadth of the Total 
Rewards membership107 yields statistical insights other companies can only dream of acquiring.  
Because of these insights, Harrah’s is able to treat potential high-value customers as high-value 
customers, thereby reducing the switching costs of gamblers that are likely to be particularly 
                                                 
107 According to David Norton, Senior VP of Relationship Marketing at Harrah’s Entertainment, the Total Rewards 
database currently contains information on over 40 million US gamblers, or approximately 80% of the American 
Gaming Association’s estimate of the 50 million population of US gamblers. 
loyal to other casino companies.  Just as Harrah’s is able to remove the switching costs these 
potential customers face, it is also able to impose switching costs upon its own customer base. 
The store of reciprocal history in Total Rewards enables the calculation of customer 
worth.  Once Harrah’s understands who its most valuable customers are in terms of profitability 
to the firm, Harrah’s is then able to set criteria for differentiated treatment for these customers.  
Through the various tiers of the Total Rewards program and their corresponding tier benefits, 
Harrah’s is able to delivered differentiated service.  Such differentiated service yields a better 
customer experience for the best customers, which leads to additional business from these 
customers – both in absolute terms as well as a percentage of their gaming budget.  The result of 
this differentiated service is customer lock-in via switching costs.   
High value customers at Harrah’s receive differentiated treatment that they are unlikely to 
experience at other casinos.  Thus, visiting another casino is a risky endeavor for these customers 
as they risk, for example, having to wait 15 minutes for slot service, or a long line at the casino’s 
restaurant, etc.  As a result, these customers face significant switching costs.  These switching 
costs manifest themselves via increased customer loyalty and increasing degrees of 
“monogamous” behavior.  This process then becomes self-reinforcing, because as the best 
customers get the best service, their switching costs lead them to play more at Harrah’s.  The 
additional gaming transactions are captured in the database, allowing Harrah’s to develop deeper 
insights into both that customer and the likelihood customers with similar profiles would 
generate similar value to the firm.  This additional insight allows for greater service 
differentiation, which again increases customer switching costs and loyalty to Harrah’s 
Entertainment.  Because the system is based on scalable information technology, Harrah’s is able 
to do this simultaneously for hundreds of thousands of customers each day at each property. 
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The Harrah’s model of scale and differentiation in services is summarized in the figure 
below.  As visible from the figure, the use of information technology allows the company to 
develop the dynamics of scale economies vis-à-vis customer value calculations and the 
determination of differentiation criteria, which in turn enables differentiated service delivery 
among masses of like-appearing customers. 
 
Figure 21: Scale and Differentiation at Harrah’s Entertainment 
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 Further, the recently announced buyout of Harrah’s Entertainment by private equity firms 
Texas Pacific Group and Apollo Management is unlikely to change this strategy. On December 
20, 2006, the day upon which the company formally accepted the offer, Gary Loveman 
announced that  
 
The privatization of Harrah’s will really not result in any changes 
in our strategy.  Indeed, I think our purchasers were taken with our 
strategy, pleased with the strategic alternatives made possible by 
the brands, the real estate position we have, and the Total Rewards 
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system and other aspects of our strategy.  So we’ll be continuing to 
pursue our strategy much as we have in the past.  This transaction 
that announced today is a change in ownership that is really not a 
change in direction at all, and I don’t think our customers or the 
vast majority of our employees will see any difference in what 
we’ve been working on to ensure great service for our guest and 
great careers and great experiences for our employees.108 
 
This sentiment was further confirmed by Charles Atwood, Vice Chairman of the Harrah’s Board 
of Directors, that same day when he indicated the strategy of focusing on customer experiences 
was unlikely to be affected.: 
 
For customers, I think this transaction is not going to mean a 
thing. They’re going to keep getting that great experience they get 
everyday at Harrah’s; and for our employees, they’re going to 
continue to provide that very special customer service experience 
that keeps those customers coming back over and over again.109 
 
 
The Three Key Ingredients of Scalable Service Differentiation 
 
The figure above demonstrates in detail how the Harrah’s service strategy took hold to 
generate a system of increasing returns to the customer relationship.  The strategy was based 
upon three primary ingredients, which seem pertinent to virtually every consumer services firm.  
The first ingredient was a mechanism through which specific customer transaction data could be 
tied to and associated with specific customers.   The second key element was an analytic engine 
                                                 
108 Gary Loveman, Chairman of the Harrah’s Entertainment Board of Directors, in the company’s video press 
release dated December 20, 2006. 
109 Charles Atwood, Vice Chairman of the Harrah’s Entertainment Board of Directors, in the company’s video press 
release dated December 20, 2006. 
that enabled the utilization of customer-specific transaction data to generate customer-specific 
value / worth metrics.  Finally, the third component was a set of delivery tools that enabled 
consistent and differentiated service delivery to customers based on the criteria / value 
determined by the analytic engine.  Underlying these three key ingredients was an information 
technology capability that powered the whole scalable service differentiation strategy.  The 
figure below summarizes the general scalable service differentiation approach. 
 
Figure 22: The Scalable Service Differentiation Strategy Model 
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Loyalty Program 
 
The first element of the general model for scalable service differentiation is a mechanism 
through which to link specific customer transaction data with specific customers.  In Harrah’s 
case, the company used its Total Rewards loyalty program as the means through which to link 
that data.  Although the most traditional manner in which to connect customer and transaction 
data is via a loyalty or frequent-buyer program, the linkage need not be based on some form of 
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“accrued rewards” to the customer.   For instance, companies such as Amazon.com use simple 
customer accounts to accomplish this same objective. 
The fundamental objective of this first ingredient should be the linkage of all customer 
transactions, selections, and revealed preferences with specific customers.  Note that the 
linkage of transaction data with customers is a relatively recent phenomenon within services.  
Consider two of the leading loyalty programs in the world: the American Airlines AAdvantage 
program and Harrah’s Total Rewards.  AAdvantage, the first frequent flyer program in the 
world, began in the early 1980s.  Total Rewards, the first casino loyalty program, began in the 
mid 1990s.  Despite the progress of these two pioneering loyalty programs, even they have fully 
achieved their potential.  Much remains to be done by way of liking the transaction and customer 
data.  For example, American Airlines does not currently know which customers order which 
drinks on which flights.  Nor do they monitor which customers fly with what types of bags.   Nor 
do they understand the preferences of outbound customers and how they may vary from inbound 
customers.  In much the same way that Harrah’s is expanding its data capture network to include 
non-gaming transaction data and more granular data on table games (see above), additional data 
capture and linkage opportunities abound at American Airlines. 
Analytic Engine 
 
Once customer transaction data is captured and linked to specific customers, an analytic 
engine is needed to extract insight from the data.  The analytic engine has one primary 
objective: using a set of predetermined criteria to rank, segment, and organize customers by 
their “worth” and/or “value to the firm.”  Harrah’s and other leading service companies have 
historically utilized the “tier” or “status” concept to differentiate between different value 
customers: at Harrah’s, the very best customers were tiered at the Seven Stars level, while the 
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next best customers were granted “Diamond” status, while the following tier was “Platinum,” 
and then gold.  Likewise, American Airlines has Executive Platinum, Platinum, and Gold status 
for its very best, next best, and good customers, respectively.   
Given the objective is to develop a prioritization of customers from highest-value to 
lowest-value, tiering is not a necessary procedure.  While it seems a bit extreme, and perhaps 
even inefficient to do so, there is no reason why customers cannot be given a particular rank 
through which customer rank #1 is always given better service than customer rank #2, who 
always receives better service than customer rank #3, etc.  Though it might seem difficult to 
manage such finely tuned differentiation among millions of customers simultaneously, but 
imagine how easy such a task might be with the Slot Service Dispatch System described above. 
Rather than treating all members of a particular tier as equivalent, the system could abandon the 
tier system and just utilize individual customer ranks.110   
Likewise, is it possible for American Airlines also to rank customers based on their worth 
to the company?  Sure.  There is no reason that upgrades should be disbursed on a first-come-
first-served basis within a particular tier.  The highest value customer should get the upgrade, 
period.  Such a prioritization system likely already exists. 
 
Delivery Tools  
 
Once a company is able to capture customer transaction data, link it to specific 
customers, and then run the data through an analytic engine to compute a differentiation criteria 
(more likely than not to be customer worth or value to the firm), delivery tools are needed to 
ensure consistent service differentiation that scales to meet simultaneous performance across 
thousands of customer touch-points and with millions of consumers.  The Slot Service Dispatch 
                                                 
110 This is not to suggest that the tier system should itself be abolished as the step-function nature of the tiers results 
in an effective aspirational element to the loyalty program which has quite significant benefits to the company. 
System and the Operational CRM tools currently deployed at Harrah’s Entertainment and 
described above are perfect examples of delivery tools that help manage consistent differentiated 
service delivery via automated prioritization.  Through extensive information technology, the 
delivery tools partially remove the employee mindset in creating unique customer experiences. 
The underlying objective of the delivery tools is to ensure that service is consistently 
differentiated for all of a company’s customers based upon the customer ranking which 
emerges from the analytic engine.  If the delivery tools were not part of the system, it is unlikely 
that the strategy would be anything more than service differentiation – meaning that it would 
lack the scalability which has proven to be so rarely in the company of differentiation.   
Application of the Strategy in Other Industries 
 
This section of the conclusion discusses how a strategy of scalable service differentiation 
can be applied to other service industries.  In particular, it highlights how one can generalize 
from Harrah’s successful application of the strategy to other contexts, with descriptions of how 
other service companies might generate consumer switching costs via effective use of reciprocal 
history (i.e. customer transaction data).  The applications of the scalable service differentiation 
approach to three other service industries are explored below: (1) transportation services, (2) 
retail services, and (3) communication services.  For each of these industries, I suggest possible 
applications of the scalable service differentiation strategy and evaluate the status of the three 
key ingredients to the strategy. 
Scale and Differentiation in Transportation Services: Airlines 
 
Is it possible to apply the lessons of the scalable service differentiation strategy to the air 
transportation industry?  Perhaps.  This section of the chapter will investigate how airlines might 
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utilize information technology and their existing stores of customer data (reciprocal history) to 
intensify consumer switching costs and enhance customer loyalty.  
Airlines are already well on their way towards the scalable service differentiation 
strategy.  Most have loyalty programs that capture data on which customers are flying which 
routes, how much they are paying for their seats, and knowledge of how those prices paid 
compare with the average fares for those routes.  Airlines have already begun tiering their 
customers into various “status” categories as well.  Finally airlines have also taken an analytic 
approach to marketing, often offering customized promotions to members of each tier. 
What airlines have failed to do, however, is to dramatically alter the experience of air 
transportation to generate increased consumer switching costs.  Consider American Airlines, 
currently the world’s largest airline company.  The airline was a true pioneer in the loyalty 
management field as it was the first firm to offer frequent flyer miles via its “AAdvantage” 
program which began in 1981.111  American also went on to pioneer tiering of its customers and 
began to differentiate offers (and in some cases, services112) based on those tiers.   
The AAdvantage program currently has four tiers – general members, Gold, Platinum, 
and Executive Platinum.113  Qualification is based upon actual travel on American Airlines or 
upon a selection of American’s partner airlines.  Members can achieve tier membership in one of 
two ways: (a) through the accumulation of actual miles earned, or (b) through Aadvantage 
“points,” a method American uses to facilitate status for high-fare paying customers.   
Discounted fares generally earn 0.5 points per mile of air travel, normal fares earn 1.0 point per 
                                                 
111 http://www.aa.com/content/amrcorp/corporateInformation/facts/history.jhtml (accessed on December 17, 2006). 
112 The manner in which American began to differentiate the actual service has to do with its use of unused First 
Class inventory, which was given to American’s best customers, thereby giving a better service experience to its 
better customers. 
113 All of the information about American Airlines and the company’s AAdvantage program were sourced from the 
AAdvantage section of www.aa.com located at http://www.aa.com/content/AAdvantage/programDetails/main.jhtml.  
mile, and premium fares earn 1.5 points.  Thus, a 2,000 mile trip will earn an AAdvantage 
member 2,000 miles and somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000 points.  Members retain separate 
accounts for their points and miles, and tier membership is based upon crossing certain 
thresholds.  A customer obtaining 25,000 points or miles in any calendar year would result in 
Gold status.  50,000 points or miles earns that customer Platinum status, and 100,000 points or 
miles equates to Executive Platinum status. 
Benefits afforded to members include complimentary upgrades on certain fare tickets, 
selected lounge access, and priority customer support telephone numbers.  These benefits are 
differentiated by tier, with Executive Platinum services exceeding Platinum benefits, which are 
better than Gold benefits, etc.   For instance, upgrades—regardless of whether they are 
complimentary or purchased—are awarded (dependent upon seat availability) to Executive 
Platinum members 100 hours prior to departure, to Platinum members 72 hours prior to 
departure, and to Gold members 24 hours prior to departure.  General members do not qualify for 
upgrades. 
Thus, although there is a degree of scalable service differentiation already present 
through upgrade benefit tiering, the possibilities for further service differentiation at American 
Airlines are enormous.  In the interest of space, I only suggest one possibility here, an 
application for the airline that can be best understood as an analogy with the slot service dispatch 
system.  Such a “Ground Operations Prioritization System” would rely heavily on the company’s 
data analytic capabilities as well as the ability to dynamically re-orient ground operations at an 
airport based on the aggregated customer value on a particular plane. 
Just as Harrah’s employees found themselves running from “candle to candle” in a 
haphazard, unstructured, and random somewhat “first come, first served” manner, so too do most 
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airlines currently allocate runway and gate slots in a “first come, first served” manner that does 
not distinguish between customer values.  Given one of the most common complaints about 
airline service has to do with unintended, non-weather delays (runway traffic, gate availability, 
etc.) that affect the punctuality of the travel experience, differentiating gate and runway slots 
based on the aggregate value of the customers on a plane would be an interesting way of 
reducing the likelihood of delays for the airline’s best customers.  The analogy to Harrah’s is 
clear: systems should work diligently on making sure your best customers are insulated as much 
as possible from “luck-busting” events. 
American Airlines already has data on its most valuable customers and has the ability to 
value customer worth.  Thus, it is possible to calculate the aggregate customer value of a plane.  
A plane with 10 Executive Platinum members, 25 Platinum members and 22 Gold members 
should clearly be given priority (on the margin) over a plane with 3 Executive Platinum and 10 
Gold members.  While the example provided is clear, exact differentiation strategies – based on 
the relative values of tiers – will determine how murkier situations can be handled.114   
Over time and in aggregate, however, such gate and runway prioritization would result in 
American Airlines’ best customers receiving the best service.  They would therefore find that 
their switching costs would be higher as competitor planes would leave them subject to the 
vagaries of airport delays and random plane and gate prioritization.  The net result would be a 
scalable service differentiation strategy that generates more loyal customers, higher than average 
industry profitability, and an increased likelihood of sustaining that advantage over some period 
of time into the future.  The figure below summarizes the various strategic approaches via the 
now familiar scalability-differentiation framework. 
                                                 
114 Further optimization will also need to take place given the complexities of airport traffic patterns, distances to 
runways, location and availability of ground operations personnel, the number (and importance) of connecting 
customers on board each of the planes, etc.  All of this implies the problem is complex, but still solvable. 
Figure 23: Scale and Differentiation in Airlines 
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To implement this strategy of automated and differentiated dispatch, American Airlines 
would need (a) a system that links specific transaction history to particular individuals, (b) an IT 
engine that allows American to determine the basis of differentiation (i.e. determine customer 
worth), and (c) an information technology tool that allows the company to consistently 
differentiate service delivery.   
American already has successfully linked individual customers to specific transactions 
via its pioneering AAdvantage program.  Further, the airline has already begun to calculate 
customer worth by distinguishing between the value of miles using the parallel “points” system 
to tier customers according to their value to the firm.  The key IT capability that American would 
need to develop in order to implement the scalable service differentiation strategy suggested 
above is an IT tool to automate the ground operations in a consistently differentiated manner. 
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Scale and Differentiation in Retail Services: Online Commerce 
 
The retail industry is an extraordinarily interesting service – although consumers do in 
fact depart from a retail experience with a tangible product, the actual service being rendered is 
the selection, presentation, and facilitation of a purchase of a manufacturer’s product.  Thus, the 
“product” is simply a pass-through and the retailer is providing a service of interfacing with 
customers.  What can the current research tell us about retailers and their ability to both 
differentiate their service as well as do it in a scalable manner? 
In the land of online commerce, Amazon provides an example of a company not 
dissimilar to Harrah’s in its focus on the customer experience and its heavy emphasis on a 
differentiated (yet scalable) service.115  Its use of information technology is obvious, but the 
engines behind the service exemplify the use of automated service differentiation.  In fact, CEO 
Jeff Bezos noted in his 2003 letter to shareholders that “the customer experience we create is by 
far the most important driver of our business.” To truly understand the impact of the Amazon 
innovation on retailing, consider the predecessors to Amazon’s initial retail focus – books.   
In the traditional, bricks-and-mortar environment, books were sold by two extremes of 
retailers – the small, boutique bookstore or the large national chain.  The competitive battle 
between these two extremes was highlighted in the movie You’ve Got Mail, in which Tom Hanks 
represents a large, low-cost bookstore chain that was competing with Meg Ryan’s boutique 
bookstore, which focused on personalized service.  The trade-off is clear: either the book retailer 
is focused on scale and uses such benefits to compete on price, or the books are “full-priced” but 
accompanied with personalized recommendations and staff that remember your name.   
                                                 
115 Amazon’s focus on the customer experience is present in numerous trade articles and secondary-source reports, 
but perhaps the best articulation of the strategy is found in a 2003 letter from Jeff Bezos, Founder, Chairman, and 
Chief Executive Officer of the company, to shareholders.  The letter is available at http://media.corporate-
ir.net/media_files/irol/97/97664/reports/2003_%20Shareholder_%20Letter041304.pdf  
Amazon.com, however, has managed to create a retail experience that is both 
personalized and scalable (Saunders, 2001; Spector, 2002).  Through effective use of information 
technology and customer accounts, Amazon has managed to develop reciprocal history with its 
customers – meaning that the company knows what types of books you have purchased, to whom 
and where they were shipped, the type of shipping service you historically choose, or whether 
you have purchased non-book items from the store, etc.   
This reciprocal history is then utilized to generate personalized service which increases 
customer switching costs.   This differentiated and personalized service is delivered in numerous 
ways.  Because the company is operating in the virtual world, it can present a different storefront 
to returning customers than to new customers.  As the IT system gets to know a customer’s 
tastes, it can provide recommendations of books that may also be of interest to you or are 
correlated with the purchases of folks who also purchased books similar to those you’ve 
purchased (i.e. we see you purchased five books on British history during WWII, you might want 
to consider this other book which is also about WWII, which other customers who purchased the 
book you purchased found interesting).  Amazon can also remind you to purchase a birthday gift 
for your sister (on the one year anniversary of your prior purchase of a gift for her which you had 
gift wrapped and sent to her address).  Further, Amazon will tell you what others who viewed a 
particular book looked at next or what they ended up purchasing.  Recommendations and 
reminders such as these are typical of the Meg Ryan small-town book shop with personalized 
service.  One would not find such service at a physical Barnes & Noble store. 
Combined with the fact that the whole system is an interactive, virtual store powered by 
information technologies that can handle millions of concurrent users, the Amazon.com store 
becomes an excellent example of how scale and differentiation can co-exist in a service business 
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model.  Thus, the net impact of this reciprocal history-driven consumer switching cost is that it is 
costly for a loyal Amazon customer to shop for books elsewhere.  Going to other online 
booksellers will not generate appropriate (if any) recommendations, will not result in friendly 
reminders of important gift-giving dates, and will effectively result in a “restart” of the 
producer’s knowledge and understanding of the consumer – resulting in a lesser quality service 
experience than previously enjoyed.  Hence, the consumer does himself personal harm by 
switching to another service provider. 
Fundamentally, however, Amazon.com has not utilized its customer knowledge and 
information technology as effectively as Harrah’s.  To do so would involve service 
differentiation by customer worth.  Is it possible for Amazon to understand customer-level 
profitability?  I think so.  Is it possible for Amazon to bucket these consumers into various tiers 
of profitability to the firm?  Absolutely.  Is it possible for Amazon to then treat each customer 
differently, based on the customer’s value to Amazon?  Certainly. 
One possible scenario is a world in which the discount received on books depends on 
your “status” with Amazon.  Thus, in a manner not dissimilar to Total Rewards or AAdvantage, 
Amazon could begin a running tally of a metric linked to customer profitability.  As customers 
passed certain thresholds, they would rise through various tiers.  Amazon could then use those 
tier rankings to differentiate upon the order in which the latest Harry Potter book was shipped to 
customers, or upon the price (or pace) of shipping, or upon the price paid for the book.  By 
providing its best customers with the best selection of books, delivered in the most efficient 
manner possible, and at the best possible price, Amazon would effectively be creating larger 
switching costs upon its best customers.  Such a strategy would likely result in more loyalty from 
the company’s best customers and therefore higher than industry average profitability. 
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Figure 24: Scale & Differentiation in Online Commerce 
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To implement this strategy of automated differentiation based on customer worth, 
Amazon would need (a) a system that linked specific transaction history to particular individuals, 
(b) an IT engine that allows it to determine the basis of differentiation (i.e. determine customer 
worth), and (c) an information technology tool that allowed the company to consistently 
differentiate service delivery.   
The linkage of specific transaction to specific customers is inherent in the Amazon 
“account” system whereby customers must sign in before making a purchase.  Further, Amazon 
already has the tools to distinguish the service based on a particular customer.116  What Amazon 
would need, however, is an analytic engine that automates customer worth calculation and sets 
the criteria for differentiation.  Developing this IT capability is unlikely to be a difficult task as 
the company already has transaction level detail for each customer account. 
                                                 
116 For instance, when I log into Amazon.com, I am presented with a virtual storefront which highlights business and 
military history books.  When my wife logs into Amazon.com, she is presented with a different storefront which 
highlights novels and social policy / political books. 
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Scale and Differentiation in Communication Services: Cable Companies 
 
 Most network businesses are inherently scalable business models: as high, fixed costs 
(i.e. the cost of building out the network) are spread across an increasing number of customers 
(i.e. scale), the cost on a per-customer basis falls, resulting in rising profitability and economies 
of scale.  In traditional economic terms, the marginal cost per incremental customer (i.e. the 
variable cost) is very low relative to the total cost (i.e. the fixed plus the variable costs).  Thus, 
the inherent scalability of a network business is dependent upon low variable costs; given that 
customization costs are largely variable (i.e. borne for each customer), differentiated offerings 
are by nature not scalable.  In short, it seems incompatible to have both a scalable business that is 
also customized to consumers. 
The cable television business is a typical network business: it is inherently scalable and 
possesses increasing returns to scale.  Although minor variations such as channel packages exist, 
the actual service is effectively standardized.  Recent innovations in network technologies, 
however, are enabling the application of data analytics on customer behavior, thereby allowing 
for a strategy of scalable service differentiation.  Let us first consider the new cable television 
services enabled by technological advancements. 
The digitization phenomenon that has struck virtually every previously analog business 
created the opportunity for cable television companies such as Time Warner to reinvent 
themselves as broadly diversified communications services companies.117  In addition to the 
traditional one-way signal transmission capabilities (i.e. the ability to send a television signal 
over the cable to a home), these same companies are now able to offer numerous two-way 
                                                 
117 For more detailed information about Time Warner and their broad suite of services, visit 
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/2006_Profile/# for a complete corporate profile which highlights the company’s 
business units and extensive menu of offerings. 
Mansharamani  Page 278 
communications services such as broadband internet access, on-demand movies, and VOIP118 
telephony services.  The development of such two-way communications services over the cable 
network has created enormous opportunities for cable companies (Lewis, 2001).  In addition to 
the simple ability to offer new services, these new capabilities allow for service differentiation in 
an already, and inherently, scalable network business.   
Consider the “movies on demand” service that is now offered by cable companies.  This 
development allowed the formerly one-way cable companies to interact with customers within a 
standardized framework.  Customers no longer needed to visit a movie-rental store such as 
Blockbuster or Movie Gallery in order to enjoy a movie of their choice in the comfort of their 
own home.  Rather, they could now browse a selection of movies (including previews), purchase 
and view a movie with the same functionality119 of a DVD or VHS tape, and “return” the movie 
without ever leaving their couch (Haddad, 2000).  To date, companies such as Time Warner and 
Comcast have enjoyed tremendous success in offering such on-demand capabilities. 
 Innovators from outside the industry, however, have viewed this success with envy and 
have recently developed capabilities to compete with these on-demand services.  New business 
models have emerged and begun to threaten the profitability of this business.  Unique movie-
rental distribution models such as the subscription service offered by NetFlix are gaining share 
by offering the flexibility of traditional movie media.120  Online downloadable movie companies 
such as Vongo are also offering competing “on-demand” movie services that do not require 
access to the cable network.121  How can traditional cable television companies such as Time 
                                                 
118 VOIP = Voice over Internet Protocol.  VOIP is a digitized version of traditional phone service that enables voice 
to be segmented into digital “packets” which are transmitted via the internet and re-assembled into voice at the 
destination.  For more information, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VoIP.  
119 Functionality includes capabilities such as pausing, stopping, fast forwarding, and rewinding the movie. 
120 For more information on Netflix, see http://www.netflix.com.  
121 For more information on Vongo, see http://www.vongo.com.  
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Warner and Comcast compete in this increasingly competitive environment?  Can they utilize the 
scalable service differentiation strategy to develop a more durable edge over their competitors?   
 The Harrah’s strategy of scalable service differentiation demonstrated how it was 
possible to utilize customer transaction data to determine criteria upon which to differentiate the 
offered service.  Through the use of data analytics and information technology, the service could 
then be delivered in a way that generated the best service for the best customers.  Just as 
Harrah’s did this on their casino floor, so too could Time Warner do this for its on-demand 
customers.   Time Warner already knows which customers are using its on-demand services, 
when those customers are using the service, the actual movies that they are watching, and how 
frequently they are using it.122  Thus, Time Warner has the data to determine customer worth for 
its on-demand consumers and can redesign its strategy around the delivery of differentiated 
service. 
 Just as Amazon provides a service that replicates the small, boutique bookstore that 
knows its customers and provides personalized suggestions, so too could Time Warner blend the 
best of the local movie-rental store (with suggestions, differentiated options, personalized 
service, etc.) and the scale and consistency of a large cable network.  Currently, all movies are 
rented for a period of 24 hours, after which they must be repurchased for continued use.  Could 
Time Warner offer its best customers a 28 hour window?  Given the high-prevalence of evening 
movie-watching, this would effectively equate to 2 nights of the movie, something that 
customers might value.   
The company could also offer a differentiated suite of movie-options.  Movie studios 
already provide movie releases to hotels and airlines earlier than to the DVD, VHS, and at-home 
based on-demand service markets.  Time Warner could negotiate with movie studios for the 
                                                 
122 If for no other use, Time Warner necessarily tracks this information for billing purposes. 
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early release of new movies (Lowry, Grover, & Forest, 2003) to on-demand services and offer 
that service only to targeted customers.  For example, the company knows which customers have 
watched every Harry Potter movie within 24 hours of the movies’ releases via the on-demand 
service.  Could the company then offer an “early release viewing” (at a premium price) of the 
next Harry Potter movie to these customers?  
Time Warner might also have knowledge of purchasing patterns and utilize that to offer 
personalized suggestions.  If 85% of customers who rented Harry Potter also rented Lord of the 
Rings, the remaining 15% might appreciate the “personalized” suggestion to also watch the 
movie.  Such recommendations based on customer purchasing patterns can be particularly useful 
with respect to new releases.  Likewise, if a customer has never rented a horror movie, they are 
unlikely to do so in the future.123  Time Warner could take this insight and not display previews 
of horror movies on its on-demand preview channel but rather require the customer to seek out 
the horror movie in order to rent it.  Such differentiated presentation would be comparable to the 
dynamic virtual storefront offered by Amazon.  
By providing such differentiated service, Time Warner might be able to generate 
reciprocal history (i.e. learn preferences and tastes) with its customers.  This reciprocal history 
can then be translated into higher consumer switching costs – as the consumer would have to 
teach Netflix or Vongo about his or her preferences in order to receive similarly “personalized” 
service.  The end result of this differentiated service would be a stickier customer, the 
development of a more durable (and constantly strengthening) competitive advantage, and a high 
probability of greater profitability for Time Warner. 
 
 
                                                 
123 This would more likely be true if the customer is an avid on-demand movie watcher and has thousands of 
transactions, none of which were for horror movies.   
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Figure 25: Scale and Differentiation in Communication Services 
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Implementing a scalable service differentiation strategy at Time Warner would not be 
particularly difficult, given the company already possesses two of the three key ingredients of the 
strategy: (a) each address is already identified in the company’s system and keeps track of all on-
demand viewing history for billing purposes, thereby linking specific transactions with specific 
customers124, and (b) the targeted advertising capabilities that Time Warner is already 
implementing enable differentiated service delivery (Kiley, 2005). The company would only 
need to develop an analytic algorithm to generate a basis upon which to differentiate across 
customers.  Such an engine would require the company to determine customer worth (or some 
other criteria for differential treatment) and could be based upon usage patterns125 or frequency 
of video “renting.” 
                                                 
124 One complication that will need to be addressed is the use of multiple different customers at a common address. 
125 For instance, a customer who rents consistently between the hours of 2pm and 5pm on weekdays may prove to be 
more valuable than a customer who rents between 8pm and 10pm on weekends due to demand patterns, etc. 
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Summary: Scale and Differentiation in Service 
 
The model presented here was developed through inductive strategy and innovation 
research at Harrah’s Entertainment, but by no means is the scalable service differentiation 
strategy applicable only to other casino companies or other entertainment companies.  The three 
key ingredients described above are available to virtually any service company, and as described 
in the previous chapter, the application of the strategy to other industries seems eminently 
doable.  The strategy has the ability to lessen the intensity of the profit-dissipating forces 
affecting most standardized offerings. 
Entrepreneurs should recognize the power of this strategy in competing against well-
entrenched and capitalized incumbents, and managers of all levels should notice that the 
Harrah’s case described above demonstrates that information technology can be powerfully 
applied to generate substantial competitive differentiators and superior returns on capital.  
Finally, the fact that a casino entertainment services company was able to deliver a scalable and 
differentiated offering—seemingly impossible126 with products—necessitates that academics re-
evaluate “accepted” conclusions through a “product vs. service” lens. 
Although the strategy is heavily based on IT-powered data gathering and analytics, it is 
equally based on the differentiated service delivery that generates the switching costs.  Further, 
the strategy is a holistic system, suggesting that a service-oriented culture focused on 
measurement may support and encourage the development of the switching costs.   Pieces of the 
system are unlikely to prove particularly effective.  At the very least, it seems that firms 
employing a strategy of scalable service differentiation are likely to have, in a very Harrah’s-
esque manner, the odds stacked in their favor.
                                                 
126 Mass customization of products is the closest approximation of scalable differentiation in products; as discussed 
above, however, such mass customization is really only “menu-driven” configuration. 
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Appendix  
Methodology Overview 
 
The following pages provide a detailed discussion of the various methodological matters 
that arose during this research.  While the section is not intended to serve as a primer on case 
study methodology, it does articulate why the case method was selected for this study, how the 
study was designed, and how the sources of data were gathered. 
Research Strategy: The Case Study Method 
 
For the reasons cited above—primarily relating to the current state of theory with respect 
to service innovation and new service development—the research approach taken in this 
dissertation is the case study method.  Much of academia continues to think of case-based 
research as a lower-quality, less-rigorous approach to investigating empirical phenomena.  This 
view, which persists in many academic circles, is best captured by Robert Yin in the preface to 
his definitive guide to case study research methodology, Case Study Research Design and 
Methods: 
 
The case study has long been stereotyped as a weak sibling among 
social science methods.  Investigators who do case studies are 
regarded as having deviated from their academic disciplines, their 
investigations as having insufficient precision (that is, 
quantification), objectivity, and rigor (Yin, 1984). 
 
Despite this stereotype, Yin continues, case study research continues to persist in many domains 
of social science academia as a prevalent research strategy.  He goes on to suggest two 
conventional explanations for why this paradox exists: (1) some researchers are not trained to use 
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alternative methods and as such, cases are their default research approach; (2) the dependence on 
US federal funding for research—and the corresponding “bureaucratically hazardous clearance 
procedures”—have made case research the preferred approach. Yin then proposes a third 
explanation: the “stereotype of the case study method may be wrong”(Yin, 1984). 
The stereotype may be wrong, notes Yin, because the case study is a unique research 
strategy that is optimal in certain circumstances.  Unlike experiments, surveys, histories, and 
quantitative analysis of archival statistics, “case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when 
the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 1984).  This is 
not the case with all research questions.  There are times when other research strategies are more 
appropriate.  Yin provides an overview of the various research strategies and the contingent 
nature of their appropriateness: 
 
Table 30: Research Strategy Approaches 
 
 
Strategy 
 
Research Question 
Requires Control 
over Behavioral 
Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment 
 
How, Why Yes Yes 
Survey Who, What, Where, How 
Many, How Much 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis Who, What, Where, How 
Many, How Much 
No Yes/No 
History 
 
How, Why No No 
Case Study 
 
How, Why No Yes 
Source: Yin (1984) 
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Although the table above developed by Yin (1984) supports the logic for selecting the 
case study method to attack the research question posed above, the primary driving consideration 
which ultimately motivated me to pursue a case-based research strategy was the current state of 
our understanding.  Thus, I would also add a fourth “criteria” column called “Degree of 
Theoretical Maturity.”  All strategies other than the Case Study would require “mid” to “high” 
theoretical maturity.  The Case Study strategy would be agnostic on the degree of theoretical 
maturity. 
 Given this set of criteria, it quickly becomes evident that the best way to attack the topic 
of interest is to utilize the case study method.  The phenomenon being studied and the question 
being asked (i.e. What is the process of creating a service offering that is both scalable and 
differentiated?) fit the criteria listed in the table above (as well as my additional column) fairly 
well.  The question is about “how” a process happens, the topic is contemporary and hasn’t yet 
been studied, it does not require control over the events, and finally, the theory is not particularly 
mature.  The literature review demonstrated that we are currently in the early stages of building a 
service-specific innovation theory.  We are in what Christensen and other innovation scholars 
have labeled the “descriptive stage” of theory building (Christensen, 2006; Christensen et al., 
2003) – a stage requiring careful description of a phenomenon and how it happens.  Other terms 
have arisen to describe the measure I am labeling “degree of theoretical maturity,” including 
what some would call “nascent theory” or “suggestive models” (Edmondson & McManus, 
2004).  Regardless of the terminology, scholars tend to agree that theoretical maturity is an 
important element of considering how most effectively to contribute to a field of study. 
 Further, given the objective of this research to generate (rather than test) a theory about 
service innovation and service firm strategy, an inductive approach in which detailed data 
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acquired via a case study serves as the basis upon which a preliminary theory can be formulated 
seems appropriate.  The overall strategy was to approach the research without any prior 
suppositions or bias that might have influenced the data gathering, the data analysis, or the 
interpretation/findings. 
The Research Design: Single Case, Multiple Units of Analysis 
 
Yin suggests that there are four primary types of research designs within the case study 
approach.  These four designs are based on a 2x2 matrix with the two dimensions of (a) number 
of cases and (b) number of units of analysis.  The figure below summarizes Yin’s articulation of 
the various case study strategy research designs. 
 
Figure 26: Case Study Research Designs 
 
Holistic
(single unit 
of analysis)
Embedded
(multiple units 
of analysis)
Single Case 
Designs
Multiple Case 
Designs
Context
Context
Case
Case
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #1
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #2
Context Context
ContextContext
Case Case
CaseCase
Context Context
ContextContext
Case Case
CaseCase
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #1
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #2
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #1
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #2
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #1
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #2
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #1
Embedded Unit 
of Analysis #2
 
 
Source: Yin (1984); Diagram originally sourced to COSMOS Corporation; Diagram above found in 3rd Edition. 
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The research design I chose to utilize in this project was a Multiple Case Embedded 
Design (“Type 4” in the Yin (1984) nomenclature).  In selecting this research design, two 
primary decisions were contemplated: (1) single vs. multiple cases, with a service company 
serving as a “case,” and (2) within the case(s), whether there would be one or multiple service 
innovations that would be studied.  The figure below summarizes the research design employed 
in this dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 27: Multiple Case, Embedded Research Design  
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Despite this research design, the dissertation placed a disproportionate emphasis upon 
one case – Harrah’s Entertainment.  Thus, one might argue that the dissertation is effectively a 
single case, embedded research design.   Yin highlights five primary rationales for a single case 
design.  The first, labeled by Yin as a “critical” case, is effectively a theory testing rationale.  To 
justify this rationale, “the theory has specific and clear set of propositions as well as the 
circumstances within which the propositions are believed to be true…The single case can then be 
used to determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of 
explanations might be more relevant” (Yin, 1984).  The second rationale is labeled as an 
“extreme” or “unique” case.  The rationale here should be obvious from the label; nevertheless, it 
is based on the desire to understand a rare or uncommon case and to seek any insights such a 
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case may have on our understanding of non-unique cases.  The third rationale for a single case 
study is to evaluate a “typical” or “representative” case in which the “objective is to capture the 
circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation” (Yin, 1984).  The goal 
of the representative case is to provide lessons that are broadly applicable and informative.   
The fourth rationale described by Yin is to conduct a “revelatory” single case study.  Yin 
notes that “this situation exists when an investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyze a 
phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation”(Yin, 1984).  The fifth and final 
rationale, notes Yin, is the “longitudinal” case in which the investigator conducts two single case 
studies at different points in time.  Given that little field and case-based research has been 
conducted regarding service innovation, Harrah’s Entertainment can be classified as a 
“revelatory” case, one in which I had the opportunity “to observe and analyze phenomenon 
previously inaccessible…”(Yin, 1984). 
Case Selection: Harrah’s Entertainment 
 
Case selection—particularly when emphasizing one case—is absolutely crucial to a 
researcher’s ability to generalize findings to other contexts.  As such, extraordinary care and 
consideration went into the process of selecting the appropriate case.  Heavily-weighted criteria 
utilized in selecting the case included (a) the depth/quality of access at the company, (b) the 
company’s success at developing new services that were both scalable and differentiated, and (c) 
the “uniqueness” of the company (i.e. has it been studied in great depth already?).  Other 
considerations included the location of the company’s management, the company’s size and 
prominence, the company’s industry, etc. 
 The other cases that serve as comparisons – The Apollo Group and United Parcel Service 
– were selected because they were particularly innovative companies operating in large service 
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sectors of the economy and were willing to participate.  Other cases which were considered but, 
for various reasons, were later eliminated included Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, 
British Airways, Ritz Carlton, Comcast, American Express, Fidelity, Dell, Merrill Lynch, 
Amazon.com, Federal Express, Onstar, British Telecom, and Verizon.   
Given the desire for an in-depth study that required significant attention from senior 
managers and the company, securing deep access was critical in the selection process.  While 
most companies were willing to grant basic access to managers for interviews, few were willing 
to share internal documents and performance data.  UPS, a member of the MIT Center for Digital 
Business, had expressed an interest in participating in research projects at MIT and therefore 
granted me access to managers and some documents.  Harrah’s – perhaps because it is run by 
former Harvard Business School Professor Gary Loveman – also granted me access and 
provided mountains of internal and external presentations.  From my previous life as a venture 
capitalist investing in the for-profit education sector, I had gotten to know the senior 
management of the Apollo Group and had learned about their strategies.  Nevertheless, most of 
the Apollo case is based upon publicly-available data. 
Fundamentally, however, one of the primary reasons I chose Harrah’s Entertainment as a 
case to study was managerial access.  The depth and breadth of access to senior managers was 
fabulous, the commitment of senior management to participation in the project was substantial, 
and the company has not been extensively studied by the business academic community.  I had 
managed to gain the support of an internal champion—Chief Information Officer Tim Stanley—
who facilitated internal introductions and shared data and presentation materials about the 
company’s service development efforts.  Several other senior managers were particularly helpful 
and authorized their direct reports to spend some time speaking with me about the various 
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service development projects in which I grew interested.  Ultimately, the depth and quality of 
access to data and management time alone justified the selection of Harrah’s Entertainment as 
the sole revelatory case for this study. 
While financial markets are notoriously fickle and stock price performance is confounded 
by a multitude of factors, the stock price chart above tells a dramatic story of Harrah’s 
performance.  Not only has the company dramatically outperformed other leading entertainment 
companies (i.e. Disney), it has also outperformed the general market (US S&P 500) by a large 
and substantial margin.  $1.00 invested in Harrah’s stock at the beginning of the year 2000 was 
worth over $3.28 on December 21, 2006 (vs. $1.16 for Disney and $0.97 for the S&P 500).   
 
Graph 17: Harrah’s Entertainment Comparative Stock Price Performance 
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Data and Information Sources 
 
This research is based upon information acquired from ten main sources: (1) formal 
interviews with managers involved in the service development process at Harrah’s using a semi-
structured interview guide, (2) informal discussions with Harrah’s executives about new 
services, (3) presentations made by various senior executives to public forums, (4) interviews of 
senior Harrah’s executives by third party sources, (5) follow-up conversations with interviewees 
after all interviews were completed, (6) Gary Loveman’s speeches and articles, (7) internal 
presentations and speeches about service development projects at Harrah’s, (8) financial and 
regulatory filings made to the Securities & Exchange Commission, (9) the www.harrahs.com 
website and (10) industry association and other publicly-available data about Harrah’s and 
service development. 
Formal Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Over the course of 7 months (April to November 2006), I conducted 24 interviews with 
senior executives at Harrah’s.  Most of these interviews took place in person either in Boston or 
in Las Vegas at the company’s corporate offices.  Several of the interviews were conducted 
telephonically.  Interviewees included managers in operations, IT, food & beverage, property 
management, brand marketing, relationship marketing, finance, and divisional management (see 
table below).  The interviews were semi-structured in that they were based on an interview guide 
that consisted of both specific and open-ended questions.  The questions were designed to 
generate undirected discussion about various topics, with no preconceived notions of what would 
be discussed beyond the general topic.  An abbreviated replication of the interview guide follows 
the interviewee list.  It is worth noting here that questions specifically about customer 
involvement in the development process were intentionally excluded so as not to solicit what was 
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sought.  All interviews were recorded and transcribed, resulting in approximately 1700 pages of 
interview text.  In aggregate, these interviews represent more than 27 hours of discussion and are 
the primary source of data used in this dissertation. 
 
Table 31: Interviews Conducted 
Name Title Date(s) 
Tim Stanley Senior Vice President, Chief Information Officer April 16, 2006 
Chris Chang Director, Information Technology April 16, 2006 
Mike Effner Director, Information Technology April 26, 2006 
Mary Dossett Director, Gaming Technologies April 25, 2006 
Sandeep Khera Director, Operational CRM April 25, 2006 
Sunny Tara Director, Enterprise Architecture & Integration April 25, 2006 
Jason Pashko Director, Database Reinvestment & Analytics April 25, 2006 
Ken Weil Senior Vice President, Gaming  April 25, 2006 
David Norton Senior Vice President, Relationship Marketing April 25, 2006 
Steve Pinchuk Vice President, Revenue Management April 25, 2006 
Joseph Flippen Director, Consolidated Operations Analysis April 25, 2006 
Patti Lee Senior Architect, Information Technology April 25, 2006 
Greg Gamsky Director, IT Solutions April 25, 2006 
Marc Oppenheimer Vice President, Marketing (Joliet, IL property) August 14, 2006 
George Dittmann Director, Customer Insight August 15, 2006 
Katrina Lane Vice President, Channel Marketing August 15, 2006 
Sherri Pucci Assistant General Manager, Grand Casino Tunica August 16, 2006 
John Bruns Vice President, Customer Satisfaction Assurance August 21, 2006 
Melissa Price Vice President, Slot Service & Operations August 21, 2006 
Gerry Tuthill Vice President, Table Games August 21, 2006 
Don Marrandino Regional President,  
Harrah’s Las Vegas and Flamingo Las Vegas 
August 21, 2006 
Karin Matthews Director, Gaming Operations August 24, 2006 
Walter Coffey Director, Food & Beverage Design August 25, 2006 
Jay Snowden General Manager, Showboat Atlantic City September 1, 2006 
 
 
 
The Interview Guide 
1. Please provide a brief background of your professional history both within and before Harrah’s. 
2. Describe your role within your department and more generally at Harrah’s.  To whom do you 
report?  What are the main functions and tasks that you seek to achieve? 
3. With which other groups at Harrah’s do you find yourself frequently working?  How? 
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4. How does your function “happen” or get accomplished? (i.e. process)  Please use an example 
or two if possible… 
5. How do you fit into Harrah’s overall corporate strategy? 
6. Can you describe an example of a new service with which you were involved?  
a. How was the concept developed? 
b. Describe how different groups interacted during the development process. 
c. What role did experimentation and/or controlled testing play? 
 
  
Informal Discussions 
 
In addition to the formal semi-structured interviews, I also had several informal 
discussions with various Harrah’s executives.  While these discussions were not recorded or 
transcribed, I did take notes during them and they served as useful background information 
gathering opportunities.  These informal discussions were particularly helpful in identifying who 
within Harrah’s was worth interviewing, as well as projects worth investigating.  In many ways, 
these informal discussions helped lay the groundwork for much of the formal data-gathering 
efforts and provided a map of the organization and the appropriate individuals within it to focus 
upon.  Although I did not meticulously monitor data about these discussions, they probably 
represent approximately 6 hours of discussions and hundreds of pages of notes. 
Public Presentations 
 
Another source of information about Harrah’s that proved to be useful was public 
presentations by senior Harrah’s leaders.  Most of these public presentations were either given by 
Chief Executive Officer Gary Loveman, Chief Financial Officer & Treasurer Jonathan Halkyard, 
or by Chief Information Officer Timothy Stanley.  Included among these presentations were the 
annual shareholder’s meeting presentation, investor relations presentations, and 
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conference/convention presentations.  These presentations were particularly helpful in framing 
the company’s external image as well as Harrah’s self-description of accomplishments, 
challenges, and the focus of management attention.  Several of them provided hard data on the 
company’s service development efforts as well.  In aggregate, these public presentations 
provided hundreds of pages of material. 
Other Interviews 
 
Given the relatively-unusual background that Gary Loveman brought to the gaming 
industry, several insightful interviews about him and Harrah’s have been published in trade 
journals or broadcast on television.  Several of these were particularly useful and insightful in 
providing appropriate context for the impact of Loveman’s strategy upon both Harrah’s and the 
industry.  Especially noteworthy is the interview by Dylan Rattigan on CNBC’s ON 
ASSIGNMENT special episode entitled “Las Vegas, Inc.”   Another noteworthy interview is the 
March 2003 McKinsey Quarterly discussion with Gary Loveman.   
Follow-up Conversations 
 
 After all the interviews were conducted, I had dozens of follow-up conversations with 
various executives at Harrah’s.  These follow-up conversations were motivated by the need for 
greater understanding regarding a specific topic or subject.  Most of these conversations took 
place over the telephone and were focused discussions targeting my desire to dive deeper into a 
topic the interviewee had referenced in an earlier conducted formal interview.  Often, these 
conversations were utilized to plug “holes” in a story that had emerged (albeit not completely) in 
the interview transcripts.  Several—but for logistical reasons, not all—of these conversations 
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were recorded and transcribed.  The table below summarizes the follow-up interviews that took 
place, including the dates and topics of discussion. 
 
Table 32: Follow-up Interviews 
Name Topic Date(s) 
Tim Stanley Project updates; Requests for additional data; 
Discussion of whom within Harrah’s I should be 
approaching for various topics; semi-structured 
interview. 
April 24, 2006 
June 6, 2006 
October 26, 2006 
January 8, 2007 
Chris Chang Project updates; customer involvement; semi-
structured interview. 
October 26, 2006 
January 8, 2007 
David Norton Seven Stars Program, Same Day Cash Back, 
Domestic Asian Hospitality Program 
November 6, 2006 
Sandeep Khera Operational CRM November 6, 2006 
John Bruns CSA Scores, BARS, Luckiness of Casinos November 7, 2006 
Greg Gamsky IT implementations of various services November 8, 2006 
Melissa Price Slot Service Dispatch System November 9, 2006 
 
Gary Loveman’s Articles & Speeches 
 
While a professor at the Harvard Business School, Loveman co-authored a piece that has 
proven particularly influential on Harrah’s strategy.  Several executives with whom I spoke made 
reference to the Harvard Business Review article entitled “Putting the Service Profit Chain to 
Work.”  As a glimpse of the strategic backdrop through which Loveman set Harrah’s strategy, 
this article is very insightful.  Although written in 1994, the article clearly lays out a strategy of 
increasing customer satisfaction to drive loyalty and increasing profitability.  In addition to that 
article, Loveman also authored another Harvard Business Review article in 2003 entitled 
“Diamonds in the Data Mine.”  This second article was written shortly after Loveman was 
promoted to Chief Executive Officer of Harrah’s and describes the data-analytic approach he and 
Harrah’s have taken to the entertainment service industry.   
Finally, I had the opportunity to review several of the speeches Gary has given at industry 
trade shows, investment conferences, the annual shareholder’s meetings, key management 
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meetings, and corporate gatherings, etc.  These proved useful as well as they provided the 
“perspective from the top.”   Two particular speeches by Loveman standout as noteworthy: (1) 
“The Journey” was a speech given by Gary Loveman to the senior management community of 
Harrah’s on the day following the closing of the acquisition of Caesar’s Entertainment during the 
Summer of 2005, (2) “On the Brink of Something Big” was a speech given by Gary Loveman at 
the Fall 2005 Key Management Meetings seminars held at Bally’s in Las Vegas for company-
wide senior management of Harrah’s.  Both of these speeches provided extraordinary insight into 
Loveman’ strategic vision for Harrah’s and the company’s focus on service delivery as well as 
his take on the competitive dynamics facing the industry.   Both were recorded, transcribed and 
coded. 
Internal Presentations 
 
Harrah’s managers shared with me several dozen internal presentations made by and to 
internal working groups and senior management committees.  Most (although not all) of the 
presentations I reviewed were specifically generated either by or with the help and cooperation 
of the IT department: the topics addressed in these presentations include project reviews, pilot 
study results, and analytics associated with marketing programs.  Other presentations discussed 
topics such as food and beverage operations and reservation management procedures and 
systems.  Several presentations described forthcoming service innovations and how the 
management team had planned the process of designing, introducing, and measuring the new 
service.  In aggregate, these presentations represent several hundred pages of material and 
contain insightful graphical interpretations of new service projects. 
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Financial and Regulatory Filings 
 
Given that Harrah’s has been a publicly-traded company for quite a long time period, 
there are mountains of data available via filings made with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission as well as press releases and earnings results announcements.  The annual reports 
published between 1995 and 2005 proved particularly useful in shedding light upon how the 
company’s service strategy was developed.  Other data (quarterly reports, merger documents, 
etc.) were reviewed on an as-needed basis and provided useful details on various historical 
matters.  In addition to the financial filings, press releases provided data on the company’s 
activities in an “ongoing” sense.    As one might imagine, ten years of SEC filings for a company 
as large as Harrah’s represents an extraordinary amount of data.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I effectively discarded all information that was focused only on financials and 
primarily focused upon the qualitative textual material found in annual filings such as the annual 
report or the SEC Form 10-K. 
Harrahs.com Website 
 
The company’s website has a plethora of information, ranging from a detailed corporate 
history to information relating to practices, management biographies, and various consumer 
facing services.  In addition to being an information source about the company, the website also 
provides spectacular details on the various offerings and services available at particular 
properties, details of the Total Rewards program, special entertainment promotions, etc.  An 
additional area of the website that has proven to be extraordinarily insightful into the company’s 
service strategy is the “careers” section.  This section of the website provided data on the hiring 
process at Harrah’s and the approach taken by management to filling different positions.   The 
career section also presents a strategy and vision of the company that, because it is not explicitly 
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targeting consumers, was another data-point on the company’s actual service strategy (vs. the 
marketing-oriented or investor-oriented perspective found in other data). 
Direct and Participant Observation 
 
 During several of my visits to Las Vegas to interview senior Harrah’s executives, I spent 
several hours watching customers interact with slot machines and Harrah’s employees.  Melissa 
Price, Vice President of Slot Service and Operations for Harrah’s Entertainment, also organized 
a session during which I was able to directly observe the Slot Service Dispatch Service in action 
(see below for more details) and speak directly with slot service dispatchers as well as Service 
Ambassadors at the Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas.  The other noteworthy direct observation 
opportunities I had during the course of this research were provided by Don Marrandino, General 
Manager of the Flamingo Las Vegas and the Harrah’s Las Vegas.  In addition to providing me a 
“back of house” tour, Don was also kind enough to arrange for me to observe a “buzz session” at 
the Flamingo Las Vegas main cashier cage.  In addition to these (and other) direct observations, I 
also acquired data as a participant at the Harrah’s Las Vegas, The Rio All-Suites, The Flamingo, 
Paris, and Caesar’s Palace properties.  Not only did I sign up and become a member of the Total 
Rewards loyalty program, but I was directly responsible for generating (as a customer) $130 of 
gross gaming revenue for Harrah’s over my three trips to Las Vegas.127  
Industry Association and Publicly-Available Data  
 
The final source of information I was able to leverage for data utilized in this case study 
was publicly available data contained in articles, industry association reports, publicly-
disseminated industry association data, etc.  One very useful source of information was the 
                                                 
127 Note: This “research expense” was not borne by MIT, the National Science Foundation, or the Center for Digital 
Business @ MIT.  Rather, these “expenses” were absorbed directly by this author’s personal accounts. 
American Gaming Association’s annual Survey of the Casino Industry, a series of documents 
published yearly which contain a broad variety of gaming industry data.  Finally, the other 
publicly available data that proved to be informative was found on www.google.com, 
ABI/INFORM, ProQuest, Lexis/Nexis, Business Source Elite, and other online databases of 
corporate information and trade journal articles.   In aggregate, these sources represent hundreds 
of pages of textual material. 
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Return on Invested Capital (“ROIC”) Calculation Methodology 
 
(The following is an excerpt from the Bear Stearns August 2006 Gaming & Lodging: 
Revisiting ROICs & The Value-Valuation Relationship report.) 
 
ROIC METHODOLOGY 
 
There are numerous ways to calculate an ROIC.  Our method slightly differs from the 
methods used by some of the companies in our coverage universe, but yields similar 
results. 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, we defined the “Return” portion as recurring, tax-
affected EBIT plus depreciation and amortization, less maintenance CAPEX.  Our 
rationale is to approximate the recurring, un-leveraged cash income which the 
companies in our coverage universe generate.  For this reason we begin with EBIT (i.e. 
recurring operating income, adjusted for non-cash and one-time items), as it excludes 
the effects of interest income and non-operating charges.  We then add back 
depreciation and amortization, given the non-cash nature of these expenses.  That said, 
we realize that asset-heavy companies in our coverage universe are subject to the true 
economic cost of the physical plant deterioration.  We therefore subtract maintenance 
CAPEX from our return calculation, to account for the amount of capital required for 
physical upkeep of PP&E (i.e. not including expansion capital). 
 
We define “Invested Capital” as total assets less current liabilities.  We begin with the 
total asset base – i.e. whether funded by debt or equity—in order to appropriately gauge 
returns on un-leveraged cash flows—i.e. returns to which both stock and bond holders 
are entitled.  We then reduce total assets by current liabilities to derive net invested 
capital.  Our rationale for subtracting current liabilities is that these partially offset 
current assets needed for day-to-day operations.  In short, we consider only the excess 
of current assets over current liabilities (i.e. the working capital required) part of the 
capital base. 
 
We realize that our calculation of ROICs does not adjust the capital base for write-offs 
or take into account inter-company differences in the definition of maintenance CAPEX 
(i.e. certain companies define a much larger percentage of total CAPEX as 
maintenance related). 
 
Nevertheless, we believe that results of our analysis are valid directional indicators of 
company returns, and feel that the simplicity and homogeneity of our calculation makes 
for transparency and easy comparability between the companies in our coverage 
universe. 
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